23. december 1941

23. december 1941

23. december 1941

December 1941

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Krig til søs

Tysk ubåd U-79 tabte Sollu



HistoryLink.org

Den 23. december 1941 blev Port Townsend USO (United Service Organisations) klubhus, der ligger på Monroe Street 2009, indviet. Klubhuset repræsenterer en fortsat indsats for at betjene sømænd ved Point Hudson flådebase og soldater fra Fort Worden under disse 2. verdenskrigs år. Det er den første færdige føderale rekreationsbygning i det nordvestlige Stillehav og en af ​​de første i nationen.

Civile og soldater i krigstid

United Service Organisations (USO), en national organisation, blev stiftet den 4. februar 1941. Den bestod af seks agenturer: KFUM, KFUK, Frelsens Hær, Jewish Welfare Bureau, National Catholic Community Services og Travellers Aid. Tidligt i krigen var agenturerne gået sammen under navnet United Welfare Committee for Defense. Udvalget sendte præsident Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) et telegram, der bad om et møde med embedsmænd for at fremlægge sine synspunkter. I december mødtes udvalget med Paul V. McNutt (1891-1955), leder af Federal Security Agency, hvis ansvar omfattede rekreation. Roosevelt pålagde til gengæld Federal Security Agency at arbejde sammen med velfærdsudvalget for at komme med et effektivt program.

Præsident Roosevelt, der erkendte borger-soldaters interesse i at søge civil rekreation, mente, at fællesskabsbaserede programmer bedst kunne tilfredsstille denne virkelighed. Derudover ville levering af fritidscentre i samfundet reducere den opfattede trussel om, at et stort antal militærpersonale skulle hænge ud uden noget at gøre. En anden fordel ville være at få lokale civilbefolkninger, især kvinder, med i krigsindsatsen og give dem meningsfulde funktioner. USO var i stand til at ansætte professionelt personale, og det gav det en enorm fordel ved at tilbyde en effektiv rekreations- og moralopbyggende organisation for servicemænd og -kvinder langt hjemmefra i krigstid.

Bygge moral

I efteråret 1940 havde flåden KFUM åbnet et anlæg i den gamle Central High School for at betjene både sømænd og soldater. (Både kystvagten og flåden havde et anlæg på Point Hudson, en mine-fejende-træning skole og patrulje-båd-reparation facilitet.)

Organisationen modtog USO -finansiering i juli 1941, hvilket gjorde det muligt at sætte danse og andre aktiviteter på. Hæren og USO samarbejdede om at få værtinder til Fort Flagler dansebusser tog dem fra byen til Fort Worden -kajen, hvor en hærbåd transporterede kvinderne til Fort Flagler.

Hurtigt viste gymnasiefaciliteterne sig at være utilstrækkelige, så der blev bygget et føderalt klubhus på $ 49.000. Phil Anderson Contractors fik det afsluttet i midten af ​​december. Port Townsend USO forblev åben i april 1946 og var sammen med Seattle, Tacoma og Astoria en af ​​de sidste aktive faciliteter.

Det lukkede i maj 1946 og blev solgt til American Legion. Renoveringer i 2008 fik bygningen til at se ud som krigstid.

USO Clubhouse (1941), senere American Legion Hall, 2009 Monroe Street, Port Townsend


HistoryLink.org

Den 23. december 1941 blev Port Townsend USO (United Service Organisations) klubhus, der ligger på Monroe Street 2009, indviet. Klubhuset repræsenterer en fortsat indsats for at betjene sejlere på Point Hudson flådebase og soldater fra Fort Worden under disse 2. verdenskrigs år. Det er den første færdige føderale rekreationsbygning i det nordvestlige Stillehav og en af ​​de første i nationen.

Civile og soldater i krigstid

United Service Organisations (USO), en national organisation, blev stiftet den 4. februar 1941. Den bestod af seks agenturer: KFUM, KFUK, Frelsens Hær, Jewish Welfare Bureau, National Catholic Community Services og Travellers Aid. Tidligt i krigen var agenturerne gået sammen under navnet United Welfare Committee for Defense. Udvalget sendte præsident Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) et telegram, der bad om et møde med embedsmænd for at fremlægge sine synspunkter. I december mødtes udvalget med Paul V. McNutt (1891-1955), leder af Federal Security Agency, hvis ansvar omfattede rekreation. Roosevelt pålagde til gengæld Federal Security Agency at arbejde sammen med velfærdsudvalget for at komme med et effektivt program.

Præsident Roosevelt, der erkendte borger-soldaters interesse i at søge civil rekreation, mente, at fællesskabsbaserede programmer bedst kunne tilfredsstille denne virkelighed. Derudover ville levering af fritidscentre i samfundet reducere den opfattede trussel om, at et stort antal militærpersonale skulle hænge ud uden noget at gøre. En anden fordel ville være at få lokale civilbefolkninger, især kvinder, med i krigsindsatsen og give dem meningsfulde funktioner. USO var i stand til at ansætte professionelt personale, og det gav det en enorm fordel ved at tilbyde en effektiv rekreations- og moralopbyggende organisation for servicemænd og -kvinder langt hjemmefra i krigstid.

Bygge moral

I efteråret 1940 havde flåden KFUM åbnet et anlæg i den gamle Central High School for at betjene både sømænd og soldater. (Både kystvagten og flåden havde et anlæg på Point Hudson, en mine-fejende-uddannelse skole og patrulje-båd-reparation facilitet.)

Organisationen modtog USO -finansiering i juli 1941, hvilket gjorde det muligt at sætte danse og andre aktiviteter på. Hæren og USO samarbejdede om at få værtinder til Fort Flagler dansebusser tog dem fra byen til Fort Worden -kajen, hvor en hærbåd transporterede kvinderne til Fort Flagler.

Hurtigt viste gymnasiefaciliteterne sig at være utilstrækkelige, så der blev bygget et føderalt klubhus på 49.000 dollar. Phil Anderson Contractors fik det afsluttet i midten af ​​december. Port Townsend USO forblev åben i april 1946 og var sammen med Seattle, Tacoma og Astoria en af ​​de sidste aktive faciliteter.

Den lukkede i maj 1946 og blev solgt til American Legion. Renoveringer i 2008 fik bygningen til at se ud som krigstid.

USO Clubhouse (1941), senere American Legion Hall, 2009 Monroe Street, Port Townsend


Fort Devens lufthavn, MA – 23. december 1941

Den 23. december 1941 forsøgte 2. Lt. Da han vidste, at han ikke havde tilstrækkelig højde til at vende om, forsøgte han at få flyet tilbage på jorden, inden han nåede enden af ​​landingsbanen. At gå ud over landingsbanen var ikke en mulighed på grund af det hårde terræn og en klippe, der lå foran ved kanten af ​​feltet. Derfor dukkede han flyet til landingsbanen i håb om at jordsløjfe det, men hans i stedet hoppede flyet på et hjul og næsede over på ryggen.

Flyet var en L-3C, ser. Nr. 42-459.

Selvom flyet var hårdt beskadiget, modtog Lt. Kubach og hans passager, 1. Lt. Hartzel R. Birch, kun mindre skader.

Mændene blev tildelt 152. Observation Squadron baseret på Fort Devens.


Slaget ved daggry: Det første slag mellem USA og Japan 7.-10. December 1941

Edit: Okay, Shattered Sword siger, at omkring 36 torps pr. Bærer var en standardbelastning, så kald det cirka 216 for hele styrken, nu ned til 176. Det er altid muligt, at IJN bare proppede flere ting om bord på hangaren, i betragtning af vigtigheden af denne op og deres monofokus på lovovertrædelsen. Jeg er sikker på, at en sådan beslutning muligvis ikke kan komme tilbage for at hjemsøge dem. Desuden sidder mange af disse torpedoer nu fast ombord på transportører, der har lidt i vejen for en brugbar torpedobomberfløj tilbage.

Hvad angår de 16 tommer skaller. Jeg aner ikke.

Mange tak for oplysningerne. Jeg er enig i, at disse ekstra torpedoer og mulige 16 -tommers skaller kan komme til at bide IJN -bærerne, hvis de bliver ramt.

Selvom dette også giver IJN Kates og Vals ekstra ammunition, hvis de jager de amerikanske transportører og skibe.

Masser af knive i luften, og vi venter på at se, hvor de lander.

LongtimelurkerinMD

På Alaska's bør spørgsmålet være, hvorfor Calbear hader dem så dårligt, hvilket var en uddannelse for mig på dette board:
1. omkostning for resultat - bedre at bygge de sidste to Iowas - meget mere dygtige skibe til samme besætning.
2. stor jeg ikke var klar over var manøvredygtighed - dårlig.

Jeg er enig i, at de ser smukke ud, og at komme fra Alaska oprindeligt, ville have været rart at se det forankret i Juneau eller Anchorage som et museumsskib.

Mike Snyder

forfattere bemærker: for dem, der ikke ved det, udførte admiral Yarnell Fleet Problem XIII i 1932, hvilket var et angreb fra transportørerne Saratoga og Lexington (simuleret selvfølgelig) på slagskibserie ved Pearl Harbor og var vildt vellykket (ifølge dommere) og omhyggeligt noteret af japanerne og begravet så dybt de kunne af USN slagskibsadmiraler.

Han befalede den asiatiske flåde indtil 1939, og da han nåede pensionsalderen, blev han inaktiv, indtil krigen begyndte. Han tilbragte krigen i rådgivende stilling. S

Jeg har altid undret mig over, hvordan en amerikansk transportflåde ledet af ham ville have været.

Mike Snyder

Hammerbolt

På Alaska's bør spørgsmålet være, hvorfor Calbear hader dem så dårligt, hvilket var en uddannelse for mig på dette board:
1. omkostning for resultat - bedre at bygge de sidste to Iowas - meget mere dygtige skibe til samme besætning.
2. stor jeg ikke var klar over var manøvredygtighed - dårlig.

Jeg er enig i, at de ser smukke ud, og at komme fra Alaska oprindeligt, ville have været rart at se det forankret i Juneau eller Anchorage som et museumsskib.

Mike Snyder

Mike Snyder

historisk note:
Fra & quotAngreb på Pearl Harbor: Strategi, kamp, ​​myter og bedrag & quot Alan D. Zimm 2011

Angående General Short
Pearl Harbor skulle være et fristed, et sted, hvor Stillehavsflåden kunne hvile, nedbryde udstyr til vedligeholdelse og tillade besætninger hvile og frihed, som alle var nødvendige i betragtning af flådens flådes intense træningsplan. General Short, kommandanten med ansvar for øens luft- og jordforsvar, fik til opgave at sørge for dette fristed. & Quot (side 355)

& quot General Short havde tilstrækkelige kræfter og udstyr til at udføre sit job. Hvis AIC (Air Information Center, hovedsageligt Air Defense Command HQ) havde været aktiv, og hans luftforsvar varslede, ville hærens forsvarere sandsynligvis have givet japanerne en meget blodig næse, og flåden ville have været godt forsvaret. & Quot (side 356 )

Angående admiral Kimmell
Som Prange bemærkede,

Han kiggede aldrig på hærens luftfartøjsbatterier, vidste ikke, at Short havde tre former for alarm, og besøgte ikke informationscentret for selv at se, hvordan radaropsætningen fungerede, selvom disse var væsentlige faktorer i forsvaret af hans dyrebare forankring og flåden ved dens fortøjninger. & quot (side 358)

For at være ærlig, holder jeg disse to mænd direkte ansvarlige for undladelsessynder og kommission på amerikansk side vedrørende Pearl Harbor. I mindre grad holder jeg ansvaret for de mennesker, der udnævnte disse to mænd til kommando, på trods af deres begrænsede viden og endnu mindre forståelse for luftfart, af en post, der mest sandsynligt ville blive angrebet fra luften, hvis den blev angrebet i kraft.

På den note vil jeg se & quotTora, Tora, Tora & quot, mens jeg skriver mine aftener

LongtimelurkerinMD

Mike Snyder

Hæren er fundet savnet
Den 8. februar 1941 blev generalløjtnant Walter Short, et infanterikommandant med omfattende erfaring og betragtet som en 'kommer' sendt til Hawaii for at tage kommandoen over hærstyrkerne der. Kort efter hans ankomst, den 17. februar, sender sekretær Stimson et brev til general Short, som sekretæren havde modtaget fra sekretær Knox, og advarede således:

"& QuotHvis der opstår krig med Japan, menes det let muligt, at fjendtligheder ville blive indledt af et overraskelsesangreb på flåden eller flådebasen i Pearl Harbor. & Quot Brevet fortsatte: & quot være: (1) Luftbombeangreb (2) Lufttorpedoflyangreb, (3) Sabotage, (4) Ubådsangreb, (5) Minedrift, (6) Bombardement ved skud. & quot (http://www.ibiblio.org /pha/pha/roberts/roberts.html) (Den officielle kongressrapport)

Admiral Richardson, der allerede har modtaget dette brev, begynder at presse på for at de stærkest mulige foranstaltninger træffes af hæren for at forberede de første to sandsynligheder, idet han overvejer sabotage rimelig usandsynligt med mindst grundlæggende sikkerhedsforanstaltninger, de næste to et flådeproblem og sidste mulighed højst usandsynligt, men bestemt hvad kystforsvarets kanoner skal forsvare sig mod. Han presser general Short og general Frederick Martin, chef for Hawaiian Air Force, for at tillade tildeling af Marine Corps og Navy -personale til Air Information Center. Admiralen er også utilfreds med graden af ​​luftfartsbeskyttelse, som hans tre søflystationer (Ewa, Ford Island og Kaneohe Bay) har og tildeler 2. og 4. marineforsvarsbataljon (mindre deres batterier på 5 tommer kanoner, som vil blive tildelt til den 1. bataljon dømt til Wake Island, og den 3. bataljon dømt til Midway). Dette giver Ewa og Kaneohe Bay hver 16 3 tommer kanoner og 48,50 kaliber maskingeværer plus 2 maskingeværfirmaer (48,30 kaliber maskingeværer) til at yde sikkerhed for baserne (og som også kan sendes til Wake eller Midway én gang faciliteter er tilgængelige). Richardson anmoder om en ekstra Marine Defense Battalion, når den er tilgængelig for Ford Island. Krig ville komme, før han fik det ønske opfyldt. I november 1941 har begge baser deres marine forsvar færdiggjort og klar til krig.

Richardson finder imidlertid ud af, at Short simpelthen ikke forstår lufttruslen, og faktisk virker usædvanligt bekymret over sabotagetruslen fra den meget store japanske befolkning på Hawaii. Generalen fokuserer også mere på sit infanteri og forbereder sig på et amfibisk angreb, som Richardson mener er usandsynligt i yderste konsekvens på grund af japanske forsendelsesbegrænsninger. Flere møder i marts og april er uproduktive, og Richardson indser, at kun Fleet Problem XXII vil tjene til at gøre hans pointe gældende.


Fleet Problem XXII maj 1941
I en kompleks plan udviklet af Richardson og Yarnell er flåden opdelt i to styrker. The Red Force, som vil blive kommanderet af Halsey (kommandør Aircraft Battleforce) og givet Saratoga, Lexington, Enterprise, plus 6 tunge krydsere, 12 destroyere og alle 3 tilgængelige oilers, og bedt om at genskabe Fleet Problem XIII. CINCPAC (Commander Pacific Fleet) forsømmer målrettet at informere hæren eller faktisk admiral Bellinger (kommandør US Navy Aviation Hawaii) om den første del af problemet, som vil være et simuleret overraskelsesangreb rettet mod Pearl Harbor. Admiral Pye, chef for Battle Force udnævnes til seniordommer, ligesom flere højtstående flådeofficerer, mens Admiral Anderson får Blue Force, som består af slagskibene og deres ledsagere, og Admiral Brown får Yorktown, de resterende krydsere og nogle destroyere som spejderstyrke for Anderson. De fleste af ubådene er også givet til Blue Force.

Beslutter, at da den røde styrke simulerer japanerne, og dermed den mest sandsynlige tilgang er fra sydvest (i retning af de japanske holdt marskalkøer), sender Anderson Brown i den retning, mens han beholder sine langsommere slagskibe i havnen som anvist . Bellinger, med kun 40 tilgængelige PBY Catalina langdistanceflyvende både, kan ikke patruljere overalt og er tvunget til at træffe valg. Han beslutter sig for primært at støtte Brown og efterlade kun en håndfuld til den nordlige eftersøgning.

Halsey, der var fuldt ud klar over PBY's begrænsninger, formår at undgå kontakt med alle undtagen én, og dommeren afgør, at krigere i hans taskforce ville have skudt den ned, før den faldt af en kontaktrapport. Ubådene, der hovedsageligt er indsat mod vest og syd, savner ham også, og dermed kommer Halsey inden for 200 miles fra Oahu nordkyst den 19. juni. Han lancerer 90 SBD Dauntless dykkerbombefly, 36 TBD Devastator torpedobomber og 36 Wildcat -krigere som strejke. Dykkerbombeflyene skal eliminere de primære hærs flyvepladser i Wheeler og Hickam felterne samt Ewa og de to flådebaser for patruljefly fra Navy, mens TBD'erne vil fungere som glidebomber og angribe maskinparker, tørdokke og olietankfarme. Jagerne vil dække og gennemføre simulerede strafingangreb på flyvepladserne. Overbevist om, at Pearl Harbour's lave dybde udelukker et torpedoangreb med lufttorpedoer, ignorerer Halsey denne mulighed, da Yarnell og Richardson også troede på dette.

Resultatet er en forbløffende forlegenhed for hæren. Hæren har endnu ikke modtaget de nye SCR270 radarsæt og har faktisk tildelt minimalt personale eller forberedelse til dem. Air Information Center er stadig minimalt bemandet, og faktisk er Marine Corps Liaison, 2 ekspedienter og en ydmyg Army -jagerpilot det eneste personale, der er til stede, når den første Dauntless begynder sit dyk på Hickam Field. Army Anti -flyenhederne er enten parkeret i opbevaring, eller for de kanoner, der er til stede, er deres besætninger for langt væk til hurtigt at bemande dem, og deres ammunitionsforsyning er låst. Kun en håndfuld krigere formår at komme af jorden under det simulerede angreb, og dommerne bestemmer, at de bliver ødelagt og deres baser ødelagt. Kun ved Ewa og Kaneohe scorer forsvarerne succeser, da marinesoldaterne er tættere på en krigsfod, selvom dommerne bestemmer, at da disse enheder stadig er under styrke og mangler udstyr og dermed betragtes baserne som beskadigede. Strejken på flådefaciliteterne er ubestridt, da Short endnu ikke har indsat batterier for at forsvare basen, og dommerne beslutter, at det ville være et totalt tab.

Kort sagt har den røde styrke elimineret hærens evne til at forsvare flåden og for flåden at støtte flåden. En fuldstændig detaljeret rapport er snart på vej til sekretær Knox.

Den næste del af problemet er designet til at se, om flåden kan opsnappe den røde styrke eller forhindre yderligere angreb. Blue Force -flåden sorterer (hvilket tager flere timer), mens admiral Brown og hans spejderstyrke skynder sig nordpå for at forsøge at finde den røde styrke. Imidlertid damper Halsey nordpå og derefter svinger nord og vest for at sætte sig inden for strejkeområde Midway, som dommerreglen er ødelagt (især da der endnu ikke er ankommet fly til flyvepladsen). En rapport om dette sendes også til Knox, selvom Brown roses for hans aggression i forsøget på at finde Halsey.

Resten af ​​maj og juni bruges på at udføre operationer i Midway -området for at simulere en amfibieinvasion samt give slagskibsdivisionerne mulighed for at øve skydevåben og manøvre.

En ny hærchef
Knox er rystet, da han læser, hvor vellykket ydmygelsen har været for hæren og dermed den sandsynlige eliminering af Stillehavsflådens evne til at operere ud af Hawaii. Han videresender rapporten til sekretær Stimson og beder om at mødes med præsidenten. På et kort møde finder general Marshall og krigsminister sig meget flov over den krise, hæren har lidt, og kort tid efter beslutter Marshall, at der er brug for en flyver til den øverste kommando på Hawaii. General Hap Arnold, chef for Army Air Corps, beslutter, at han har lige manden.

Brigadegeneral Millard Harmon, der for nylig vendte tilbage fra sine pligter som observatør på De Britiske Øer og en af ​​de mest højtstående piloter i hele Army Air Corps, ligner bare manden. Han har en god forståelse for anvendelsen af ​​radar, har set RAF bruge det, og han forfremmes til generalløjtnant, springer en hel rang over og sendes til Hawaii den 19. juli 1941. General Walter Short sendes tilbage til USA og givet kommando over 2. hær i Tennessee, som i øjeblikket er en træningsorganisation.


The Rattler (San Antonio, Tex.), Bind. 23, nr. 6, red. 1 fredag ​​den 5. december 1941

Halvmånedlig studenteravis fra St. Mary 's University i San Antonio, Texas, der inkluderer campusnyheder sammen med reklame.

Fysisk beskrivelse

seks sider: ill. side 20 x 15 in. Scannet fra fysiske sider.

Oprettelsesoplysninger

Sammenhæng

Det her avis er en del af samlingen med titlen: The Rattler og blev leveret af St. Mary 's University Louis J. Blume Library til The Portal to Texas History, et digitalt arkiv, der er vært for UNT Libraries. Den er blevet set 24 gange. Flere oplysninger om dette problem kan ses nedenfor.

Mennesker og organisationer, der er forbundet med enten oprettelsen af ​​denne avis eller dens indhold.

Redaktør

Forlægger

Publikum

Tjek vores websted for ressourcer til undervisere! Vi har identificeret dette avis som en primære kilde i vores samlinger. Forskere, pædagoger og studerende kan finde dette problem nyttigt i deres arbejde.

Leveret af

St. Mary 's University Louis J. Blume Library

Grundlagt i 1852 af marianistiske brødre og præster, dette er den første institution for højere uddannelse i San Antonio og det ældste katolske universitet i sydvest. Dens mission er at danne mennesker i tro og uddanne ledere til det fælles bedste gennem samfundsintegreret liberal arts og faglig uddannelse og akademisk ekspertise.


28. december 1941: infamys dag

Mig? Vil du bruge enhver mulighed for BB på BB -handling, jeg kan, og gøre mere for at starte? Aldrig! Nej aldrig!

Selvfølgelig efter krigen vil Yamato fanboys hævde, at det ikke var en fair kamp, ​​og en Yamato kunne have slået en Iowa, hvis bare.

MerryPrankster

Sir Chaos

Mig? Vil du bruge enhver mulighed for BB på BB -handling, jeg kan, og gøre mere for at starte? Aldrig! Nej aldrig!

Selvfølgelig efter krigen vil Yamato fanboys hævde, at det ikke var en fair kamp, ​​og en Yamato kunne have slået en Iowa, hvis bare.

Usertron2020

Lothaw

Så. vi venter nu bare på Leyte Gulf equivilent. Bortset fra at japanerne ikke engang har en lokkefartøjsflåde denne gang.

Også datoerne var ikke for klare, hvornår præcist fandt Marshall Island -slaget sted. Pludselig ser jeg frem til hvor lang tid det vil tage dem at komme til Japan i modsætning til hvor lang tid det vil tage at få atombomben klar.

Gridley

Gridley

Marcus_aurelius

Uden at blive for off-topic ville jeg antage, at ETO udviklede sig på samme måde som OTL?

Usertron2020

Uden at blive for off-topic ville jeg antage, at ETO udviklede sig på samme måde som OTL?

Lothaw

Godt man skulle antage, at det europæiske teater ville være lidt anderledes, bare ved al forskydning af flådens ressourcer til Stillehavet, når tingene så dårligt ud for USA tidligere.

Operation Torch kan godt have været forsinket nogle, hvilket ville have interessante konsekvenser.

Gridley

Uden at blive for off-topic ville jeg antage, at ETO udviklede sig på samme måde som OTL?

Ikke ligefrem, men ret tæt.

Godt man skulle antage, at det europæiske teater ville være lidt anderledes, bare ved al forskydning af flådens ressourcer til Stillehavet, når tingene så dårligt ud for USA tidligere.

Operation Torch kan godt have været forsinket nogle, hvilket ville have interessante konsekvenser.

Faktisk blev mange af Atlantic Fleets store enheder overført til PTO selv IOTL.

Fra maj 1944 forbereder W.Allies sig på at invadere Frankrig nær Normandiet med en måldato i begyndelsen af ​​juni. De har ryddet Nordafrika for aksestyrker, taget Sicilien og kæmper i Italien syd for Rom. Slaget om Atlanterhavet er stort set forbi (selvom der fortsat siver et tab af tab, bygger de allierede skibe meget hurtigere end aksen kan sænke dem og synker U-både hurtigere end tyskerne kan bygge dem). De allierede er godt inde i en strategisk bombeangreb, der har lammet Luftwaffe. På østfronten er den røde hær i den strategiske offensiv langs hele fronten, og har netop befriet Kiev.

Samlet set er de allierede ikke helt så langt, men de har ikke lidt så tæt på i forhold til OTL som i Stillehavet.

Rediger for at tilføje: indeks
Indlæg nr. 1: Prolog
Indlæg #7: Pearl Harbor
Indlæg #41: Vågn
Indlæg #86: Filippinerne
Indlæg #90: Malaya
Indlæg #108: Hollandsk Østindien
Indlæg #115: Doolittle
Indlæg #125: Coral Sea, del I
Indlæg #134: Coral Sea, del II
Indlæg #140: Coral Sea, del III
Indlæg #148: Afledning og raid
Indlæg #154: Midway, Part I
Indlæg #164: Midway, del II
Indlæg #165: Midway, Del III
Indlæg #202: Midway, Part IV
Indlæg #214: Midway, del V
Indlæg #253: Midway, Part VI
Indlæg #256: Midway, Part VII
Indlæg #285: Stillehav: adj., Fredelig, rolig ...
Indlæg #292: Gilberts -kampagnen, del I
Indlæg #299: Gilberts -kampagnen, del II
Indlæg #308: Solomons -kampagnen, del I
Indlæg #314: Solomons -kampagnen, del II
Indlæg #323: Solomons -kampagnen, del III
Indlæg #328: Solomons -kampagnen, del IV
Indlæg #330: Solomons -kampagnen, del V
Indlæg #333: Solomons -kampagnen, del VI
Indlæg #334: Solomons -kampagnen, del VII
Indlæg #341: Solomons -kampagnen, del VIII
Indlæg #354: Bougainville
Indlæg #376: The Silent Service
Indlæg #379: Marshals -kampagnen, del I
Indlæg #388: Marshals -kampagnen, del II
Indlæg #418: Marshals -kampagnen, del III
Indlæg #430: Marshals -kampagnen, del IV
Indlæg #452: Marshals -kampagnen, del V

Gridley

Marshals -kampagnen, del V

Omkring 400 USN -fly, en fjerdedel af dem beskadiget til en vis grad, forsøgte nu at lokalisere deres flåde og lande i mørket. Halsey havde autoriseret alle transportører til at tænde deres dæklys, da strejken vendte tilbage, men gav ingen eksplicit tilladelse til andre overtrædelser af normal lysdisciplin. Admiral Mitscher, der havde kommando over TG 51.3, beordrede sine transportører til ikke kun at tænde deres dæklys og kørelys, men også søgelys for at give et visuelt fyrtårn for de tilbagevendende fly. Dette var så vellykket, at mange fly fra TG 51.1 og TG 51.2 sluttede med at lande på Mitschers luftfartsselskaber. Alligevel gik hundrede og halvtreds amerikanske fly tabt til søs eller styrtede ned. Næsten alle piloter og besætninger blev genoprettet i løbet af de næste flere dage.

Da strejken var genoprettet, fortsatte Halsey mod vest. Medlemmer af hans stab protesterede endnu en gang og mindede ham om den katastrofale nataktion i Midway. Halsey satte halvdelen af ​​sine destroyere ud som en langdistance radarskærm, men ignorerede ellers disse advarsler. TF 55 fulgte lidt bag TF 51.

Yamamotos slagstyrke fortsatte på sin side mod øst mod amerikanerne. Det er bemærkelsesværdigt, at dette ikke skyldtes nogen ordre fra Yamamotos side, men simpelthen mangel på ordrer om at ændre kurs, selvom meddelelserne om ødelæggelsen af ​​Carrier Force kom ind. Yamamoto vidste, at kun et mirakel ville bringe ham inden for pistolområdet af den amerikanske flåde ved daggry, og at intet andet resultat kunne bringe noget resultat undtagen ødelæggelse af hans styrke. Alligevel vidste han også, at med hans flådebærere og deres uerstattelige uddannede kadre af piloter og besætninger, der var gået, kunne ingen anden flådeaktion forventes at give et bedre resultat.

Yamamoto fik næsten sit mirakel. Halsys aggressive kurs bragte sine stakdestruderer inden for 100 miles fra IJN Battle Force ved daggry. Begge sider så hinanden næsten med det samme, og over tre tusinde kvadratkilometer hav gik hundrede skibe i flankefart.

Den 20. maj 1944 ville være krigens sidste store flådeaktion.

Japanerne trak første blod, da en F1M fra CVS Nisshin skød en OS2U ned fra USS New Jersey i en af ​​de få dueller i krigsflyvemaskine mod flydefly. Det ville ikke være den sidste underlighed ved dagens handling.

Halseys luftfartsselskaber kørte mod øst, da de febrilsk opdagede deres strejkefly, vendte derefter mod vest kl. 0900 og begyndte at starte. Bare at få øje på strejkerne havde været en udfordring, forstyrrelserne i natlandingen stablet oven på den foregående dags kampe havde ikke efterladt nogen luftfartsselskab med alle dets resterende fly om bord, og de fleste havde fly fra flere skibe. USS Ticonderoga CV16 havde fly fra otte forskellige skibe, herunder den tabte Yorktown og to CVL'er om bord fra alle tre opgavegrupper.

Krigere fra den daggryske fælles landbrugspolitik engagerede allerede japanerne, da strejkerne blev lanceret, og hver arbejdsgruppe blev instrueret til at angribe på egen hånd. Med så lidt tid til orientering og planlægning og så lidt sammenhængskraft i strejkegrupperne, blev der gjort en dyd af nødvendighed, og de fleste transportørgrupper blev henvist til at angribe efter vilje, et lamret japansk skib på dette tidspunkt let kunne afsluttes senere.

Resultatet var en kaotisk dødsdans udspillet omkring og over den japanske slagstyrke, da den styrede mod TF 51.


27. december 1941 – Elsa Binder

Elsa Binder var tæt på slutningen af ​​sine teenageår, da krigen forstyrrede hendes liv. Først besatte Sovjetunionens militærstyrker hendes hjemby Stanisławów. Tyskland og USSR havde underskrevet en ikke -aggressionspagt, og i en hemmelig del af traktaten blev de enige om at dele Polen mellem sig. I september 1939 invaderede Tyskland Vestpolen og sovjetiske tropper trådte ind fra øst. 22 måneder senere angreb Tyskland sin tidligere sovjetiske allierede og besatte resten af ​​Polen.

Forholdene var vanskelige for Elsa og hendes familie under den sovjetiske besættelse, men blev endnu mere ødelæggende under nazisterne. Den første handling i tragedien kom den 12. oktober 1941, da tyskerne massakrerede ti tusinde jøder fra Stanisławów -området. To måneder senere blev de overlevende tvunget til at flytte ind i en ghetto. Det var da Elsa begyndte at føre sin dagbog.

FARE i ghettoen

Fare var overalt i ghettoen. Folk levede under den konstante trussel om fattigdom, vold og død. Belastningen i situationen tog hårdt på familieforholdene. Den 27. december skrev Elsa: “Og mor? Vi har kæmpet i et par dage. Om trivialiteter, som normalt. Men uanset hvilket humør vi er i, er hun den kæreste person i verden for mig ... men når jeg ser, hvordan hun behandler min søster, koger mit blod og jalousi kvæler mine bedre impulser. Jeg tror ikke, at hun elsker Dora mere, end hun elsker mig, men faktum er, at hun kræver mere af mig og er mere overbærende over for min søster. ”

Elsa var klar over, hvor meget atmosfæren i den konstante krise forvrængede hendes normale holdninger og følelser. Hun følte behov for at diskutere sine følelser, men hun kunne kun betro sig trygt i sin dagbog. Hun sluttede sine tanker den 27. december, ”Jeg er nødt til at udtrykke mig oftere og mere oprigtigt. Jeg læser, hvad jeg lige har skrevet, og det ser ud til at være meget naivt og fjollet. Men det er min måde at tænke på. Jeg er ked af, at jeg skal lægge det på papir, før jeg indser, at det er sådan. Uanset denne opdagelse vil jeg blive ved med at skrive mine tanker ned, men jeg vil ikke læse dem med det samme. ”

Desværre havde Elsa ikke en chance for at gennemgå sit forfatterskab, efter at Holocaust -krisen var forbi. I hele 1942 og begyndelsen af ​​1943 tømte nazisterne gradvist Stanisławów -ghettoen i bestræbelserne på at gøre området judenrein (renset for jøder.) De fleste af de resterende indbyggere blev sendt til dødslejren i Belzec eller skudt lokalt. Elsas dagbog blev senere fundet i en grøft ved siden af ​​vejen til kirkegården.

Læs flere poster fra Elsas mejeri i bogen, Bjærgede sider: Unge skribenters dagbøger om Holocaust af Alexandra Zapruder.

Listen to readings from the diary in the MTV documentary “I’m Still Here. ”


This day in history

Today is Monday, Dec. 23, the 357th day of 2019. There are eight days left in the year.

Birthdays: Actor Ronnie Schell is 88. Former emperor Akihito of Japan is 86. Football Hall of Famer Paul Hornung is 84. Actor Frederic Forrest is 83. Actor-comedian Harry Shearer is 76. US Army General Wesley K. Clark (retired) is 75. Actress Susan Lucci is 73. Singer-guitarist Adrian Belew is 70. Pearl Jam singer Eddie Vedder (Pearl Jam) is 55. Jazz musician Irvin Mayfield is 42.

In 1783, George Washington resigned as commander in chief of the Continental Army and retired to his home at Mount Vernon, Va.

In 1913, the Federal Reserve System was created as President Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act.

In 1941, during World War II, American forces on Wake Island surrendered to the Japanese.

In 1948, former Japanese premier Hideki Tojo and six other Japanese war leaders were executed in Tokyo.

In 1954, the first successful human kidney transplant took place at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston as a surgical team led by Joseph Murray removed a kidney from 23-year-old Ronald Herrick and implanted it in Herrick’s twin brother, Richard.

In 1968, 82 crew members of the US intelligence ship Pueblo were released by North Korea, 11 months after they had been captured.

In 1972, a 6.2-magnitude earthquake struck Nicaragua the disaster claimed some 5,000 lives.

In 1986, the experimental airplane Voyager, piloted by Dick Rutan and Jeana Yeager, completed the first non-stop, non-refueled round-the-world flight as it returned safely to Edwards Air Force Base in California.

In 1995, a fire in Dabwali, India, killed 446 people, more than half of them children, during a year-end party near the children’s school.

In 1997, a federal jury in Denver convicted Terry Nichols of involuntary manslaughter and conspiracy for his role in the Oklahoma City bombing, declining to find him guilty of murder. (Nichols was sentenced to life in prison. )

In 2001, Time magazine named New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani its Person of the Year for his steadfast response to the 9/11 terrorist attack.

Last year, amid criticism and fallout from the resignation of Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, President Trump pushed the Pentagon chief out the door two months earlier than planned in a series of tweets, Trump appeared to question why he had put Mattis in his Cabinet in the first place.


Rethinking history

The naval balance of power, let alone other forces, in December 1941 just wouldn't have allowed the same sides to form.

But that needs some explanation.

When I started to draft this article, I realised I needed to do some background, and it actually led to 5 'preview' articles that can be accessed in this blog.

2. Effective Re-Builds of WWI battleships.

3. If War had started December 1941, Part 1 - Battleships

4. If War had started December 1941, Part 2 - Aircraft Carriers

5. If War had started December 1941, Part 3 - Naval Balance of Power

You are welcome to read them all to follow the reasoning of this article. (And I would welcome comments and any extra information that people might have. the field is vast, and I keep finding minor corrections or additions to much of the available information.)

But the conclusion is simple.

If Britain, France, and Germany had not gone to war in 1939 (and Italy in 1940), and all had continued their building programs to December 1941, then a later start to WWII would simply not have seen Germany, Japan and Italy as allies.

First I will restate the summary of my last article on Naval Power Summary December 1941:

First, why might war not have started in September 1939?

Frankly, it is because Britain was having trouble getting France and the Dominions to agree to go to war. It is perhaps unfortunate that after years of trying to get everyone signed up, they finally got agreement to fight at a bad time, over a very poor case.

When Germany re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936, it was Britain that wasn't ready to support France in countermeasures.

But by the time of the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938, none of the 3 WW1 allies – Britain, France, or Italy, were willing to fight Germany over the issue. (One American journalist asked the previously belicose Mussolini why he had threatened war with Germany over just this sort of plan in 1934, but backed down in 1938. His answer was simple. "In 1934 I could have beaten Germany's army".)

Nonetheless the Anschluss made the major powers accelerate their re-armament programs. though note that Germany tripled it's gold reserves, and greatly increased its steel resources.

The occupation of the Sudetenland by Germany in September 1938 caused much more debate, but Chamberlain's notorious Munich Agreement was considered a reasonable result by many people, given that the Sudetenland was mainly occupied by German people's. But Hitler's promise that it was his last territorial demand was given a little bit too much weight. Churchill demurred.

We have suffered a total and unmitigated defeat. you will find that in a period of time which may be measured by years, but may be measured by months, Czechoslovakia will be engulfed in the Nazi régime. We are in the presence of a disaster of the first magnitude. we have sustained a defeat without a war, the consequences of which will travel far with us along our road.

Unfortunately sacrificing the powerful Czech army and its impressive border defences to this agreement actually undermined the ability of Britain and France to bring Hitler to heel. In October 1938 the combined British, French and Czech forces could probably have beaten the still woefully unprepared German forces. (The strong Czech army, with superb border fortifications and 470 modern tanks – more than Germany had at the time – was very motivated to fight until sold out by the British and French. If anything it was actually capturing the Czech arsenal and munition factories that made it possible for Germany to win the battle with France 18 months later. That included 25% of all German military equipment, including 350 of the mechanically reliable Czech t35 and t38 tanks. Which were effectively the dominant medium tanks for the German attacks on Poland and France, being hugely superior to the large numbers of Panzer I and Panzer II that were the backbone of the German forces, and greatly outnumbering the Panzer III, and Panzer IV that were only just entering service.)

But when the British government discussed war in 1938, the simple fact was that none of the Dominions were willing to consider it yet, and it had been clear since the White Russian wars and the Turkish Crisis of the 1920's that the British would not go to war without at least the agreement of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and hopefully South Africa.

[Eire was pretty much a write off for the Allies in WWII, and not worth considering in the anti-Axis camp. The Irish government's supposed neutrality was actually fairly pro-Nazi – or at least anti-English – in its effects for much of the war: greatly hindering Allied efforts, and giving constant fears of Vichy style Nazi occupation that would have to be countered by British or American troops. (The Valera government was the only government in the world to issue official condolences to Germany on Hitler's death in 1945. A fitting comment on their parochial delusions about the world.)]

Frankly, in 1938 and early 1939, the Dominions weren't ready to fight for 'a small country, far away, that no one has heard of' over its right to control its German sub groups. So war at surprisingly good odds for the allies was not possible. New Zealand might have signed up, maybe, but possibly not even Australia, and almost certainly not Canada or South Africa.

This was particularly unfortunate, as the German High Command actually sent a private envoy to tell the Chamberlain government they would mount a coup if Hitler ordered an attack and started a war that Germany must surely lose. See the Wikipedia article on the Munich Agreement/Opinion:

On 4 August 1938, a secret Army meeting was held. Beck read his lengthy report to the assembled officers. They all agreed something had to be done to prevent certain disaster. Beck hoped they would all resign together but no one resigned except Beck. His replacement, General Franz Halder , sympathized with Beck and they both conspired with several top generals, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (Chief of German Intelligence), and Graf von Helldorf (Berlin's Police Chief) to arrest Hitler the moment he gave the invasion order. This plan would only work if Britain issued a strong warning and a letter to the effect that they would fight to preserve Czechoslovakia. This would help to convince the German people that certain defeat awaited Germany. Agents were therefore sent to England to tell Chamberlain that an attack on Czechoslovakia was planned, and of their intention to overthrow Hitler if this occurred. The proposal was rejected by the British Cabinet and no such letter was issued. Accordingly, the proposed removal of Hitler did not go ahead. [62] On this basis it has been argued that the Munich Agreement kept Hitler in power, although whether it would have been any more successful than the 1944 plot is doubtful.

The allies actions, or lack of them, not only bolstered Hitlers position, but undermined any opposition. Poland and Russia had been willing to untie with teh British and French against Germany over Czechoslovakia. Both were appalled that the French in particular abandoned their treaty obligations. Th Poles shrugged and joined in the scavenging, (though their are cases where Czech and Polish forces worked together to stop further German advances). But the Soviet Union started seeking a rapprochement with Hitler.

Unfortunately it was only Hitler's occupation of the 'rump' of Czechoslovakia a few months later that revealed the lie of 'no more territorial demands', and swung the Dominions around. People like Prime Minister Menzies in Australia start actually pushing for Britain to make a stand. But too late.

Germany gained 2,175 field guns and cannons, 469 tanks, 500 anti-aircraft artillery pieces, 43,000 machine guns, 1,090,000 military rifles, 114,000 pistols, about a billion rounds of small-arms ammunition, and 3 million rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition. That could then arm about half of the Wehrmacht. [99] Czechoslovak weapons later played a major role in the German conquest of Poland and France, the last of which country had urged Czechoslovakia into surrendering the Sudetenland in 1938.

Unfortunately the next opportunity for a stand was Poland.

The problem with Poland was that it was a bad country to make a stand for. Politically and militarily.

Whereas Czechoslovakia was a nice fairly innocuous country that could and would have put up a fight that Britain and France - possibly even Italy – could have effectively supported, Poland was not.

Poland was a fairly nasty aggressor between the wars, invading Russia in the 1920's, and gleefully grabbing part of Czechoslovakia, and indeed Hungary, when the Nazi's carved it up in 1938. Nor were they militarily capable of holding the Germans – armed with Czech tanks – off on open plains, the way Czech's might have held the considerably weaker German forces a year earlier in the fortified mountain passes. Nor could the allies find an effective way to support the Poles, particularly after the Russians also stabbed them in the back.

So the first point at which the British could go to war, was probably the point at which they shouldn't, and for a country they definitely shouldn't. (And which, notably, they couldn't save anyway, neither from the Germans, or from the Soviet's post war.)

Frankly the September 1939 start to the war was during a fairly temporary optimum window for the Germans.

The German economy was already in poor condition, and it was the looting of Austrian gold and Czech armaments that gave it a temporary boost in what was effectively still peacetime. (The later looting of the Polish and French economies never made up for the costs of a full world war being in progress.)

Demographically German military manpower was at a height in 1940/41 that gave it an advantage over the allies and potentially Russians, that would quickly evaporate within a few years. (Demographics was an important science between the wars, and many leaders – like Hitler and Stalin – make frequent references to it. The Russians in particular would start having more manpower available starting in 1942. perhaps not a coincidence that Germany invaded in 1941?)

The Nazi air forces had a temporary superiority over the Allies in 1939 that was already being rapidly undercut as both the British and the French finally started mass production of newer aircraft. (By mid 1940 British aircraft production had overtaken the Germans, even without the French. If the war had not started in 1939, by 1941 the Luftwaffe would have been numerically quite inferior to the combined British and French air forces, even without the surprisingly effective new fighters being bought on line by the Dutch and others.)

German ground forces, while not really ready for war in September 1939 (half of their divisions were still pretty much immobile, and they had only 120,000 vehicles all up compared to 300,000 for the French army alone), were nonetheless in a peak of efficiency considering the Czech's and Poles had been knocked out, and the British and French were struggling to get new equipment into service. The Soviet short term decision to ally with the Germans to carve up Eastern Europe (Stalin knew this was only a temporary delay to inevitable conflict), also allowed the Germans an easy victory and much greater freedom of action. Again, by 1941 British conscription and production, and French (and Belgian, and Dutch, etc. ) upgrades and increases in fortifications, would have come a lot closer to making the German task next to impossible. (Even then it was the collapse of French morale after the loss of Finland - leading to the collapse of the French government – and Norway, that really defeated France, not vastly inferior divisions or equipment.)

A byproduct of an Allied vamp up might also have seen Belgium rejoin the allied camp in 1941, or at least make significant planning preparations to properly add its 22 divisions and strong border fortifications to allied defences if Germany attacked. (Rather than the hopeless mess that happened in 1940 when the allies rushed to rescue the temporarily non-ally that had undermined the whole interwar defensive project . ) Again, the German's managed to find a sweet spot in 1939-40 that temporarily undermined long standing interwar co-operation, and one that was not likely to last very long.

Similarly a delay of war would have allowed allied negotiations with the Balkan states to advance. The same guarantee that was given to Poland had been given to Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece. (It is usually forgotten that Greece – attacked by Italy – and Yugoslavia – voluntarily – joined the British side at the worst possible moment in 1941. (Only to be crushed by the Germans. but with the interesting by-product of effectively undermining Germany's chances of defeating the Soviets and occupying Moscow in the same year. )

The enigma that was Italy

More importantly Italy had wobbled backwards and forwards between supporting the allies in WWI, and threatening the Germans in the early 30's to threatening the allies in the mid 30's over territorial expansion in Africa to fighting on the anti-Communist side along with the Germans in Spain in the mid 30's to desperately trying to supply the Finns in their fight against the Soviets in 1940 despite the Germans trying to prevent them getting supplies through.

Probably the only consistent thing about Italy's stands in Mussolini's 20+ years in power was anti-communism. Which was why his relations with Hitler were so fraught when Hitler signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and why Mussolini's government did its best to ship military supplies to Finland, and entered perfectly genuine negotiations with the Allies to support operations against Russian aggression. in return for getting back all the shares in the Baku oilfields that the Communists had nationalised. (Shares that skyrocketed on the French Bourse during the Finnish crisis. )

Mussolini was an opportunist rather than a genuine foam flecked fascist like Hitler. But he was a very genuine anti-Communist. People remember that at one point he signed they Axis Treaty with Germany, but manage to forget all the other treaties he signed with France (such as the Locarno Treaties in the 20's, and the Mussolini-Laval Accords in the 30's). The times he seemed to swap sides usually had more to do with where Britain, France or Germany were on the anti-Communist perspective at that point, than with which side he finished up on. Though of course, he always wanted any glorious territorial success story for his people to gloat about. the what and where, and indeed value, of that territory was actually hardly even relevant. (Ethiopia for God's sake! Who would want to fight a major conflict to control Ethiopia. particularly when Britain can cut your communications to it any time it likes?)

Frankly, had the allies gone to war at the time of the Rhineland, or even of Anschluss or had they seemed like winning against the Molotov-Ribbentrop alliance: then Mussolini would probably just have joined the allied side. (For appropriate prestige and preferably territorial enrichment of course. Principals be damned.)

Mussolini made the fatal choice of joining Germany in 1940 –against the wishes of most of his population – simply because he saw a quick and easy win when France collapsed. He even let that greed overcome his disgust at the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

But there is no way he would have declared war on Britain and France unless France suddenly collapsed. as it did in Germany's 1940 sweet spot. If war had not started until December 1941, and Italy had been faced with the naval balance of power listed above, there is no way that Mussolini would declare war on the allies. In fact, even if a much stronger set of allies had still seen France still collapse in 1942, it is nonetheless hard to see Mussolini taking the 'opportunity' he saw in 1940, given the overwhelming RN superiority that would completely dominate the Mediterranean by 1942.

Mussolini thought he saw a 'sweet spot' in 1940, and was wrong. It is unlikely he would have imagined the same sweet spot in the 1942 conditions described above.

Frankly Italy abandoning its century long ally Britain and opportunistically joining the German side in 1940, was as bad a decision as Turkey doing the same thing in 1914. With equally bad results.

In the classic phrase of an Indiana Jones film, 'he chose poorly'.

Such incentives would have been extremely unlikely to happen in 1942. even if France did collapse then.

If war between Germany and the allies started in December 1941 it is hard not to see Mussolini joining the allied side. As long as he could get something out of it.

Particularly if it was a war of allies against a Molotov-Ribbentrop pact alliance.

Only if the war that started in December 1941 was between Germany and the Soviets, but not against Britain and France, might he have been on the same side as in the Spanish Civil War. (With the slight qualification that the British and French navies had not been willing to prevent him interfering in Spain during their civil war, and he would need the same effective licence from those navies to even considering interfering in Russia if Germany attacked the Soviets.)

To emphasise the point. Mussolini was genuinely anti-Communist, but also genuinely opportunistic. He only moved when he thought he saw real advantage.

Moving against the allies in 1940 probably seemed like a good idea at the time. But that in no way implies that he would have declared war on Britain and France at any point that didn't seem so opportunistically advantageous.

Similarly, the December 1941 Japanese Navy preferred option to 'go south' against the French, American, British and Dutch colonial possessions (rather than keeping on with the Japanese Army's preferred 'going north' against the Chinese and Russians): was again, a decision to try and take advantage of a temporary 'sweet spot'.

Again, it may have looked clever to start with, but in reality, they also 'chose poorly'.

In reality France and the Netherlands had been suddenly knocked out of the war and occupied. (Making efforts to defend their Asian possessions almost impossible, and allowing the occupation of French Indo-China, which moved the Japanese air forces within easy reach of Malaysia, and also allowed her to demand 'basing rights' in Thailand).

And in reality Britain was suddenly saddled with a world-wide multi-front war where it was very difficult to move enough forces East to secure Malaya and Singapore in time. (Britain was fighting the Germans and Italians in Europe, Africa and the Middle East across the north and South Atlantics, and the Indian Ocean and also trying to fight enough supplies through to a recently invaded Russia to keep it in the war, which required the occupation of Syria, Iraq and Iran as well.)

Even though Britain theoretically had the military forces to secure Malaya if it had been possible to move them to the other side of the world in time, she could not get troops and planes from Europe to Asia while trying to keep all the other balls in the air. (The 3,000 fighters and several hundred tanks the British had shipped to Russia in 1941 may have been critical to save Moscow in December 1941, but a mere 10% of those planes and tanks would almost certainly have saved Malaya. IN fact 20% and the Japanese would not even have tried. Such are the consequences of difficult choices in wartime.)

Nonetheless, by March 1942 the intention was to have a fleet of 7 battleships and 2-3 aircraft carriers based in Ceylon, with enough extra planes and troops arriving in Malaya to finally make it secure enough to move an offensive fleet there. (And similarly the US was reinforcing its Pacific fleet and Philippines air forces as well, and discussions were finally moving towards combined operations, and units of the USN – a carrier, several cruisers and lots of destroyers and submarines were usually mentioned – rebasing to Singapore to support the RN.)

By April, or at latest by May 1942, the allies would have been strong enough to make a Japanese attack far more risky.

But in December 1941 the allied reinforcements were still dribbling in, and no proper plans for co-operation had been finalised: allowing the Japanese chose to take the chance. A temporary sweet spot.

Had war in Europe not broken out yet, it is hard to see Japan taking the chance.

Allied Naval Forces in the Far East in December 1941

Again, here are a couple of paragraphs from my post on Aircraft Carriers in December 1941 (read the full post for full deployments. )

The above does not include the dozens of extra cruisers, destroyers, submarines and escorts the allies would have been able to relocate to Asia in these circumstances. The Dutch alone had a number of new cruisers and submarines coming on line between 1939 and 1942 to reinforce the half dozen cruisers and 20 odd submarines already based there.

British, French and American air production was also skyrocketing from 1938 onwards (with a lot of the US increase being orders for the French and Dutch and even Chinese military), and without war start in September 1939, the allied air forces in Asia would have looked similarly enhanced by December 1941. Unless France and the Netherlands had already fallen to Germany: French Indo-China, Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies, would all have had a steady flow of new aircraft arriving. (And the main Japanese air forces would be starting from Taiwan – 3,100 kilometres away from Singapore – not from French Indo-China – about 1,100 kilometres – or indeed from Thailand - literally next door to Malaya.)

With conscription being re-introduced in March 1939 in Britain (pre-1939 war start. ) late 1939 in Australia (admittedly on war start, but probably would have come anyway considering how the Menzies government was going) and in 1940 in the US (again, well the US entering the war): it is also likely that Britain, India and Australia would have had a several more divisions to defend Malaya, let alone US reinforcements to the Philippines, French to Indo-China or Dutch to the East Indies.

Even should France and the Netherlands both suddenly collapse after a December 1941 start where Germany, Italy and Japan actually co-ordinated efforts (realistically never likely to happen), Japan could not have just started from positions in Indo-China and Thailand for it's Blitzkreig, and wouldn't have had the necessary sweet spot of temporary superiority to allow it to move it's forces quickly to defeat each allied position one at a time before they could be made more secure.

Repeating the Turkish Mistake

Frankly Japan was an unlikely opponent anyway. On the allied side in WWI, it was really only a combined effort by paranoid Americans and racist Australians that saw the Anglo-Japanese Naval Treaty – only just renewed post war – destroyed at the Washington naval conference. But for that incredibly stupid decision, the Japanese would have been as foolish to take on their British allies in WWII, as the Turks were to attack their long term ally and protector in WWI.

It may have seemed a good opportunity at the time, but see 'they chose poorly' above.

German/Japanese Co-operation

In the real war, the Axis version of co-operation was pathetic, with almost no attempt to co-ordinate action between the Germans and the Japanese.

Personally I think this is partly German racism, partly Japanese paranoia, and partly simply that the Japanese opportunism against the allies was almost as surprising to the Germans as German opportunism against the Russians a few months earlier had been to the Japanese.

But if we assume no start to war in 1939, and give the Germans and Japanese 2 extra years to communicate, (and particularly if we don't have the shocking Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to convince the Japanese not to trust the Germans): might they have actually come up with some sort of combined strategy?

I still think probably not, but if it had happened, it could have had only one target.

Again, people forget that when the allies intervened in the White Russian wars between the communists and the Tsarists in the post-WWI period, one of those allies had been Japan. Even when the British and French eventually withdrew their troops from Archangel, Finland, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Siberia: the Japanese had continued to occupy significant parts of Siberia for several years.

And since engaging in the 'China adventure' in the 30's, Japan had fought several encounters with the Soviets. See Zhukov's brilliant victory against them in 1939 for instance. (And get a reinforced sense of why the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact really, really convinced the Japanese they couldn't trust the Nazi's.)

Yet if war had not happened in 1939. and particularly if the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact had not seen Japan 'stabbed in the back' by their Axis friend, then would a war start in December 1941 have seen the two co-operate to crush Russia? Certainly Japan's Foreign Minister Matsuoko had been as keen on the idea as the Imperial General Staff.

In 1941 it seems far more likely that the Japanese would 'do a Poland' and co-operate with Germany to go after Russia than that they would co-operate with Germany to attack a combination of Britain, France, the Netherlands and the US.

Any chance of Italy joining the Axis?

Not in an attack on Britain and France (and incidentally on the US), no.

Particularly if Italy was now feeling a bit pro-allied in that regard. or should we say a bit more intimidated by rising allied naval superiority.

In fact the ONLY way Italy might finish up on the Axis side in December 1941, would appear to be if Germany and Japan convinced Mussolini that Russia was the only target. and that the British and French might not go to war to save her.

(This is not to say that Mussolini might not have tried to knock off Greece or Yugoslavia in passing. He was still a dangerously stupid opportunist. But if he did finish in a war against Britain and France, it would almost certainly be by accidental hubris, not by cunning plan. )

So is there any chance of a World War starting in December 1941 instead.

No, not in the form we know it.

But yes, definitely in the form of a German and Japanese alliance against Russia.

After all, that would be both more possible, and more attractive, given the changing balance of naval power.

There is even the possibility that Italy might have joined them in an 'anti-Communist crusade', but only if they thought it would NOT involve fighting Britain and France in the process.

So you are left with Germany and Japan, and perhaps Italy, against Russia and. China?

But does that become a world war? Could such a simple war start have led to 'complications'.

Would Britain or France have gone to war to save Stalin's appalling Communist dictatorship in such circumstances? It seems unlikely. (Nor would the Dominions have been keen to go to war for Stalin.)

Would Germany or Japan have felt it to be clever to attack Britain and France in such circumstances? It seems unlikely. If they were getting their territorial aggrandisement unopposed, why would you?

More interestingly, would the US have eventually decided to try and intervene on China's behalf anyway? Unlikely given US isolationism, and the reality that the US showed no interest in joining in either world war until forced into it, (and even then in 1941 it only actually declared war on Japan after having their teeth kicked in. Hitler still had to be the one to declare war on the US to get them properly involved). But I suppose it is still possible to conceive of the US going to war with Japan over China. After all, it was ever increasing US pressure and sanctions over China that effectively convinced Japan it had to take on the US in 1941.

This then provides the amusing picture of the US deciding to fight Japan over China while Britain and France are still neutral. (It may be hard to imagine the US actually taking the lead in anything given their domestic politics, but it parallels what they actually did in 1941.)

In which case, perhaps it would even having the same disastrous results that the US managed to achieve in reality? Without any British, Indian, Australian, New Zealand or Dutch allies distract the Japanese military into Malaya, the East Indies, Burma, New Guinea, and the Indian Ocean: there would be no need to divert most of the best Japanese units in other directions. Leaving only the barest screen against the British and French navies, the Japanese could have concentrated their battle hardened forces on the inexperienced and inadequately prepared Americans instead.

[Actually that looks like being a fun article in itself. perhaps my next post. ]

Actually it even offers the amusing thought of a US-Russian-Chinese alliance against a German-Japanese-Italian alliance. without Britain or France becoming involved. Sweet!

More realistically though, a German attack on Russia in the 1940 or 1941 campaigning seasons would almost certainly have succeeded, for the following reasons:
1) The entire German military could have concentrated on Russia. Instead of the reality where 90% of the Kreigsmarine (or what was left of it after 2 years of war with Britain), 50% of the Luftwaffe, and 35% of the Wehrmacht, were occupying - Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete and fighting in/over/under – Britain, North Africa, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean.
2) The Russians would not get immediate support from people already fighting the Germans. Certainly not thousands of vital fighters and tanks pre Christmas.
3) The best German forces for the invasion would not have done a little detour for a couple of thousand miles through the Balkans down to Greece and Crete, and back to the Polish border, before kicking off. And not suffered the casualties, attrition, and wastage of irreplaceable supplies that they actually suffered just prior to invasion in 1941. (It was actually Von Kluge's 10th Army – the one that fought all the way down to Greece and back before starting Operation Barbarossa – that finally ran out of steam in the suburbs of Moscow in December 1941. )
4) The crack German paratroop arm, which was supposed to be a key to breakthroughs in Russia – as it had been in Belgium and France – would not have been wiped out as an effective force in Crete.
5) The Russian military would not have had the time to get into the rebuild that its disastrous failures in the Finnish campaign actually led to. (Which were only starting to see vital new equipment like T34's arrive in late 1941.)
6) In fact Russia would probably not have had the disastrous Molotov-Ribbentropp Pact defeats in Finland to force it into changing its military structures, rebuilding its officer class, and hastening new equipment like the T34. Frankly it might have been in an even more parlous military state, and collapsed completely.

Frankly the 'miracle' of Russian survival in 1941 was only possible with all those things in their favour. Without any distractions to the Germans, or any rebuilds after a Finnish disaster, or indeed any equipment support from allies like Britain, the Soviets were unlikely to hold out.

Had the Japanese followed up with a serious invasion at the same time (meaning that Zhukov and his 30 crack Siberian divisions could NOT have been rebased to the defence of Moscow in December), then the Soviet collapse would have been practically guaranteed.

So the question becomes, does a Germany that has achieved its territorial ambitions in Europe and conquored Russia (and is extremely occupied digesting its new territories), then feel the need to attack Britain and France? Unlikely, at least in the short term.

Germany would simply have no capacity to attack Britain effectively. (And in Mein Kampf Hitler makes it clear that he valued the British Empire's role in the world, and saw them as natural allies who would only become enemies if they interfered in his 'rightful territorial ambitions'.) And if Britain was willing to stick to the guarantee to France, then even attacking France would be an unnecessary risk. (Remembering Hitler only felt the need to take the risky step to attack France in 1940, because they had gone to war with him over Poland. )

Or, given that they would both be much stronger by then, do Britain and France feel the need to attack Germany pre-emptively, just in case they might be next? Unlikely, as domestic politics would probably be as against it as US isolationism, and again, the Dominions might be hard to convince.

Frankly, no matter how we might fantasise that the British and French might go to war for to save the horrible Soviets, or the US go to war for the Chinese: it is far more likely Britain and France and the US would have stayed quietly behind their much improved defences, and just negotiated for the Germans and Japanese be satisfied with their new colonial empires in Russia and China.

If war had been delayed from the 'sweet spots' that Germany managed in 1939/40, and Italy and Japan consequently THOUGHT they saw in 1940/41, then it would simply not have happened in the same way.

Given naval build up alone, neither Italy or Japan would have even considered going to war with Britain and France in December 1941. No sweet spot = no fatal attraction.

Now whether a late 1940's war between a new German/Japanese alliance that had successfully integrated Russia and most of China, and THOUGHT they saw a sweet spot of allied disunity later. whether that might have happened.