Amos Pinchot

Amos Pinchot

Amos Pinchot blev født i 1863. Søn af en velhavende forretningsmand, Pinchot studerede jura i New York City. I 1900 blev han gift med Gertrude Minturn. Parret havde to børn, Rosamund og Gifford. Pinchot havde venstreorienterede synspunkter og hjalp i 1911 med at etablere det radikale tidsskrift Masserne.

I 1912 var Pinchot med til at danne det progressive parti. Senere samme år blev Theodore Roosevelt og Hiram Johnson partiets kandidater til præsidentvalget. Det foreslåede program omfattede kvinders stemmeret, direkte valg af senatorer, antitrustlovgivning og forbud mod børnearbejde. Ved at vinde 4.126.020 stemmer besejrede Roosevelt William H. Taft, den officielle kandidat for det republikanske parti. Han fik dog færre stemmer end Demokratiske Partis kandidat, Woodrow Wilson.

Pinchot mente, at den første verdenskrig var forårsaget af det imperialistiske konkurrencesystem. Dette var synspunktet udtrykt af Masserne. I juli 1917 hævdedes det af myndighederne, at artikler af Floyd Dell og Max Eastman og tegnefilm af Art Young, Boardman Robinson og H. J. Glintenkamp havde overtrådt spionageloven. Under denne handling var det en lovovertrædelse at offentliggøre materiale, der underminerede krigsindsatsen. Den retslige handling, der fulgte, tvang tidsskriftet til at ophøre med at offentliggøre. I april 1918, efter tre dages overvejelser, undlod juryen at blive enige om mændenes skyld.

Den anden retssag blev afholdt i september 1918. John Reed, der for nylig var vendt tilbage fra Rusland, blev også anholdt og sigtet for de oprindelige tiltalte. Denne gang stemte otte af de tolv nævninge for frifindelse, og de tiltalte gik fri den 5. oktober 1918.

Pinchot skiltes fra sin første kone og giftede sig med Ruth Pickering i 1919. Parret fik to børn, Mary Pinchot og Antoinette Pinchot. Regelmæssige besøgende i hjemmet omfattede Mabel Dodge, Crystal Eastman, Max Eastman, Louis Brandeis og Harold Ickes.

I 1920 blev to italienske immigranter, Nicola Sacco og Bartolomeo Vanzetti, anklaget for at have myrdet en skofabriks lønmodtager i Braintree, Massachusetts. Pinchot og hans kone var overbevist om, at de to mænd var uskyldige og brugte meget tid og kræfter på at få dem løsladt.

Pinchot støttede sin ven, Robert La Follette, kandidaten for det progressive parti ved præsidentvalget i 1924. Selvom La Follette og hans løbepartner, Burton K. Wheeler, fik støtte fra fagforeninger, Socialistpartiet og aviskæden Scripps-Howard, vandt La Follette kun en sjettedel af stemmerne.

Pinchot arbejdede i flere år på to bøger, Big Business in America og The History of the Progressive Party. Bøgerne blev dog ikke udgivet i hans levetid.

Oprindeligt støttede han Franklin D. Roosevelt og New Deal. Han var imidlertid imod sit forsøg på at kontrollere Højesteret. I april 1937 fik Pinchot et brev offentliggjort i New York Times hvor han kritiserede Roosevelts styreform "der placerer arbejdskraftens, industriens og landbrugets skæbne i et bureaukrati kontrolleret af en mand ... Jeg er tvunget til at konkludere, at ... du ønsker en diktators magt uden navnets ansvar . "

Pinchots datter fra hans første ægteskab, Rosamund Pinchot, blev skuespillerinde. Selvom hun kun optrådte i en Hollywood -film, fik hun dele i flere franske film. Hun led dog af depression, og i 1938 begik hun selvmord. Pinchot var ødelagt og kom aldrig helt ud af denne tragedie.

Pinchot beholdt sine pacifistiske synspunkter og hjalp i september 1940 med at oprette America First Committee (AFC). America First National Committee omfattede Robert E. Wood, John T. Flynn og Charles A. Lindbergh. Tilhængere af organisationen omfattede Burton K. Wheeler, Hugh Johnson, Robert LaFollette Jr., Hamilton Fish og Gerald Nye.

AFC blev hurtigt den mest magtfulde isolationistiske gruppe i USA. AFC havde fire hovedprincipper: (1) USA skal bygge et uigennemtrængeligt forsvar for Amerika; (2) Ingen fremmed magt eller gruppe af magter kan med succes angribe et forberedt Amerika; (3) Det amerikanske demokrati kan kun bevares ved at holde sig uden for den europæiske krig; (4) "Aid short of war" svækker det nationale forsvar i hjemmet og truer med at involvere Amerika i krig i udlandet.

AFC påvirkede den offentlige mening gennem publikationer og taler, og inden for et år havde organisationen 450 lokale kapitler og over 800.000 medlemmer. AFC blev opløst fire dage efter, at det japanske luftvåben angreb Pearl Harbor den 7. december 1941.

Pinchot blev mere og mere deprimeret af fremskridtet i Anden Verdenskrig, og i sommeren 1942 skar han sine håndled. Han overlevede dette selvmordsforsøg, men hans helbred kom sig aldrig og tilbragte resten af ​​sit liv på hospitalet.

Amos Pinchot døde af lungebetændelse i februar 1944.


Tidligt liv og uddannelse

Pinchot blev født i Paris af episkopalske forældre. Hans far var James W. Pinchot, en succesrig New York City tapethandler og tilhænger af bevaringsbevægelsen, og hans mor var Mary Eno, datter af en af ​​New Yorks rigeste ejendomsudviklere, Amos Eno. Hans søskende var bevaringslederen Gifford Pinchot og Antoinette E. Pinchot, der senere blev gift med Alan Johnstone. [1]

Pinchot blev uddannet på Yale, hvor han var medlem af det hemmelige selskab Skull and Bones, [2]: 88–9 Han tog eksamen med en Bachelor of Arts -grad i 1897. I 1898 tilmeldte Pinchot sig ved Columbia University for at studere jura. Senere samme år forlod han skolen for at kæmpe i den spansk -amerikanske krig. Pinchot meldte sig ind i det første New York Volunteer Cavalry og tjente i Puerto Rico. Efter krigen sluttede han på New York Law School i 1899 og blev optaget i advokatforeningen i New York i 1900. [3] [4]


Progressionspartiets historie 1912-1916

Pinchot, Amos R.E. Hooker, Helene Maxwell (red.)

Udgivet af New York University Press, 1958

Brugt - Indbundet
Tilstand: rimelig

Indbundet. Tilstand: rimelig. Støvjakke Tilstand: Dårlig. 305 sider. Ex-bibliotek med typiske mærker, slid på hylden, sider tonet revnet forreste hængsel, men et godt læsekopi. Jakken har nogle falmnings- og slidpletter, der skrives på frontklappen, der er fastgjort inde i betrækene. Theodore Roosevelt, Robert M. LaFollette osv. Tilgængelig mængde: 1. Vægt afsendt: Standardvægt. Kategori: Amerikansk historie Inventory No: 146186.


Personligt liv

Den 14. november 1900 giftede Pinchot sig med Gertrude Minturn i St. George's Episcopal Church i New York City. Minturn var den ældste datter af shippingmagnat Robert Bowne Minturn Jr. og hans kone Sarah Susannah Minturn (født Shaw). Γ ] De fik to børn, Rosamond og Gifford Pinchot. Parret blev skilt i 1918. Δ ]

I august 1919 giftede Pinchot sig med magasinforfatteren Ruth Pickering. Ε ] Med Pickering ville Pinchot have to børn mere: Mary Eno (senere Mary Pinchot Meyer) og Antoinette "Toni" Pinchot. Ζ ]


Amos Pinchot - Historie

Katharine Meyer Graham ejede Washington Post avis. Hun var datter af Eugene Meyer, formand for “Federal ” Reserve. [1] (Virkelig ikke føderalt, men privatejet.)

Cord Meyer var en top CIA -embedsmand. Hans far, Cord Meyer Sr., var diplomat og ejendomsudvikler. [2]

Det er fristende at forstå, at Katharine Meyer og Cord Meyer var i slægt. Et overfladisk udseende viser imidlertid ingen sammenhæng.

Cord Meyer blev gift med Mary Eno Pinchot i 1945. Mary Eno Pinchot var datter af Amos Pinchot. Amos Pinchot var medlem af Yale ’s Skull and Bones hemmelige samfund. [3] Cord Meyer var medlem af Yale ’s Scroll and Key hemmelige samfund. [2]

Mary Pinchot blev skilt fra Cord Meyer i 1958. [2]

Mary Pinchot, frigivet fra Cord Meyer, gik på en eventyrlig sti. Hun var i det høje samfundsmiljø, og jeg mener det høj. Hun og andre kvinder i et højt samfund eksperimenterede med sindsændrende stoffer i begyndelsen af ​​1960'erne. De fik deres marihuana og LSD fra Timothy Leary, professor i psykologi ved Harvard. [4]

Den svingende tressere Mary Pinchot blev præsident John F. Kennedys (JFK) sande kærlighed. Hun var hans LSD Madonna. De to lovebirds røg marihuana og prøvede endda LSD. [4]

En bog – Katharine den Store: Katharine Graham og The Washington Post (af Deborah Davis) – fortalte om disse og andre shenanigans, men blev undertrykt. Forfatteren, Deborah Davis, hævdede, at kilden bag Watergate -skandalen, populært kendt som Deep Throat, var en CIA -officer ved navn Richard Ober. [5]

Wisenheimers kan måske komme ind nu og sige: "Kom nu, Ersjdamoo. Vi ved det nu Deep Throat var FBI associeret direktør Mark Felt. ” Undtagen vi ved det nu publikum faktisk ikke ved det. De dybt vidende er dog klar over, at Mark Felt ikke var Deep Throat.

Det Ædelsten filer sige, at Deep Throat var Katharine Meyer Graham! I mellemtiden tilbage ved Washington Post, Katharine Meyer ‘Deep Throat ’ Graham havde fodret [Bob] Woodward og [Carl] Bernstein information til deres artikler. ” (Gemstone 10: 1) [6]

Deep Throat i Ukrainegate -affæren er sandsynligvis CIA -analytiker Eric Ciaramella. Hans “LSD Madonna ” (ikke medbringende egentlig LSD i dette tilfælde) skulle være ukrainsk-amerikansk aktivist Alexandra Chalupa. [7]

Deep Throat II er “ whistleblower ” i Ukrainegate. Tweeted præsident Donald Trump den 1. november 2019: “ Whistlebloweren må stå frem for at forklare, hvorfor hans beretning om telefonopkaldet med den ukrainske præsident var så unøjagtig (svigagtig?). ”


Amos Pinchot Nettoværdi

Amos Pinchot skønnede nettoværdi, Løn, Indkomst, Biler, Livsstil og mange flere detaljer er blevet opdateret nedenfor. Lad os tjekke, Hvor rig er Amos Pinchot i 2019-2020?

Ifølge Wikipedia er Forbes, IMDb og forskellige online ressourcer den berømte berømthed Amos Pinchot's nettoværdi 1-5 millioner dollars, før han døde. Amos Pinchot tjente pengene som professionel berømthed. Amos Pinchot er fra Forenede Stater.

Amos Pinchot ’s Nettoværdi:
1-5 millioner dollars

Anslået formue i 2020$ 1- $ 3 millioner
Forrige års nettoformue (2019)Under gennemsyn
Årlig lønUnder gennemsyn.
IndkomstkildePrimær indkomstkilde Berømthed (erhverv).
Netværdi -verifikationsstatusIkke verificeret


Amos Pinchot - Historie

Hans studier blev afbrudt af den spansk-amerikanske krig, hvor han tjente i Puerto Rico som menig i det 1. New York Volunteer Cavalry. Han meldte sig, fordi han følte, at Spanien udnyttede Cuba. Hans far kunne let have arrangeret en kommission som officer, men Amos nægtede.

Efter krigen vendte han tilbage til sin uddannelse og blev optaget i baren i New York i 1900. Han blev hurtigt udnævnt til stedfortrædende assisterende distriktsadvokat for New York County, men forlod stillingen et år senere. Da han ikke kunne lide den almindelige retspraksis, tog han derefter kun sager, der var relevante for hans personlige årsager.

Forvaltningen af ​​familieboerne blev et stort ansvar. Amos var i høj grad efterfølgeren til sin far som offentligt livlig borger i New York City. Også han elskede kunsten, tjente som tillidsmand for New York Philharmonic Society og pressede på for moral i regeringen. Hans politiske foreninger matchede hans brors og Theodore Roosevelt, hans klubmedlemmer, som hans far havde. I sine tidlige år brugte han en betydelig mængde tid på velgørende formål, tjente som leder af Manhattan State Hospital for Insane og som kurator for University Settlement, Association for Improving the Foor's Condition og the Orthopedic Hospital.

Ligesom sin far, Gifford og Theodore Roosevelt, var Amos dedikeret til reform og lettelse for de mindre heldige, men indså hurtigt, at de spørgsmål, der var på spil, var dybere, end velgørende tilgange kunne løse. I 1910 besluttede han, at hans indsats hidtil kun havde behandlet symptomerne på social sygdom, ikke årsagerne. Denne åbenbaring gjorde ham til en af ​​de mest nidkære reformatorer i det 20. århundrede.

Det spørgsmål, der bragte ham fuldt ud i politisk aktivitet, var Ballinger-Pinchot-kontroversen, den offentlige strid mellem hans bror, Gifford og indenrigsministeren om kulfelter i Alaska. Ballinger ønskede at returnere jorderne til det offentlige område. Oprettet syntes Pinchot, at det var som at overdrage kyllinger til ræven, i dette tilfælde store kulinteresser. Om Amos rolle sagde Gifford:

& quot [Han var] manden, som jeg naturligvis henvendte mig til først. Han kunne naturligvis ikke optræde som min formelle repræsentant. Ikke desto mindre var hans råd og hans hjælp uvurderlig. Han var uundværlig og var især nyttig til at få fakta til offentligheden. & quot

Kontroversen blev et vendepunkt for Amos. Han forberedte briefs, frembragte beviser og vidner og holdt pressen klæbet til problemerne. På ægte Pinchot -måde konkluderede Amos, at store økonomiske interesser var bøjet til at dominere offentlige arealer, ressourcer og politiske institutioner for at tjene deres egne egoistiske formål. For ham drejede kontroversen sig om politisk etik og tjente til at oplyse offentligheden om den trussel, der udgjorde af uregulerede og uansvarlige indehavere af finansiel magt.

Kontroversen etablerede også for Amos en række vigtige og varige venskaber med førende progressive politikere, herunder Louis D. Brandeis og senatorer Jonathan P. Dolliver, Albert Beveridge, A.B. Cummins og M.E. Clapp. Men vigtigst blandt hans nye og nære venner var senator Robert La Follette, hvis liberale politiske filosofier og kompromisløse principper var meget i overensstemmelse med hans egen.

Efter 1910 hjalp Amos og Gifford med at danne det progressive fløj af det republikanske parti og til sidst det progressive parti. Amos var midtpunktet i det, han kaldte partiets & quotradiske kerne. & Quot Theodore Roosevelt foretrak at kalde det & quotlunatiske udkant. & Quot; Filosofisk stod Gifford sammen med Amos, men udøvede en vis politisk afstand fra sin bror til manøvreringsformål.

Amos og hans kohorter korsfarede for et komplet program for social og økonomisk reform, & quot befrielsen af ​​dette land fra særlige privilegier og chefregering, & quot Amos sagde. Deres politik gik på tværs af partigrænser, var kompromisløst reformistisk og løb tidligt i konflikt med de mere konservative progressive under ledelse af Roosevelt og George Perkins. Deres offentlige kamp i 1914 gjorde Amos til et af de mest kendte navne i Amerika og hjalp med at ødelægge det progressive parti.

Amos beskrev sig selv som en & quotliberal reformator. & Quot; Han mente, at almindelige mennesker blev holdt i elendighed af & quot; hensynsløs og tankeløs kommercialisme, & quot, at benægtelse af grundlæggende økonomisk og social retfærdighed i sidste ende ville føre til voldelig revolution. Hans & quotradicalisme & quot var efter hans opfattelse konservativ, for han ønskede at bevare landets politiske institutioner fra revolutionær ødelæggelse:

Det jeg forsøger på en ydmyg måde at hjælpe med at gøre, er at forhindre vold, uorden og elendighed ved at få folk til at se retfærdigheden i den almindelige mands krav om en bedre økonomisk position i dette land og den fuldstændige nytteløshed at benægte eller ignorerer dette krav. & quot

Han kæmpede for kollektive forhandlinger og strejkeretten og for offentligt ejerskab af strategiske naturressourcer og hvad han kaldte "naturmonopoler" som offentlige forsyningsselskaber, vandkraft og transportsystemer. Han ønskede at udelukke industrielle monopoler og rovdyrs praksis og afslutte misbrug som børnearbejde og tilsidesættelse af arbejdstagernes sundhed og sikkerhed.

Amos aktive arbejde i forbindelse med arbejdskraft og industrielle reformer førte til hans medlemskab af National Defense Council, organiseret for at forsvare arbejdere, der blev anholdt på tvivlsomme grunde til strejker eller andre aktiviteter. Det førte til to af hans vigtigste livslange korstog. Den ene var borgerlige frihedsrettigheder, der lå i kernen af ​​hans politiske filosofi. Han blev lige så fremtrædende i forsvaret af pacifister under første verdenskrig, som han havde været i forsvaret af arbejdere. Truslerne mod borgerlige frihedsrettigheder, han var vidne til under krigen, skyldes delvis hans rolle som grundlægger og medlem af forretningsudvalget for American Civil Liberties Union.

Amos modsatte sig amerikansk indtræden i Første Verdenskrig. Selvom det ikke var en pacifist og støttede en defensiv krig, betragtede Amos imperialistiske krige som skabninger af industrielle tyranner, der brugte dem til at fremme deres kontrol over folk og regeringer. Han troede, at arbejdstageres rettigheder til et anstændigt liv og sagde, at i regeringen var blandt de første krigsofre.

Oprindeligt en tilhænger af Franklin D. Roosevelt, Amos blev hurtigt mistroisk over for New Deal. Han frygtede, at regeringen ville erstatte særlige interesser i at dominere menneskers liv i stedet for helt at afskaffe sådan herredømme. I midten af ​​1930'erne kritiserede han New Deal åbenlyst, en position, der adskilte ham fra de fleste af hans tidligere progressive allierede, herunder (om disse spørgsmål om politisk filosofi) hans bror Gifford, der ikke desto mindre sluttede sig til ham for at støtte Roosevelts modstandere i 1936.

Amos troede på, at regeringen i sidste ende ville trække landet ind i en anden verdenskrig. Han fokuserede på det antimilitaristiske spørgsmål i slutningen af ​​1930'erne og blev fremtrædende en af ​​de tidlige forfattere og talere for America First Committee, mere generelt kendt som isolationister. Han fungerede som formand for udvalgets kapitel i New York. Dette, som så mange af hans andre korstog, kom til sorg, da USA gik ind i krigen.

Forfatteren til snesevis af publikationer om emnerne i hans livslange korstog og en samler af malerier og fine møbler, døde Amos i sit hjem i New York i 1944. På trods af sin ihærdige antimilitarisme forblev han stolt over sin egen krigstjeneste. Hans gravsten i familiens grund på Milford Cemetery er den, han havde ret til som veteran, og citerer hans tjeneste i krigen med Spanien.


Det Progressive Partis historie, 1912-1916

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Millionærreformatoren

Det er aftenen den 20. juni 1912 scenen, et stort værelse på Congress Hotel i Chicago. Omkring tyve mænd er til stede. Måske sidder en snes af dem omkring et stort bord. Andre spreder sig træt i lænestole eller læner sig op ad væggene. Den ene, en solid, beslutsom udseende fyr med tykke glas og et børstet overskæg, skrider grimt frem og tilbage i stilhed, som en grizzly i bur. Han er Theodore Roosevelt, og det er hans nærmeste politiske rådgivere. Alle er meget, meget vrede.

I et nærliggende auditorium bevæger den republikanske nationale konvention sig med den frygtelige sikkerhed for en damprulle mod udnævnelsen af ​​den velnærede William Howard Taft for en anden periode som præsident i USA. Alle mændene på hotelværelset mener, at denne nominering med rette tilhører Roosevelt, og at den bliver "stjålet" af et kynisk band af reaktionære politikere, der har brugt deres kontrol over festmaskineriet til at rumme nok ulovligt udvalgte delegerede til at forsikre udvalg af deres mand Taft. Roosevelt-mændene vil ikke tage dette liggende, de vil gerne køre deres kandidat på en tredjepartsbillet. Men de indser, at uden en masse penge ville en sådan plan være umulig. Frustration føder og intensiverer dermed deres vrede.

Det vokser sent, og alle er trætte. Samtale halter. Men gradvist er opmærksomheden centreret om to mænd, der har trukket sig tilbage til et hjørne. De taler spændt i hurtige hvisken. Den ene er forlaget Frank Munsey den anden, George W. Perkins, en tidligere partner i J. P. Morgan & amp Company. Ingen af ​​dem har haft megen politisk erfaring, men begge er meget rige og meget glad for Theodore Roosevelt. Nu fornemmer alle deres emne og indser dets betydning. Alle øjne er fokuseret i deres retning. Pludselig når de to millionærer en beslutning. De retter sig op og skrider hen over rummet til Roosevelt. Hver lægger en hånd på en af ​​hans skuldre. "Oberst," siger de enkelt, "vi ser dig igennem." Således er det progressive parti - "Bull Moose", som nogle vil kalde det - født.

Af disse to har Munsey relativt lille betydning i historien om moderne amerikansk reform. Han var hverken helt i sympati med Progressive mål eller endda særlig interesseret i dem. Hans tilknytning til Roosevelt var personlig, og det varede ikke meget ud over kampagnen i 1912. Perkins blev imidlertid en central skikkelse i den progressive bevægelses historie.

En central figur, men ikke en typisk, for intet enkelt menneske kan siges fuldstændigt at repræsentere den mangefacetterede, modstridende og uorganiserede massedrift til forandring. For eksempel var Perkins ikke, ligesom William Jennings Bryan, repræsentant for utilfredse landmænd, der var bange for tab af status og stigning i gigantiske selskaber, og han var heller ikke, som Roosevelt, en aristokrat, der slog til med de kommercielle kommercialisering af de nye industrimagasiner. Faktisk var han en del af den nye magtelite, som Bryans, født fattige, og Roosevelts, født rige, fandt så stødende og uforståelig i den progressive æra. Men Perkins var en forretningsmand med en højt udviklet social samvittighed og en følelse af, at tiderne krævede ændringer, hvis tidligere fremskridt skulle fortsætte i fremtiden. Dette var bestemt karakteristisk "progressivt". Uden at acceptere socialisternes argumenter havde han lært ikke at være bange for regeringens regulering eller for tanken om at "manipulere" med økonomien.

I de første år af dette århundrede delte mange forretningsmænd også dette generelle synspunkt. Men de fleste begrænsede deres politiske aktiviteter til at underskrive checks på kampagnetidspunkt, få var villige eller i stand til at lægge penge til side, kravle op på en sæbekasse og føre kampagne blandt politikerne og almindelige mennesker for det, de mente var rigtigt. Perkins gjorde disse ting. Han betalte en høj pris, og ikke kun i penge, men han havde ikke noget imod, at han havde korsfarerens ånd. Også dette var typisk "progressivt".

Ikke desto mindre betragtede mange mennesker, herunder nogle af dem på Roosevelts hotelværelse i Chicago, i 1912 Perkins fuldstændig malplaceret i en sådan samling af avancerede liberale. De kendte ham som højre hånd for den forhadte plutokrat JP Morgan som en glat, glat talende undskylder for monopolistiske selskaber som US Steel og International Harvester som en magtfuld forsikringschef, hvis "forbrydelser" var blevet "afsløret" af Charles Evans Hughes i den berømte Armstrong-forsikringsundersøgelse fra 1905. ∗ Med sine smukke, renskårne træk begyndte hans bølget brune hår kun at blive flækket med gråt i templerne og hans pyntede overskæg lignede han for meget, hvad han faktisk havde været et typisk drengemangel på Wall Street. Denne mand var mange gange millionær, mens han knap var fyrre - en kørende, aggressiv leder af mænd og penge. Han ejede en paladsagtig ejendom, Glyndor, med udsigt over Hudson ved Riverdale, han tilhørte New York Yacht Club og andre eksklusive organisationer. Hvad lavede Perkins sig som en reformator, associeret med en liberal som Teddy Roosevelt?

Faktisk var Perkins helt oprigtig i sin progressivisme. Som vi skal se, havde han alvorlige personlige svagheder som politisk leder, men denne mistanke om hans motiver afspejler kun forvirring, jalousi, fanatisme og småsindethed hos andre progressive reformatorer. Halvtreds år gammel i 1912, havde han påbegyndt sin karriere som femten som kontordreng på $ 25 om måneden i New York Life Insurance Company 'store myretue. Selvom han manglede selv begyndelsen på en gymnasial uddannelse, havde han demonstreret salgs- og ledelsesevner, der vandt ham et næstformandskab på tredive.

Fra forsikring gik han videre til virksomhedsfinansiering. Så engagerende og overbevisende var hans personlighed, at Pierpont Morgan tilbød ham et partnerskab til en værdi af millioner, første gang de mødtes. Som højre hånd for Morgan overvågede Perkins organisationen af ​​Northern Securities Company (det første store selskab, der blev angrebet af Roosevelt under Sherman Antitrust Act). Han fjernede kontrollen med Louisville og Nashville Railroad fra John W. "Bet-you-a-million" Gates. Han repræsenterede Morgan på Det Hvide Hus -konference, hvor den store kulstrejke i 1902 blev afgjort. Han var i den tykeste kamp, ​​hvor Morgan stoppede Wall Street-panikken i 1907, og han var Morgans mand i US Steel, hvor han i årevis var formand for det almægtige finansudvalg (se “Charlie Schwab bryder banken, ”Og” En løve på gaden ”, AMERICAN ARITAGE, april og juni, 1957).

I 1902 skabte Perkins også landbrugsmaskinernes "tillid", International Harvester Company. I en glimrende manøvre bragte han hovedejerne af de fire førende virksomheder, der fremstiller landbrugsmaskiner til New York. Alle disse mænd gik ind for en fusion, men personlige rivaliseringer i den stærkt konkurrencedygtige mejetærsker havde frustreret alle deres bestræbelser på at udarbejde en aftale. Ved at installere hver gruppe på et andet hotel for at afskrække dem fra at se hinanden, skyndte Perkins frem og tilbage og afviklede detaljerne i den nye kombination. Sådan var alle parters eventuelle tillid til hans retfærdighed, at da den endelige kritiske tildeling af aktier i det nye selskab blev foretaget, underskrev hovederne for de fire selskaber simpelthen deres navne til denne erklæring rettet til Perkins: "Vi lægger i dine hænder endelig bestemmelse af vores vurderingsværdier, særlig god vilje, skalering osv. osv. ” McCormicks og Deerings havde de øverste kontorer, men Perkins var i mange år den egentlige leder af skæbnen for International Harvester. Det var præmier som denne, de ikke ubetalte bekvemmeligheder ved et partnerskab i House of Morgan, som Perkins opgav, da han satte sig som korsfarer for reformer.

Var det virkelig så overraskende? Perkins havde altid besiddet eller, hvis man vil, lidt af en "gør-godt" -rekke. Hans far, også en forsikringsmand, havde været en socialrådgiver dybt involveret i forvaltningen af ​​drenges reformskoler. Han udviklede hos unge George en interesse for Y.M.C.A. og i forskellige religiøse organisationer. For familien Perkins havde salg af forsikringer været en måde at udføre en nyttig social service på samt at leve godt. Senere, da Morgan først tilbød ham udsigten til stor rigdom, hvis han ville komme ind i firmaet, afviste Perkins ham faktisk. Først da bankmanden beskrev de muligheder, jobbet ville byde på for at håndtere de komplekse sociale og økonomiske spørgsmål, der opstod ved fremkomsten af ​​gigantiske selskaber, gav Perkins et sympatisk øre.

Perkins erfaring med at styre store virksomheder gav ham en særlig interesse for arbejdsmarkedsforhold. I New York Life havde han udviklet et pensions- og overskudsdelingsprogram for bureaudirektører og sælgere. Dette program udvidede han kraftigt i stål- og høstvirksomhederne. Da han erkendte længe før tanken var almindelig, at manglen på kontakt og forståelse mellem arbejdstager og arbejdsgiver var en hovedårsag til dårlige arbejdsforhold i store virksomheder, forsøgte han at interessere arbejdere i at købe aktier i de virksomheder, der ansatte dem. Han udviklede en plan for U.S. Steel, hvorved en medarbejder, der investerede $ 82,50 i en andel af Steel Preferred, ryddet $ 125,0 på fem år - og stadig ejede aktien. Kritikere til venstre beskrev, at dette var en subtil måde at forhindre vækst i fagforeninger. Perkins afviste fagforeningernes grundlæggende overbevisning om, at der var en grundlæggende interessekonflikt mellem kapital og arbejdskraft, men han var ikke usympatisk over for organiseret arbejdskraft. På et tidspunkt foreslog han, at en stålarbejder skulle være i bestyrelsen, det hele var meget fremskredent for tiden.

Den nye reformators arbejde med giganter som New York Life og U.S. Steel havde overbevist ham om, at ren skævhed i erhvervslivet ikke var en forbrydelse, som "tillidsbusterne" argumenterede for, men en nødvendighed. Besparelserne som følge af storstilet drift, evnen til at se langdistancen, til at planlægge, dyrke forskning-dette gjorde det store selskab effektivt og dermed socialt ønskeligt. Konkurrence, loven om tand og klo, var rå, grusom, uciviliseret, mente Perkins. Antitrustlovene var forældede i stedet for at bryde giganterne op, regeringen burde simpelthen regulere deres aktiviteter. Moderne teknologi og massemarkeder gjorde ældre former for virksomhedsorganisation forældede. I stedet for konkurrence bør samarbejde være den moderne verdens ord. Perkins mente, at store virksomheder med deres tusinder af aktionærer virkelig var "offentlige" virksomheder. Virksomhedsledernes funktion som ham selv, sagde han i et foredrag ved Columbia University i 1908, var at bestemme "hvad der er fair og rigtigt mellem offentlighedens kapital, som de repræsenterer, og offentlighedens arbejde, som de ansætter."

Fra begyndelsen af ​​1911 brugte Perkins det meste af sin tid på at gå ind for disse ideer. Han accepterede taleforpligtelser over hele landet og skrev uophørligt om emnet. Uundgåeligt involverede hans korstog ham i politik, selvom han ikke havde forestillet sig at blive politiker, da han afbrød sine forretningsforbindelser.

Perkins havde altid været republikaner. Så sent som i 1908 havde han arbejdet aktivt for William Howard Taft mod Bryan. Men efter 1910 blev han mere og mere forfærdet over Tafts holdning til store virksomheder. Selvom præsidenten allierede sig generelt med de konservative, var han en bekræftet tillidsbuster. "Vi skal tilbage til konkurrencen," sagde han. "Hvis det er umuligt, lad os gå til socialisme, for der er ingen vej imellem." Perkins var overbevist om, at der var en "vej imellem": regulering af store selskaber af den føderale regering. Da Taft beordrede antitrustdragter mod både U.S. Steel og International Harvester, gik Perkins bestemt ind i oppositionen. Som de fleste liberale republikanere syntes han, at Roosevelt var det mest attraktive alternativ.

På trods af sin mangel på politisk erfaring blev Perkins formand for det nye Progressive eller "Bull Moose" -partiets forretningsudvalg. Faktisk var han Roosevelts kampagneleder, og han forsøgte at køre kampagnen på den måde, som en forsikringsmand driver et drive til nye forretninger. For ham var vælgerne ligesom forsikringstagerne og "udsigterne" i forsikringsverdenen. Et af det progressive partis store handicap var, at det kun havde "udsigter" i øjeblikket, og så begyndte en stor salgskampagne.

Perkins styrede kampen fra hovedkvarteret i New York og oversvømmede snart posterne med torrents af kampagnelitteratur. Three million copies of Roosevelt’s “Confession of Faith” were distributed. Countless other pamphlets followed. Perkins established a weekly magazine called the Progressive Bulletin , copied from a bulletin he had edited for years while working for New York Life. Like its prototype, it was full of slogans designed to inspire confidence in the faithful, along with “up-to-date, sledge-hammer arguments” to convince the doubtful. “What are you doing to help the Progressive party? Are you telling our story to every man and woman you meet?” Under Perkins the political “hard sell” reached a new peak.

It made for an exciting and hard-fought, if inevitably unsuccessful, effort. The fundamental fact of 1912 was that the Republicans had split while the Democrats remained united. Had the Democrats nominated a conservative like Champ Clark of Missouri, who almost won out at their convention, Roosevelt might have been elected, for 1912 marked the highwater mark of the Progressive wave. But with Woodrow Wilson in the fight, fresh from his triumphs as Governor of New Jersey, Progressives could choose between two appealing candidates. Wilson collected his full share of their votes, and together with the solid South and the “regular” Democrats of the North, this made an unbeatable combination.

The Bull Moosers were far from discouraged, however. Roosevelt ran a strong second, winning over 4,126,020 votes (to Wilson’s 6,296,547) and carrying six states, including California, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. He overwhelmed Taft, despite all the President’s advantages, so that the ample champion of the orthodoxy won only 3,486,720, or eight electoral votes. ** The future looked bright. “Progressive seed has been sewn on such a large area of soil that a pretty fair crop is bound to be the result ere long,” Perkins announced after the election.

But there was much to learn about politics, Perkins had discovered. Selling a candidate was not like hawking insurance. Some of the personal qualities that had made him a brilliant businessman proved only weaknesses when applied to politics. He found it impossible to subordinate himself to a team effort. The Bulletin had been his idea, and a good one, but he had made it far too much a vehicle for his views rather than for general Progressive policies and opinions. The first issue contained a full-page reprint of an editorial in the New York Journal praising his organizing ability. Two weeks later there was a long account of a petty argument between Perkins and Woodrow Wilson over the difference between Tammany Society and Tammany Hall. Two issues later came a lead article by Perkins on Wilson and the trust question.

It was natural enough for the Bulletin to stress the trust issue it was central to Perkins’ beliefs, and by 1912 Roosevelt was substantially in accord with Perkins’ idea that government regulation was the proper way to deal with giant corporations. But Perkins erred deeply when he allowed the Bulletin to devote such a disproportionate amount of space to the question and to print his name as often as it did. His aggressiveness irritated many loyal Progressives. The conservation expert Gifford Pinchot, for example, dubbed him “Gabby George,” and another supporter of T.R. claimed that the entire New York organization of the party “consisted of George W. Perkins and a push button.” Such criticism came as a profound shock to the political neophyte.

Another lesson that Perkins had to learn during the campaign was that the rough and tumble of politics is not for the tender-skinned. He had given up all his profitable business connections—his partnership in the Morgan firm alone was probably worth a million dollars a year—in order to work for public betterment. He believed utterly in the soundness of his crusade against the Sherman Antitrust Act certainly no one should question his motives, he thought. He had remained active in U.S. Steel and in International Harvester not to make money, for he drew no salary from either company, but because he felt that “these organizations are right from the viewpoint of modern ethics, just as I am sure they are necessary from the viewpoint of modern economics.” Yet now he found himself assailed as an unscrupulous and selfish capitalist seeking to use the government to benefit his pet monopolies.

Scarcely had Roosevelt been nominated by the Progressives when a Democratic congressman began to call Perkins “the chief intermediary” between big business and the Justice Department, the “minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary” of the Morgan interests. Even Woodrow Wilson, who did not stoop to mudslinging, was unusually forthright in attacking Perkins and his views. “These gentlemen say that these big combinations are necessary for economy and efficiency,” Wilson said in one speech. “The only answer I can think of that meets the suggestion is: Rats! Go tell all that to the Marines.”

Perkins was naturally angered by these criticisms, most of which questioned not only his beliefs but also his motives. It was particularly exasperating to be called a tool of the House of Morgan when in fact J. P. Morgan, Jr., was trying to force him off the Board of Directors of U.S. Steel! Morgan thought Perkins’ political activities “controversial” and likely to injure the corporation. Many other business leaders, of course, were horrified by Perkins’ views on government regulation of business, which they considered socialistic.

Perkins did not resign from U.S. Steel, then or later, nor did he alter his basic beliefs. Nevertheless, when the campaign was over he changed his political techniques considerably in the light of his 1912 experiences. He made an effort to conciliate Progressives, like Gifford and Amos Pinchot, who had criticized his leadership. In part the objections of these men had been ideological, for they were ardent advocates of trust busting. (Amos Pinchot once tried to write a book exposing the sins of U.S. Steel.) The party structure was revamped and critics of Perkins given important places in it. The Bulletin was transferred to other hands, both the trust question and Perkins’ name disappearing from its pages. A Progressive Service, to provide economic and sociological information useful in drafting legislation, was established.

Nevertheless, even his co-workers found it hard to accept Perkins’ leadership. Prejudices rising from his former business connections would not die down. “Perkins stands for nothing but rights of property,” a disgruntled Progressive from South Dakota complained. Nor could Perkins completely suppress what William Allen White called his “seven-devil lust to grab the drum and get up around to the head of the procession.” The business world had taught him to act decisively, but not how to give others a sense of participation.

It is extremely significant that, in Perkins, leadership looked more and more like dictatorship. Roosevelt started a third party because he felt that a small clique of professionals had stolen control of the G.O.P. Yet from start to finish, the Progressive organization itself was managed by a tiny inner circle. In the summer of 1912, delegates to the first Progressive convention were hand-picked by local caucuses in the traditional smoke-filled rooms at the climactic 1916 convention, Perkins and a few other leaders intrigued for days to prevent the delegates from nominating Roosevelt before the Republican convention had committed itself, although nearly every soul among them desired to do so at once. It was the methods, not the program, that soured the rank and file.

Of course there were other reasons why Roosevelt’s Bull Moose organization did not fulfill the high hopes of 1912 in succeeding years. Wilson’s New Freedom undermined the Progressive appeal by putting many of its proposals into effect. And the party lacked the patronage, prestige, and organization at the grass roots to sustain itself while out of power. Its one matchless asset was Roosevelt, yet after the outbreak of the European war the old Rough Rider rapidly lost interest in domestic affairs. First enthusiasm faded, then hope. By 1916 many Progressives were ready to go back to the Republicans on almost any terms. One of Perkins’ strengths was his continuing willingness to contribute time and money to the cause when others drifted away.

The story of the efforts of Progressive and Republican leaders to agree upon a common candidate in 1916 has already been told in these pages ( see “T.R. on the Telephone,” AMERICAN HERITAGE, December, 1957). Perkins arranged for the then-novel private telephone that connected the politicians in Chicago with Roosevelt in Oyster Bay, and paid the bill. But his main role was to keep the Progressives quiet until the Republicans could be persuaded to accept the apostate Roosevelt as their candidate. When compromise efforts failed, and when Roosevelt decided to support the Republican nominee, Charles Evans Hughes, Perkins went along with him reluctantly personally he had little use for Hughes.

The Progressives now disappeared as a party, and Roosevelt, the leader, devoted himself chiefly to assailing Wilson’s foreign policy. Perkins, on the other hand, was determined to keep fighting for the Progressive program within the Republican ranks. He persuaded Hughes to include six former Progressives—including himself—on the Republican campaign committee. Later, after Hughes’ narrow defeat of 1916, when the Old Guard seized control of the Republican Executive Committee, Perkins tried to organize a liberal revolt, an effort cut short by U.S. entry into the European war. The following year Perkins led the battle that resulted in the election of Will Hays, who was friendly to the former Progressives, as Republican National Chairman. It was in no small part because of Perkins that the Old Guard faction was held in check until the 1920 election. By that time Perkins was no longer alive to fight.

Unlike so many amateur politicians, Perkins was willing to work as hard on local and state questions as on “important” national problems. The 1915 revision of the New York State constitution (which he opposed) and the wartime New York City Food Committee (which he managed) are examples of his activities on these levels. In 1914 he traveled all the way to the Panama Canal Zone simply to try to persuade Colonel George W. Goethals, the engineer in charge of constructing the canal, to accept appointment as New York City Police Commissioner. Goethals did not come.

Perkins’ governing principle, in local and national politics and in business too, was that the people, if given a chance to understand fully, would always do whatever was right. This faith in democracy was typically “Progressive”—Bryan, it will be recalled, possessed it so utterly that he assumed automatically that the truth could be determined by counting noses. What distinguished Perkins’ faith in the people was his willingness to invest vast amounts of his own money in seeing that the public was fully informed. When he was battling for stricter food and price controls during the war, he spent thousands spreading his views.

His dedication to Jefferson’s great principle that the truth, if left to itself, would always prevail, was proved conclusively by an incident that occurred during the fight. He was challenged by Samuel Fraser of the New York Federation of Farm Bureaus. Perkins, Fraser said, was making unfair use of his wealth by flooding the state with huge advertisements which his opponent could not afford to match. Without a moment’s hesitation, Perkins offered to buy space in every paper in the state so that Fraser could present his arguments to the people. On September 27, 1917, Fraser’s indictment of Perkins was spread across the pages of 141 New York newspapers, at a cost to Perkins of $25,000.

This use of widespread advertising for political purposes was a new thing. Perkins, the trade paper Editor and Publisher commented in 1915, had “uncovered the 42-centimeter gun that from now on must be considered the master of the situation when it comes to carrying the redoubts of public opinion.” In all his political activities, as earlier in business, he was noted for boldness, imagination, and a willingness to use new and unconventional methods. When battling to keep down New York food prices in 1917, he discovered that there was a great run of smelts on the Pacific coast and bought over 100,000 pounds at four cents a pound. These he shipped to New York and sold to retailers at four and a half cents, on condition that they sell them to the public for not more than six. At that moment, Atlantic coast smelts were selling at about eighteen cents a pound.

The Great War affected Perkins profoundly, although not really until it was all over. Like any public-spirited citizen he worked hard during the conflict—at his Food Committee job and in raising money for the Y.M.C.A. But two events in late 1918 hit him with staggering force. One was the death of his son’s young wife in the flu epidemic. The other was an investigation he made of Y.M.C.A. activities overseas right after the Armistice. His experiences in France and Germany broadened and tempered his Progressivism. When first he saw the devastated areas of France he had seethed with rage against the Germans. But anger and revenge were futile in the face of so much misery and destruction.

When he stepped off the boat on his return to America, he told reporters that economic reconstruction seemed far more urgent than political. They asked him about the menace of Russian communism, and he said: “I don’t know what to say about Bolshevism in Europe. There are deep-seated troubles there. In Paris … people are paying $1 apiece for apples, and $3 a pound for butter.” When asked if, by feeding Russians and Germans, the Allies were not “nursing a viper in the breast,” he replied: “How are we going to cut out any one group of people?”

Realizing that the world was at a great turning point, Perkins searched hard for the path that “the man of the future” should take through the morass of postwar readjustment. There was much labor unrest a bitter strike was convulsing the steel industry and angry radicals were talking of sweeping changes in the order of things. “The questions that took me out of the banking business,” Perkins wrote his old friend Albert J. Beveridge, “are now coming to a head.” In December, 1919, in a lecture at Columbia University, he argued that the politicians of the future must “so frame our laws as to permit co-operative effort … conducted under proper regulation and control.”

Where national politics was concerned, Perkins was moved by the same vague and somewhat authoritarian desire to get at fundamentals and by a conviction that intense partisanship was out of place in modern society. When one politician suggested to him that the trend was running so strongly toward the Republicans that they could elect a “yellow dog” President in 1920, he replied by asking him icily “what use … a yellow dog would be to our country and the world at large in the handling of the momentous questions presenting themselves at this time.” And he lectured Senator Reed Smoot of Utah about the importance of “constructive thought” and the futility of “hot-air speeches.”

Such words had little effect on Smoot and the other leaders of the Republican party, who were then not at all interested in Perkins’ ideas about “proper regulation and control” of the economy. They gave the country Warren G. Harding and “normalcy.” But Perkins did not live to see what followed, for his health failed rapidly in the spring of 1920, and in June he died, victim of acute encephalitis complicated by a heart condition.

George Perkins had brains, money, enthusiasm, self confidence, and faith in the cause of reform. Even his enemies acknowledged his winning nature, his sincerity, his vivacity. “Anyone who knows him cannot help liking him,” his relentless foe Amos Pinchot confessed. Why then did he fail at reform? In part, the prejudices of lesser men undid him: they called him a tool of the “interests.” “If I had built a hospital “ or endowed a library with the money I spent,” he told one critic toward the end of his career, “many people would have risen up and called me blessed. I prefer to spend what money I am able in advancing measures that I believe are thoroughly in the public interest, and I intend to pursue this course.”

But Perkins was also partially responsible for his own failure. He was too headstrong to be successful in politics. His decisiveness and his dedication often led him to ignore others. When called to account, he liked to reply that every business must have a single head, and he could cite examples from his experience in industry to prove his point. The real nature of political democracy still escaped him: this was the paradox of Perkins’ life. He believed that progress depended upon men learning to work together, but he could not work in harness with others at the task of making a better world.

* The charges were later dismissed in a federal court after the politicking was over.

** In this election, the Socialist Eugene V. Debs received about 900,000 votes, the highest percentage of the total vote that party ever won.


Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, December 3, 1912

I want to write you apropos of our conversation about Perkins last Friday, because I feel that I can express myself more clearly in writing. If you care to show this letter to Perkins, I shall be glad to have you do so, as I know he will understand the spirit in which it is written, and as I do not want to say anything about him which I would not say to him.

In my opinion, it would be a serious, if not fatal, error to have him remain in the position of titular head of our party. And I firmly believe that if the facts are presented to Perkins, he will see this as plainly as many of us do and be the first in urging that he should withdraw from the Chairmanship of the Executive Committee.

I do not like to burden you, Colonel, with my anxieties. I know the burden you already carry in leading a great movement, in keeping us all together, and in planning for the future, is more than any man, however strong, should be asked to bear. But in this Progressive Party, with its thousands of earnest men and women giving their strength to the cause of humanity, and with the millions of struggling people who see some hope in a cause dedicated to economic justice instead of to politics, we have something so fine and so full of possibilities of real usefulness to our [page 2] country, that I feel justified in laying before you what seems to me so fearfully plain.

From the beginning of the organization of the Progressive Party, we have set a high standard and made the claim that we are going to something a little different and better than the old parties. We have frankly stated that we are not out for political victory only, but to establish social and economic justice. As Lincoln freed the chattel slave, so are we going to free the industrial slave. We have gone into battle singing hymns and announcing that we will stand at Armageddon and battle for the Lord. From the very beginning, we have framed our campaign rather as a crusade than as a political fight. In short, we have assumed a heavy responsibility toward the people and placed ourselves on a plane where any suspicion of insincerity would be utterly ruinous to the cause.

We speak more specifically, we are today solemnly pledged to carry on an active campaign against the system of exploitation which the trusts have fastened upon the American people. It is the same old struggle for economic justice which has gone on from the beginning of time, -- the few who are strong and rich and organized against the many who are poor, weak and unorganized. In the old days it was the Crown and the privileged group surrounding the Crown against the people. Today it is the industrial oligarchy, the trusts, against the people.

We have outlined a magnificent program. In the first place, we plan to have real popular government, and in the second place, we have [page 3] announced a campaign of social and industrial justice. Under the latter head we advocate decent hours of labor, minimum wage, industrial insurance, old age pension, safety devices, employers' liability, etc. All of these things will, we hope, make the lives of wage earners during their hours of labor safe and healthy. They will make our factories a better place to work in, labor safer, and old age more endurable. But all these reforms when established will be costly, and will make the production of the necessaries of life more expensive. If we put every one of these measures into practice, and do not at the same time prevent the trusts from simply shifting the burden of the additional cost of production on the to the shoulders of the people, as they have frequently done in the past, we will accomplish little or nothing. It will be as hard as ever for the average man and woman to pay for food, clothing or fuel. The wage-earner, though perhaps working under better conditions in the factories, will be as near starvation as ever in the home. We will help the consumer not at all. The trusts will continue to make a killing out of selling the sheer necessities of life at prices that they can ill afford to pay, and our whole program of social and industrial justice will be open to the criticism of woeful incompleteness, if not of insincerity.

We have got to meet this trust question frankly and immediately. It is the cost of living question, -- the bread question. If we weaken or falter in regard to it, our party will fail.

We cannot keep the people's confidence or support by preaching mere [page 4] palliatives. We have got to stand for something different and more fundamental than the old parties have stood for, or quit claiming that our cause is the cause of humanity and justice.

All of this is what you have seen and taught people to see. And each day they are seeing and feeling it more intensely. There is but one great issue in America, and that is the economic issue whether our industrial system shall serve or exploit the people.

The Republican Party has just crashed to the ground because it stood with the corporations instead of against them in this struggle.

The Democratic Party has just won a sweeping victory because the people hoped that it would fight the corporations instead of protect them. Nothing that Wilson did in his campaign gave him the confidence of the people to such an extent as his telegram in reply to Bryan's question whether he would stand for the election of Judge Parker, a corporation man, as temporary Chairman of the Democratic Convention.

We may have a party as highly organized as Perkins and Munsey's money and Perkin's great business ability can make it, -- perhaps as highly organized and perfectly [coordinated] as the G.O.P. sig selv. But unless we keep the great issue clear -- unless we make plain beyond a suspicion our stand on the great economic question, whether the trusts shall or shall not be allowed to exploit the people by dictating the terms upon which the people shall obtain food, fuel and clothing, we will lack a cause and our party will be a flash in the pan. I believe that under the circumstances the selection of a trust magnate as leader (titular or otherwise) of our [page 5] party would be bad politics and bad ethics. Mr. Perkins has been a director of the Steel and Harvester trusts. These two particular corporations are the ones whose unsocial and monopolistic practices have been most thoroughly exposed in the magazines, in the daily press, in the publications of the Survey and of the Sage Foundation, and in the investigations of two Congressional Committees. The Executive Committee of the Steel Trust of which Mr. Perkins I believe has been Chairman, has openly, and I think indefensibly been instrumental in stamping out labor unionism from the steel corporation. I understand that more or less of the same thing has gone on in the Harvester Trust. The record of both trusts in regard to their treatment of employees is public property today.

Since Mr. Perkins has been Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Progressive Party, he has been more active than any one man in any party in the defense of big business. His signed columns in the daily papers have been largely pleas in behalf of big business and [attempts] to show that big business is after all the people's best friend. He was quoted (I do not know whether accurately or not) in a public statement as advocating that the Industrial Commission called for in our platform should be made up of men like Mr. James J. Hill. He has shown bad judgement by attacking Bryan in the state of Colorado, by making himself and the justification of big business an issue everywhere, by circulating two pamphlets entitled, "Is Perkins Honest," and "Is Perkins Sincere?" And by offering to become our party's expositor of the trust question in a series of signed articles on Collier's, answering Brandeis. His unceasing [page 6] activity and his large contributions, together with Munsey's contribution, have given the impression that our party has fallen under trusts' and Wall Street influences in short, that Munsey and Perkins hold a kind of mortgage on the Progressive cause.

I realize that we should be and are most grateful for Perkins's tremendous generosity and hard effective organizing work. Any one that knows him cannot help liking him and admiring his energy, perseverance, and ceaseless industry. Personally, I believe that Perkins will not demand a controlling position in the party as a condition of remaining in it and working with it. I cannot believe that he, or any man who really cares for the Progressive Cause, would require a fifty-one percent. interest in the party, or refuse to take any interest at all.

Nothing that Perkins has done or said has suggested that he was not strictly on the level and acting conscientiously and in accordance with his deepest convictions. Nothing that we could give Perkins or do for him would be too great a reward for his hard work and financial support. But Perkins, like the rest of us, must be governed in this crisis by only one thing, -- the good of the party and the Progressive movement. It will be hard for him to relinquish a controlling position in the party, but hard things happen to all of the Progressive leaders. It was hard for you to go into this terrible [grueling] fight with the almost certain knowledge that you would be defeated, and hard for you to have been shot in the body at the end of it by a would-be assassin. It has been hard for Ben Lindsey to make his fight against the Evans-Guggenheim crowd hard for Heney and [page 7] Johnson in their struggle hard for Gifford wearing himself out in fifteen years of incessant effort for the cause of the people. But no man, whatever his services, can deserve anything from the party which will endanger the party's welfare or even its existence.

What I have mentioned above seems to me to contain serious objections to Perkins's leadership in the Progressive Party. I think he will see that himself if he is talked to plainly about it. But there is one matter in comparison with which I feel all others are minor considerations. Unless I am much mistaken, the episode of the elimination of the anti-trust plank from the Progressive platform is bound to come out, either at Chicago or subsequently. McCarthy's interview has started people talking, and anyhow, practically all of the Resolutions Committee are probably familiar with the facts.

If Perkins remains in a position of control it will be said that our party has chosen as its leader the man who went to Chicago and succeeded in having cut from our contract with the people the one clause which bound us to fight the trusts and protect the people. It will be said that he not only fought the anti-trust clause and succeeded in having it eliminated after the Committee on Resolutions had adopted it on the night before the platform was read, but that when the Committee put it back again and repassed it, and after he himself next day heard it read to the Convention and formally adopted, and after it had thus become actually and legally part and parcel of our platform, he was instrumental in once more having it out in defiance of the Convention's action.

In addition to this, it will be pointed out that, although our Convention [page 8] adopted the anti-trust clause and made it a part of our platform, and although you yourself were in favor of the plank and in essence embodied it in your speech to the Convention (and Perkins knew this to be the case, for he heard the plank read to the Convention by Dean Lewis, and he was familiar with your Convention speech), he caused to be printed and spread broadcast throughout the country a false version of the platform intentionally omitting the anti-trust clause.

We know what the result of this was. We were placed in a false and fatal position in regard to the whole trust question, and especially in regard to monopoly. Our sincerity was questioned. The Democrats scored upon us heavily. And in spite of the fact that your own position was right, and that our real platform was right, we could not justify our shortcomings and were obliged to spend every ounce of our energy in defending ourselves and explaining to the people that we stood for something which our contract with the people omitted, and that we were really not opposed to the prosecution of monopolistic and unsocial combinations.

On the whole, we came out of the trust controversy with only fair credit. What the result would have been if the facts of [Perkins's] fight against the anti-trust plank had come out during the campaign it is hard to say. But it is probable that there would have been an immediate crisis if it had become known that the omission of any reference to the anti-trust in our platform was not through inadvertence that an anti-trust in our platform was not through inadvertence that an anti-trust plank had been adopted by the delegates to the Convention, but cut at the instance of a director of the Steel and Harvester trusts., [page 9]

I believe that Perkins will see all of this as clearly as we do. I believe that he will see that the great essential in the Progressive Party is to keep our people together and develop an undivided, effective fighting force, united in personnel, but above all united in principles and policy. I believe that he will see that the probability of being able to do this is practically nil as long as the cause is led by a man who differs so radically with the majority of the party upon a fundamental question of policy, and who doesn't command the confidence (I do not mean personal confidence, but confidence in regard to the trust questions) of the rank and file and of the majority of the leaders of our party.

If the fight against Perkins on the ground that he unjustifiably emasculated our platform in the interest of big business is not made at Chicago next week, we are in serious danger of it being made at some time, for his leadership, unwelcome as it will be to a large element of the party, will surely result in discord, and this discord may at any time develop into an attack upon him on the grounds I have stated. We cannot stand such an attack and Perkins himself is the only man who can save us from it by doing the fine thing which I think he is willing to do, and putting us in a position where our cause will not have the sword of Damocles hanging forever over us.

In order to succeed as a party we must have a program representing an actual economic need of the people. This actual economic need of the people is today what is has always been since history's beginning, -- freedom from industrial exploitation at the hands of special privilege. [page 10] The only difference is that today, owing to the educational work which has been going on in this country since your first administration, the people know exactly what is the matter and are fully determined that something shall be done about it.

For us to go into this fight unnecessarily handicapped, weakened, and threatened by the leadership of a man whose record even up to and since the Chicago Conventions shows him to be unsympathetic to the cause as understood by the majority of the people, seems to me to be in first place unjust to the cause upon purely ethical grounds, and in the second place, to be political folly. No amount of financial support or organizing ability can for an instant counterbalance the loss of respect and the blow to the sincerity of our aims such an arrangement would result in.

You said to me the other day that it was folly to propose that Perkins should resign as Chairman of the Executive Committee until we had found someone else to take his place. It seems to me that it would be better to even leave the office vacant for a while than to have him continue in it. But there must be men who could fill this position effectively, [although] not with quite the same degree of brilliancy or ability. Bristow, Chester Rowell, Merriam, Herbert K. Smith, William Allen White occur to one's mind and there must be several other men who could be called on and made to feel the obligation to serve.

It is the fundamental question whether we will start right or wrong, whether we will have such support as is accorded to parties or men who are known to be sincere and right-thinking. [page 11]

If we believe that the mission of our party and the business of our generation in America is to destroy privilege and fight an oppressive industrial system which makes the lives of men, women, and children harder than they should be, we must draw the issue clearly and simply, and leave no place for doubts of our singleness of purpose.

If our party should fail now it would be a public calamity. It would seem to mean a humiliating defeat of those forces in America which are represented not only by patriotic politicians, but by the splendid list of social workers, educators, etc., who have found a home for their efforts and aspirations within the party.

If Perkins want to take a position of leadership in the party, let him first identify himself with progressive social and industrial work, so that in the mind of the public he will be something besides a trust magnate -- so that his name will bring to mind other organizations than the New York Life Insurance Company, J. P. Morgan & Co., the United States Steel Corporation, and the International Harvester Company. He could easily take a position of leadership in industrial work in this state and in the nation if he feels as we feel about these questions. He has in the highest degree the ability, the attractive personality and the energy necessary for such leadership. There is plenty for him or any man in his position to do. Let him clean up the unfortunate conditions of labor in the Harvester Trust. Let him make a fight in the Steel Corporation in favor of labor unionism and against the terrible system of industrial oppression that the Sage Foundation publications so vividly portray. Then he can assume leadership in the Progressive Party, with the confidence of the people and with [page 12] a record which affirms rather than denies the propositions for which our party stands.