Kan lide og ikke lide blandt Napoleons Marshalls of the Empire

Kan lide og ikke lide blandt Napoleons Marshalls of the Empire

Det er anekdotisk, men jeg vil vide, om Marshalls of the Empire udpeget af Napoleon kom godt overens, eller om de næsten ikke kunne tolerere hinanden.

Jeg er specielt interesseret i Lannes, Davout, Desaix, Masséna, Murat, Ney og Soult.

Jeg ved det allerede - vær venlig at rette mig, hvis jeg tager fejl - det Murat blev ikke meget værdsat af Davout, Lannes eller Ney. At Ney og Soult hadede hinanden efter Spanien. At Desaix og Davout var venlige, og det Masséna nægtede at dømme Ney til døden efter de hundrede dage.

Hvis alt det ovenstående er korrekt, er der så noget andet værd at nævne - forholdsmæssigt - blandt disse syv Marshalls of the Empire?


Jeg vil basere følgende på et essay af Frans G Bengtsson, "Marskalkarna av Frankrike", fundet i Sällskap för en eremit. Essayet blev til gengæld skrevet, efter at han havde læst Gabriel d'Orgevals Le Maréchalat de France og især den del, jeg vil tage mit materiale fra, G.A. Macdonell Napoleon og hans marskaller. Jeg vil bruge ordet "had" meget som en catch-all, da det er svært at se på en kort konto præcis, hvor stærk modviljen faktisk var. Jeg vil også dække mislikninger mellem alle marskalens, til gavn for alle, der finder dette spørgsmål i fremtiden. Videre til det egentlige svar:

Marshalerne ser ud til at have lidt lidt af hinanden som hovedregel:

  • Davout, Berthier og Bernadotte hadede alle hinanden.
  • Ney og Soult hadede hinanden.
  • Soult og Masséna hadede hinanden
  • Masséna og Bessières hadede hinanden.
  • Macdonald og Gouvion Saint-Cyr hadede hinanden.
  • Augereau og Murat hadede hinanden.
  • Lannes hadede Murat og Bessières, og de hadede ham på skift.

Følgende par ser ud til at have været gode venner:

  • Davout og Oudinot
  • Murat og Bessières
  • Lannes og Augereau

Kan lide og ikke lide blandt Napoleons marmorer i imperiet - Historie

Napoleonske historikeres tabte stemmer

"Hans rekord er lang, og der er mange pletter, forfalskninger og uklare passager," skrev George Gordon Andrews, "men så længe mægtige våbengerninger vækker fantasien hos mænd og navne på helte indgraveret i berømmelseshaller, som så længe store administrationsværker og statsmandskab letter menneskets byrder, så længe genialitet, der storslået tør — og mislykkes, har magt til at løfte menneskets sind til store bestræbelser, så længe vil Napoleon være sin side værdig i historiens optegnelser. "

Denne passage fra Napoleon in Review (1939) er blot et eksempel på de tabte stemmer fra historikere, der brugte meget af deres liv på at strømme over Napoleons forskning, men hvis bøger nu er udgivet og ofte utilgængelige. Tilgængeligheden af ​​bøger om Napoleon Bonaparte har aldrig været et problem, men mange interessante værker er ved at uddø.

Undgåelse af den store samling af Napoleoniske erindringer og de forfattere, der enten falder ind i kategorierne heltenes tilbedelse eller anti - Napoleon, er en anmeldelse af den håndfuld af de tusinder af ud -of -print biografier nyttig, især når der fokuseres på de historikere, der frit delte deres mening om Napoleon. Dette essay koncentrerer sig om deres meninger om en af ​​de mest fundamentale i Napoleons debatter: hans plads i historien. (Jeg har udeladt en af ​​mine foretrukne Napoleons forfattere, Emil Ludwig, siden hans biografi fra 1926 er let tilgængelig.)

Andrews, der underviste ved University of Iowa, levede ikke for at se sin bog udgive sin ven og mentor, Cornell -historikeren Carl L. Becker skrev introduktionen af ​​sin afdøde vens bog. Andrews mål var at gennemgå visse aspekter og egenskaber ved sit emne. "Napoleon var så inkonsekvent i mange af sine handlinger, så utroværdig i meget, at han sagde om sig selv, og så alt i alt i hans ambitiøse design, at forskellige fortolkninger af manden er uundgåelige," skrev Andrews. "Uden tvivl er netop denne kendsgerning ikke i nogen grad ansvarlig for den fortsatte interesse for hans karriere."

I sin bog fra 1885, The First Napoleon: A Sketch, Political and Military, skrev Boston's John C. Ropes: "Selvom vi ikke tøver med at tale med den korrekte alvor af Napoleons hensynsløse forløb i 1813 og 1814, om hans ihærdige tilslutning til et militær løsning af de vanskeligheder, der omfattede hans imperium, af hans ligegyldighed som soldat for krigens ondskab, for hans glemsomhed som soldat for sine pligter som suveræn, - mens vi erkender disse mangler og fejl, lad os være lige ærlige i at erkende hans store kvaliteter - hans utrættelige industri, hans hengivenhed til public service, hans oplyste syn på regering og lovgivning, hans menneskelighed. "

Marjorie Johnston, i Domination: Some Napoleonic Episodes (1930), der talte om Napoleon -æraen, sagde, at det kun var muligt, mens Napoleon "forblev i stand til at dominere det, da en gud dominerer hans skabelse. Det var en ting, der så hurtigt og ufuldstændigt blev opfattet, at den undlod at retfærdiggøre sin eksistens i tide for at redde sig selv fra ødelæggelse, men som en skabelse havde den nogle meget flotte elementer. " Johnston mente, at 1803 var begyndelsen på slutningen for Napoleon og sagde, at det var første gang, revolutionært Frankrig bevidst havde søgt påskud for krig.

"Havde Bonaparte død i det år," skrev Johnston, "havde verden efterladt et helt andet indtryk af ham." Napoleon ville have været "betragtet i lyset af noget heroisk og husket som noget ejendommeligt, men måske farligt, fint", ifølge Johnston. "En stor soldat, en stor befrier, en stor reformator og en stor lovgiver. Da det imidlertid blev givet ham at leve i 18 år efter dette og arbejde aktivt for 12, er han blevet fordømt - og det er det må tilstås med en vis grad af sandhed - som en usurpator, en tyran og en grådig, egoistisk og ambitiøs hersker har det også vist sig umuligt at benægte, at hans arbejde, som det var, blev udført med en udsøgt effektivitet er næsten fuldkommen. "

Den britiske forfatter Norwood Young (The Growth of Napoleon: A Study in Environment, 1910) skrev, at Napoleons kommando over Italiens hær i 1796 var den centrale begivenhed, der sikrede hans plads i historien. Da han diskuterede kombinationen af ​​held og geni, sagde Young, at Bonapartes lykke "gav ham kommando, da han var ukendt, det gav omstændigheder forbundet med den kommando, som hjalp ham med at vise sin evne, og det fortsatte med at tilbyde lignende gunstige muligheder i efterfølgende kampagner. "

Napoleons særegne kombination af militært geni, civil uinteresse og dominerende vilje var lige hvad Frankrig ønskede, skrev Young. "Disse kvaliteter var tilfældigvis passende for tiden og stedet, og han havde den bemærkelsesværdige lykke at få mulighed for at vise dem på en stor scene." Hans geni var militær ifølge Young. "Af hans borgerreformer er det mest at sige, at de i det hele taget kan beskrives som fremskridt."

Brødrene Headley fra New England skrev hver om Napoleon i løbet af det nittende århundrede. J.T. (Joel Tyler) Headley var forfatter af historiske og biografiske værker. Hans Napoleon og hans marskaller fra 1847 indeholdt denne kommentar: "Napoleons moralske karakter var ligegyldig nok endnu som en ven af ​​menneskelig frihed og ivrig efter at fremme racens fremskridt ved at åbne feltet for talent og geni, uanset hvor lav deres fødsel er, han var uendeligt overlegen alle de suveræne, der forsøgte at knuse ham. "

P.C. (Phineas Camp) Headley, en gejstlig og forfatter til biografier, skrev The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte i 1903: "Napoleon var stor - intellektuelt tårnhøje over prinserne og monarkerne i mange generationer. Han havde ingen rival i krigens taktik. Hans fantasien var under fornuftens vejledning, hvis intuition var klar som morgenlys og så hurtig i deres omfattende handling. "

Men, skrev Headley, Napoleon var en "moralsk dværg", der selv i sine "storsindede gerninger altid fremrykkede sin berømmelse. Han stræbte efter ubestridt fremtrædende plads blandt Europas troner, men han havde ikke de højere kvaliteter i hjertet og den rene filantropi, som ville have gjort det sikkert at holde den magt, der til tider syntes inden for hans rækkevidde. "

Walter Geer inkluderede et reflekterende kapitel om Bonapartes karriere i slutningen af ​​hans Napoleon den Første i 1921: En intim biografi og brugte, ligesom mange Napoleons forfattere, ordet "dominans" til at beskrive Napoleons indvirkning. "Det var dog først mod slutningen af ​​sin karriere, at Napoleon helt gav efter for denne dominansånd. Så da han så nationer underkaste sig og suveræne bøjer sig for ham, tager han ikke længere hensyn til hverken mennesker eller natur, og tør alt, påtager sig alt. "

Ifølge Geer udviklede Napoleon gradvist følelsen af, at fiasko var umulig: "Da han ophørte med at tolerere uenighed, gik diskussionen i ubrug, og alle adlød hans ordrer, selvom de vidste, at kejseren ikke var underholdt af fakta." Geer mener, at dette blev illustreret under kampagnen i 1813, "den fattigste han nogensinde har gennemført." Geer bemærkede også, at Bonaparte, lige så genial som Napoleons militære berømmelse, "indså, at han manglede den største af alle rekvisitter til politisk magt - legitimitet - og at kun fortsat succes kunne sikre hans trons stabilitet."

Selvom William Milligan Sloanes biografi med fire bind er en klassisk reference, er den muligvis stadig ikke bredt tilgængelig. Sloane, dengang professor i historie ved Princeton og redaktør af American Historical Review, skrev denne biografi til serialisering i Century Magazine i 1894 - 1895, og den blev senere udgivet som en bog i 1912. Den tidligere sekretær for historiker George Bancroft skrev, " Generelt er der ikke noget mysterium i dominansens magt: han bestemmer, hvem der er uundværlig.Jakobinerne havde brug for en mand, de fandt ham i den skrupelløse Bonaparte, biblioteket havde brug for en mand, de fandt ham i den ekspertartillerist Frankrig havde brug for en mand, fandt hun ham i erobreren af ​​Italien. "

Sloane, der mente "der ikke findes nogen registrering af menneskelig aktivitet mere fuldstændig" end Bonapartes, opsummerede også Napoleons fiasko i et ord - udmattelse. Det var først, da hans modstandere lærte lektierne ", som han lærte sine generaler ved en række objektdemonstrationer, der varede 20 år, at læreren begyndte at falde i succes og pragt. Bedømt enten historisk eller teoretisk er Napoleons strategi" original, unik og uudmærket. "Sloane bemærkede, at dette var Napoleons største præstation, fordi det var" hans mest kreative. "

Ida M. Tarbell var ikke en etableret myndighed om Napoleon, men havde fulgt den aktuelle litteratur om Napoleon, mens han skrev i Frankrig for McClure's Magazine. I 1894 blev den 37-årige forfatter bedt af sine redaktører om at skrive et stykke om Bonaparte, der skulle ledsage en samling af Napoleons illustrationer til at køre i otte afleveringer, det blev udgivet som en bog to år senere. Hendes tanker om Bonaparte er inkluderet, fordi hendes stykke afspejler den voksende Napoleon -bevægelse i Amerika på det tidspunkt.

"Han var sin tids største geni," skrev hun og tilføjede, "måske nogensinde, men alligevel manglede han storhedens krone - den høje visdom født af refleksion og introspektion, der kender sine egne kræfter og begrænsninger og aldrig misbruger dem den fine følelse af proportioner, der holder andres rettigheder i den samme højtidelige ærbødighed, som den kræver for sin egen. "

Hun viste, ligesom de andre forfattere, der er repræsenteret her, en balance til optegnelsen Bonaparte forlod: "Man kan være overbevist om, at de grundlæggende principper i hans liv var despotiske om, at han brugte de ædle ideer om personlig frihed, om ligestilling og om broderskab, som en tyran om, at hele tendensen i hans civile og militære system var at koncentrere magten i et enkelt par hænder, aldrig at fordele den, hvor den hørte til, blandt de mennesker, man måske føler, at han ofte ofrede personlig værdighed til et teatralsk ønske om at pålægge mængden som en helt af klassiske proportioner, en gud fra Olympus kan man stønnen over det blod, han spildte.

"Men han kan ikke nægte at erkende," fortsatte Tarbell, "at ingen nogensinde mere klart havde forstået den pragtfulde videnskab om krig, han ikke kan undgå at bøje sig for det geni, der opfandt og udførte den italienske kampagne, der kæmpede de klassiske kampe ved Austerlitz, Jena og Wagram. Disse gerninger er store epos. De bevæger sig i ædle, målte linjer og rører os ved deres magt og perfektion. Det er kun et geni af den mest storslåede orden, der kunne håndtere mennesker og materialer, som Napoleon gjorde. "

Nye bøger om Napoleon er bestemt velkomne, såsom Alan Schoms (1997), men selvom nuværende forfattere stoler på de beretninger, der kom før dem, er det umuligt at fange deres forgængeres ånd fuldstændigt. For disse stemmer skal vi fortsætte med at stole på de mængder, der for længst er udgået på velassorterede folke- og universitetsbiblioteker og de muggenes korridorer i vores foretrukne brugte boghandel.


The Savage Storm af David Andress - anmeldelse

D ivrig Andress nye bog forsøger at være en militær, politisk og social historie om Napoleonskrigene. Det genfortæller to historier, velkendte favoritter for læsere af patriotiske historier: hvordan Pitt, Nelson, Wellington og den "modstandsdygtige" britiske herskende klasse reddede Storbritannien fra invasion af Napoleons hære og hvordan Pitt og hans tilhængere i regeringen sikrede, at Storbritannien ikke blev en revolutionær republik efter den franske model eller en satellitstat i det franske imperium.

Disse to historier af og til afbrydes af stumper af social historie, som kan dukke op de mest uventede steder. Jeg var især forundret, da meddelelsen om den britiske sejr i Waterloo på bogens højdepunkt pludselig muterede til en beretning om Regency -mode, som om Andress havde glemt at lægge den andre steder. Forlagene mener, at det samlede resultat er et levende portræt af alderen, en sammensmeltning af social og militær historie, men det er bestemt kampene, der ophidser dens forfatter mest, og bogen vil blive nydt mest af læsere, der deler hans entusiasme.

Slagene, især dem, som Storbritannien var involveret i, beskrives i betydelig længde, med en god del verve og meget fra britisk side. Franskmændene er gentagne gange out-generalled og out-fightede. Napoleon selv, for hvem Andress tydeliggør sin modvilje, beskrives på et eller andet tidspunkt som mobning, selvtilfredse, solipsistisk, forvirrende, vildledt, tvangsmæssig, selvrespektiv og ofte forvekslet, hvilket alle uden tvivl var. Men på samme tid for at rejse sig så hurtigt fra en ydmyg artilleri-officer til kejser, må han sikkert have haft nogle mere brugbare kvaliteter?

Andress giver ham held og lykke, men var disse velsignelser, og den hensynsløshed, Andress også medgiver ham, virkelig nok til at redegøre for de succeser, han nød eller beundringen af ​​hans beundrere? Han tillader Bonaparte en vis militær dygtighed i den tidlige del af sin karriere senere, men når han vinder kampe, er det normalt fordi han er reddet fra fiasko af sine underordnede officerer, og dette på trods af det faktum, at det fremgår af Andress's beretning, at han var ikke særlig god til at bedømme, hvilke officerer der skulle promoveres.

Blandt nogle mærkeligt udvalgte billeder- victorianske graveringer af georgiske kampe, en karikatur af William Windham fejlagtigt identificeret som Pitt- er portrætter af fire af Napoleons marskaller, hvoraf tre, ifølge billedteksterne, hovedsageligt er mindeværdige for deres svagheder: forkælet, ydmyget, over- ivrig, uforstandig. Måske er hovedspørgsmålet, som bogen skulle behandle af denne beretning, ikke hvordan briterne i sidste ende formåede at give Napoleon en blodig næse, men hvorfor det tog dem så lang tid.

Andress's forståelse af krigens militære historie virker dog en hel del fastere end hans greb om reformbevægelsen i 1790'erne og dens efterfølgere i det nye århundrede. En del af myten om Pitt, den "himmelskfødte minister", "piloten, der gennemlevede stormen", den mest modstandsdygtige i en modstandsdygtig herskende klasse, er forestillingen om, at han samtidig med at redde Storbritannien fra invasion af Fransk, holdt han en svulmende strøm af hjemmevoksede revolutionære tilbage. Det oprindelige mål for bevægelsen for parlamentariske reformer, fortæller Andress, var "at få en politisk stemme gennem manddom stemmeret - men det indebar at feje alle strukturer i den eksisterende orden væk, og efterhånden som deres antal voksede, voksede den trussel, der blev opfattet, også de stillede. "

Dette er propaganda, og Andress ser ud til at have slugt det hele. I et par måneder i 1795 havde den største af reformgrupperne, London Corresponding Society, sandsynligvis 3.000 betalte medlemmer, noget mindre end 1% af den voksne mandlige befolkning i London, men i det meste af sit korte liv havde den langt færre end 1.000. Nogle få af dem i reformbevægelsen var virkelig republikanere, men det er usandsynligt, at mange ønskede mere end årlige parlamenter og almindelig manddomstemme, og det virker klart, at jo mere republikansk et radikalt samfund blev, jo mindre medlemskab var det.

Efterfølgende regeringer ønskede, at offentligheden skulle tro, at de gjorde alt, hvad de kunne for at indeholde en massebevægelse af bevæbnede oprørere på den måde, at de kunne aflede opmærksomheden fra reformatorernes faktiske krav ved at advare om det anarki, de angiveligt ville skabe. Men de vidste, at der aldrig var den mindste chance for en væbnet revolution. Regeringens egne omhyggelige undersøgelser antydede, at LCS og dets efterfølgerforeninger på det britiske fastland i et land, der var grundigt politiseret af militsregimenter, havde adgang til færre våben, end der kunne dekorere væggene i et lille landsted. Ludditterne, om hvem Andress giver en kort, men sympatisk redegørelse, havde sandsynligvis flere, men havde ingen planer om at "feje den eksisterende orden væk".

Det, der til sidst slog franskmændene ned efter Andress 'beretning, var sømandsskabet for Nelson, generalskabet i Wellington og under hele krigen "modstandsdygtigheden" for den britiske elite, den herskende klasse. Portrætterne af Napoleons marskaller matches af billeder af britiske politikere, og denne gang har billedteksterne næppe et dårligt ord at sige, selvom George Canning beskrives som "over-følelsesmæssig" og Lord Grenville "querulous" (men kun når han vender Whig og angriber udførelsen af ​​halvøskrigen). Men selvom Andress føler dybt for den herskende elite - tror jeg ikke mange historikere stadig synes det er "foruroligende", to hundrede år efter begivenheden, at mordet på Spencer Perceval på alle premierministre blev mødt med mere glæde end sorg - han er villig andre steder til at erkende, at mange af dem havde "en forfærdelig ligegyldighed over for de menneskelige omkostninger ved krig", delte "en forankret foragt for almindelige menneskers politiske rettigheder" og var grundigt korrupte. Så var de faktisk: dem, der krævede almindelig manddomlig stemmeret og årlige parlamenter, troede rimelig nok, at kun disse to foranstaltninger kunne bringe en stopper for det system af institutionaliseret bestikkelse, hvorved aristokratiet nød et næsten monopol på politisk magt. Dette var det system, reformatorerne ønskede at "feje væk", og dette, som regeringerne var parate til at gøre alt for at bevare, retsforfølge tankeforbrydelser, bøje loven, stole på beviser, som de vidste var forfalden, og pakke juryer med regeringssupportere (ikke sjældent, som Andress hævder, men rutinemæssigt). Men selv om de var urokkelige, foragtelige og korrupte, var det aristokratiets modstandsdygtige engagement i krigsindsatsen, hvad enten det var som politikere eller officerer, der "smed en sag" for dem, mener Andress, "som ikke blot det historiske, men også moderne herskende elite ".

Andress er klar over, at han har skrevet en "personlig", endda en partisanbog, og er angrende. "Det er mine forforståelser og fordomme," skriver han, "hvis de kolliderer med dine, kan jeg kun håbe, at debatten er frugtbar." Det meste af vejen gennem bogen støder mine forforståelser og fordomme, hvis det er det, de er (jeg tænker selvfølgelig på dem som velbegrundede domme) faktisk med Andress. Men hvis hans pointe er, at den herskende elite i Napoleon -æra meget lignede den moderne herskende elite, er jeg med ham hele vejen. De er måske ikke så blåblodige i dag, men de afgiver lige så velhavende, nogle af dem, en mere end vag duft af korruption, der kaldes ligeglade med lidelser for mange af dem, de hersker over foragtende over for rettighederne til "almindelige" mennesker". Det lyder for mig som den moderne herskende elite.

John Barrell Despotismens ånd: Invasioner af privatliv i 1790'erne udgives af OUP.


Syv ting Napoleon ikke kunne lide (eller hadede)

Selvom Napoleon kunne lide mange ting, såsom at give folk øgenavne, var der flere mennesker og ting, Napoleon ikke kunne lide (eller hadede). Han hadede enhver, der var svag, og han hadede det, da andre europæiske lande kæmpede mod ham om magten. Der var også syv andre ting, som han ikke kunne lide eller hadede. De var Storbritannien, Madame de Staël, dårlige bøger, katte, hunde, Kashmir sjaler og Toussaint L ’Ouverture.

Napoleon Bonaparte. Forfatterens samling.

Napoleon hadede Storbritannien lige så meget som briterne frygtede ham. På grund af deres frygt blandede briterne sig i franske anliggender, og det fik Napoleon til at betragte briterne som en konstant torn i hans side. Under Napoleonskrigene (1803-1815) kæmpede han mod et svingende udvalg af europæiske magter, der dannede sig i forskellige koalitioner, og blev finansieret og normalt ledet af Storbritannien. Napoleon ville ødelægge briterne og håbede at erstatte deres imperium med fransk indflydelse. Selv efter at han blev tvunget til at abdisere, følte han sig stadig overlegen i forhold til briterne, så da han undslap Elba og før slaget ved Waterloo, erklærede han:

"Jeg fortæller dig, at Wellington er en dårlig general, englænderne er dårlige soldater, vi vil afklare dette ved frokosttid." [1]

Selvfølgelig ved vi alle, at hans ord kom tilbage for at hjemsøge ham. Wellington besejrede Napoleon, og han blev derefter fængslet på St. Helena, hvor han den 5. maj 1821 døde af mavekræft, ligesom sin far.

Napoleon kunne også ikke lide den formidable Anne Louise Germaine Necker, bedre kendt som Madame de Staël, fordi hun ikke var villig til at bukke under for hans indflydelse. Germaine far var Jacques Necker, Louis XVIs finansminister, og derved en magtfuld og velhavende mand. Napoleon var lidt utilpas med hendes familieforbindelser, og han ville også have, at folk kunne lide ham. Madame de Staël var ikke nødvendigvis en varm og fuzzy person. Hun var snarere åbenhjertig og fortalte direkte til Napoleon, hvordan hun havde det med ham, da hun frimodigt påpegede hans fejl. Da der i 1796 gik rygter om, at hun støttede genoprettelsen af ​​monarkiet, besluttede Napoleon, at han havde en grund til at eksilere hende, ligesom han senere ville eksilere hendes kære ven Madame Récamier. Madame de Staël vendte senere tilbage til Frankrig, men han forviste hende igen. I sin eksiltid fortsatte hun med at skabe fjendskab ved at kritisere Napoleon og hans regering gennem bøger, breve og essays. Kritik af hende fik Napoleon til at mislike hende endnu mere. Derfor, da hun skrev om Tyskland i sin bogtitel fra 1810 De l’Allemagne, erklærede han det anti-fransk og beordrede alle kopier af bogen ødelagt. Der skete aldrig nogen forsoning mellem de to, før Madame de Staël døde i 1817.

Madame de Staël. Forfatterens samling.

Udover at kunne lide Madame de Staël var en anden ting, Napoleon ikke kunne lide, dårlige bøger. I løbet af sin tid som ensom kadet på militærskolen blev han en ivrig læser. Han nød klassikerne og læste værker fra romerske og græske forfattere som Tacitus, Plutarch og Homer. Desuden var forfatteren fra det tyvende århundrede Louis Etienne St. Denis på grund af Napoleons kærlighed til en god bog, villig til at vise sin store utilfredshed med en dårlig.

“I hvert værelse i de private lejligheder på Tuilerierne var der kammertjener og brudgomme i kammeret. Blandt sidstnævnte var unge mænd, der havde modtaget en uddannelse. Disse sidstnævnte morede sig ved at læse for at fordrive tiden og for at aflede sig fra kedsommeligheden ved at blive i et værelse. Det skete undertiden, at i det øjeblik, hvor de mindst forventede det, ville kejseren dukke op. Bogen blev straks lagt til side, men nogle gange blev den glemt på en stol, en lejrstol eller et andet møbel. Hvis bogen faldt under kejserens øjne, ville han tage den og se den igennem. Hvis det var en god bog, ville han lægge den tilbage, hvor han fandt den, men hvis den var dårlig, ville han vise en livlig utilfredshed med, at læsning af sådanne bøger i hans palads var tilladt. Jeg er ikke sikker på, at han ikke smed dem i ilden. ” [2]

Selvom Napoleon måske ikke kunne lide bøger, kunne han ikke lide katte endnu mere. Faktisk hævdes det, at han havde en dødelig frygt for katte. En historie om ham og katte opstod efter Frankrigs anden besættelse af Wien. En nat hørte en ledsager en tumult i Napoleons værelse og åbnede døren for at finde en svedende, halvklædt Napoleon, der rasende svingede sit sværd mod de gobelin-dækkede vægge. Tilsyneladende var en kat kommet ind på hans værelse, og han forsøgte at beskytte sig selv.

Napoleon var ikke nødvendigvis et hundemenneske, enten fordi en anden af ​​de ting, Napoleon ikke kunne lide eller i det mindste ærgrede sig over, var Josephines lille pug “Fortune. ” Angiveligt hævdede Napoleon, at Fortune var hans rival og var i besiddelse af sin kone ’s seng, da han giftede sig med hende, hvilket også fik ham til at sige om mopsen:

Jeg ville fjerne ham, det var ret ubrugeligt at tænke på det, og det irriterede mig betydeligt, men jeg var nødt til at bestemme mig. Jeg gav efter. Favoritten var mindre imødekommende. Jeg bærer bevis på mit ben på, hvad jeg siger. ” [3]

Josephine ’s Pug, “Fortune. ” Public domain.

Det var ikke bare hundebid, der generede Napoleon. Han påstod, at når han og Josephine lidenskabeligt var lidenskabeligt “in flagrante delicto ” blev puggen så ked af det, at han angreb og bed ham. På trods af hundens bid kan Napoleon i sidste ende være kommet til at respektere den lille mops, fordi han engang skrev i et brev til Josephine, “Millions kys, endda til Fortune, på trods af hans uartighed. ” [4] Da Fortune døde, blev den mops, der erstattede ham, heller ikke omfavnet af Napoleon. Han afskyede hunden og trods påbud om det modsatte angiveligt “opfordre [d] sin kok til at beholde en kæmpe tyrhund, i håb om at den store hund ville fortære den lille. ” [5]

Blandt andet Napoleon ikke kunne lide var Kashmir sjaler. Han havde givet sin kone et Kashmir -sjal efter en rejse til Egypten og andre kvinder elskede så de bløde og luksuriøse sjaler, at det startede en modefælle, der fik hver kvinde i Paris til at ønske et. Inden længe erklærede Napoleon krig mod Kashmir og dets sjaler, fordi det påvirkede franske tøjproducenters velstand. Han var så ked af sjalene, at han truede kejserinden, at han ville kaste hendes Kashmir -sjaler i ilden, hvis hun blev ved med at bære dem. Imidlertid plejede kejserinden at svare ham, at så snart de kunne give hende tingene så lette og varme som kashmiruldene, ville hun være glad for at bære dem. ” [6] På grund af kejserinde ’ modvilje mod ethvert sjal, men dem fra Kashmir, det fik Napoleon til at opmuntre franskmændene til at fremstille sjaler. Angiveligt har han endda bestilt design af en storslået uldtøj som kashmir på en hvid grund … Marie Louise bar dem med en vis modvilje … [og] klagede [red] med grund, at hendes kjole & #8216greb ’ når hun gik nær ilden. ” [7]

Portræt af Madame Récamier af François Gérard med et Kashmir sjal. Hilsen af ​​Wikipedia.

Toussaint L ’Ouverture, den bemærkelsesværdige leder af de haitiske slaveoprør, der drev en klud-tag-hær af slaver til sejr, kaldes ofte “Sorte Napoleon. ” På trods af lighederne i navn og evner var Toussaint imidlertid en anden af de ting, Napoleon ikke kunne lide. Det var fordi, da Napoleon kom til magten, ønskede ejere af sukkerplantager at vende tilbage til slaveriet, hvilket fik Toussaint til at gøre indsigelse, og han kastede Haiti tilbage i krig. I 1803 indgik Napoleon, der var træt af Haiti -situationen, en aftale med Toussaint, der lovede, at han ville anerkende Haitis uafhængighed, hvis Toussaint trak sig tilbage. Napoleon forrådte ham imidlertid, da Toussaint ankom til Frankrig i 1802. Han blev anholdt og sendt i fængsel i Fort-de-Joux i Doubs i august. På grund af Napoleons afsky (eller had) til ham blev Toussaint sultet og forsømt. Han døde den 7. april 1803. År senere, da Napoleon blev spurgt om hans beklagelige behandling af Toussaint, svarede han kaldt:

Hvad kan døden af ​​en elendig neger betyde for mig? ” [8]


Noter

  1. Vincent Cronin, Napoleon Bonaparte, en intim biografi (London, 1971). Tilbage til (1)
  2. Steven Englund, Napoleon: Et politisk liv (Cambridge, MA, 2004). Tilbage til (2)
  3. Philip Dwyer, Napoleon: Vejen til magt (New Haven, CT, 2008). Tilbage til (3)
  4. Charles Esdaile, Napoleons krige: en international historie (London, 2007). Tilbage til (4)
  5. Ralph Ashby, Napoleon mod store odds (Santa Barbara, CA, 2010). Tilbage til (5)
  6. Andrew Uffindell, Napoleon, 1814: Frankrigs forsvar (Barnsley, 2009). Tilbage til (6)

Professor Hughes er taknemmelig for anmelderens kommentarer til hans bog og nægter at svare yderligere.


Livet i isolation

Rigets ledere, fortalte han sine forhørere, var en gruppe styret af fælles loyaliteter og en fælles ambition om at genoplive tyske formuer, og Hitler havde holdt denne uregerlige bande sammen ved kraft af hans vilje. Göring var ofte manden, der havde det sidste ord om de fleste spørgsmål, ikke nødvendigvis den første. Selvom han var cagey med detaljer og ofte sparsom med detaljer, mindskede Göring på ingen måde sin rolle i det tredje rigs sammensværgelser eller hans loyalitet over for Hitlers vision om et større Tyskland. Hitlers engang trofaste paladin indrømmede dog, at han havde været imod at gå i krig med England og betragtede invasionen af ​​Rusland som uundgåelig, men for tidlig.

Livet for fangerne i isolationsfængslets uhyggelige tavshed var hårdt og sjældødbrydende. Den dysterhed, der gennemsyrede gennem de kolde stenvægge i tilbageholdelsesblokken, syntes imidlertid ikke at have skyllet over Göring. Til stor irritation for de andre indsatte var han ofte højlydt, sædvanligvis bombastisk og altid trodsig. Synet af rigets tidligere ledere, der underdanigt bøjede sig for deres fangers vilje, gjorde ham rasende. I hans sind ville det på ingen måde hjælpe deres sag for retten ved at vedtage en synligt angrende opførsel. De var allerede skyldige uanset deres adfærd i fængslet.


År med økonomisk og politisk stabilisering

The financial recovery that began with the restabilization of the German currency in late 1923 received a boost in 1924 when the Allies agreed to end their occupation of the Ruhr and to grant the German government a more realistic payment schedule on reparations. A committee of the Allied Reparations Commission headed by the American financier and soon-to-be vice president Charles Dawes had recommended these changes and urged the Allies to grant sizable loans to Germany to assist its economic recovery. The Dawes Plan marked a significant step in the upswing of the German economy that lasted until the onset of the Great Depression. The 800 million gold marks in foreign loans had by 1927 enabled German industrial production to regain its 1913 prewar high. That same year the Reichstag addressed the vital need for social and class reconciliation by voting for a compulsory unemployment insurance plan. Reconciliation on the political level seemed achieved in 1925 when the 77-year-old Hindenburg was elected to succeed the deceased Ebert as president. Although no democrat, the aged field marshal took seriously his duty to support the constitution and the republic.

The guiding spirit in German foreign policy from 1924 through 1929 was the foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, who firmly believed that Germany was more likely to gain relief from the harshness of Versailles by trying to fulfill its terms than by stubbornly continuing to resist them. Stresemann’s efforts ushered in what came to be known as “the era of fulfillment.” It began in December 1925 when Germany signed the Pact of Locarno, in which it guaranteed to maintain the new postwar boundaries with France and Belgium and to submit to international arbitration any boundary disputes that might arise in the east with Poland or Czechoslovakia. Germany formally rejoined the family of nations by being granted membership in the League of Nations in September 1926. In 1928 Germany became party to the most dramatic symbolic gesture of postwar reconciliation, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which promised to outlaw aggressive war this agreement was signed by nearly all the world’s major countries during the next year.

The May 1928 Reichstag elections seemed to reflect the economic and political stabilization of the Weimar Republic. The antirepublican parties of the left and right together received only 13 percent of the total vote, with the Communists receiving 10.6 percent and the Nazis taking only 2.6 percent. Germany’s reintegration into the international political structure advanced with the decision in early 1929 by the Allied Reparations Commission to settle the reparations question. Owen D. Young, an American business executive, headed the committee appointed to make recommendations in this matter. The Young Committee proposed that German reparations be reduced to about 37 billion gold marks, less than one-third of the 1921 total, and that payments be stretched until 1988. It also called for the dissolution of the Reparations Commission and for an immediate end to what remained of the Allied occupation of the Rhineland.

The German government, seeing the obvious advantages in the Young Plan, officially accepted its terms in August 1929. However, right-wing opposition parties saw the plan as nothing less than a renewal of Germany’s humiliation. Led by the German National Peoples’ Party (DNVP) and its leader Alfred Hugenberg, the press and movie-industry lord, the nationalist opposition seized upon the constitutional processes for popular initiative and referendum in order to force the government to reverse its acceptance of the plan. To run the opposition’s anti-Young Plan campaign, Hugenberg engaged Hitler, the leader of the apparently moribund Nazi Party. The objective was to force the German government to repudiate the reparations debt as well as the war guilt clause of Versailles upon which the debt rested. German signatories to the Young Plan, moreover, were to become liable to the charge of treason. The right wing’s initiative did force the Reichstag into reconsidering its approval of the Young Plan but to no avail. The national plebiscite that necessarily followed found only 13.8 percent of the voters favouring the objectives of the right wing. The bitterness of the campaign, however, may have contributed to the illness and death of Stresemann during the campaign.


"Why the "Empire Hatred"?" Topic

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Please do not use bad language on the forums.

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Kommentarer eller rettelser?

Sider: 1 2

No idea why any one would "hate" a rules set. Dislike. Fair nok.

Either way. If you don't like them, leave em to the folk that do.

Well, the emperor just isn't a very nice guy, what with stormtroopers stomping all over the place………Don't get me started on Darth Vader, what a total [email protected][email protected]!…………

Reading the Empire board made me realize that I have no desire to play the game.

Haven't been back there in several years!

As we all well know, sometimes the problem ain't the rules.

In this case however, it is.

Well, I guess from the "haters" out there, we can assume only about 1% of pewter pushers actually enjoy a good set of rules like this. I am part of that 1%, and would seriously consider dropping my membership, if this site folded. I have gleaned some valuable info over the last couple years from other knuckleheads who post here. Seriously, I appreciate our discussions, though I have to admit (as in this thread), you have to sift through the garbage posts to find a gem or two. Doesn't bother me in the least that others have negative comments, as it adds flavor to any discussion, and occasionally, someone gets it dead on correct. Plus, in terms of basing units, unit strengths, how another gamer combines units, etc it gives me a different perspective on how I run my own units. I have over 10,000 figures, so I take serious the posts here, if, for no other reason, than to make sure I am current with the rest of the gaming world.

I don't knock others who choose to play simplistic rules I just don't expect them to bully me off any site, because it is not to their liking. After all, win, lose or draw, we are all just pewter pushers and dice rollers. We share that common bond, no matter how simplistic or complicated the rules set we use. We all use what makes us happy what gives us a great satisfaction at the end of a game, like a good meal, or a woman's touch.

I agree with your comments, John. Live and let live to each his own. Let the site stand…

Hi, I believe the site is in no danger. Like I said in my previous comment and as several others have stated I doubt most of the folks advocating the boards elimination could care one way or the other about Empire. I played it for about a year or so until lack of players made it impossible. I had taught a few other and thought there were some cool ideas in the rules.

However, there is a principle involved. There simply are boards that see little or no use. Martin R has it right. When topics drop off the front page they can often be too difficult to find. The search engine isn't always a great help. I would favor archiving all material on a board being eliminated or moving it to a similar one.

For example, explain why there is a 6mm scifi board and a Dirtside one? Jeg ved. Bill likes Dirtside. However, consider that the most recent top 3 busiest Dirtside posts have 2 of those 3 threads crossposted to 6mm scifi too. Seems a little silly.

With something as polarizing as Empire there is a question as to if having a dedicated board keeps the topics (and flames) more localized to that board, allowing the general population to better ignore them if they so choose, or if having the board drives more flaming because it entices those who dislike the topic.

I still don't even remotely understand what all the fuss about Empire is actualy about-why on earth is a rules set this polarizing or provocative to anyone? In what meanigful way does it matter who likes them or doesnt,and why? Who cares about one more board?

Yet, apparently it does so I am missing something. Probably something I would prefer to ignore anyway, come to it.

I suspect that part of the antipathy tends to come from Mr Bowden's approach, which, reading between the lines, seems to be "Those who play Empire are simulating history and the rest of you are just playing with toy soldiers". A bit of the same thing comes through in his books.

That being said, I in no way begrudge Empire players a separate board. Indeed, I think that Empire is a fine game in many ways, provided that you have the ability to leave battles set up for a long time.

Essentially that's the key. We always thought a house with a spare room or basement was the answer. If you don't have one its kind of an expensive wargames accessory though.

Dabout1972 wrote:
I don't knock others who choose to play simplistic rules
----------
You just did, by using the word 'simplistic'.

I think Todd Fischer did a good job of streamlining much of the time consuming mechanics of Empire in Republic & Empire, which I consider a real improvement. If you like(d) Empire, it is really worth a go. Some real repairs to some of the historical inaccuracies that turned folks away as well.

Played it for years and we had a good group so it was enjoyable. Really don't see the point re eliminating the board.

The board must stand! So long as the board stands Connard Sage walks amongst us!

I'm still playing it, and do miss Connard Sage.

What happened to Connard Sage?

More bandwidth. You can never have enough bandwidth.

I miss him – I loved the way he used to get all hot and bothered at the very mention of Field Marshal Haig.

I might miss him if I knew who he was…..

Frankly, any game that takes longer to play than the actual battle has a problem…..

I'd play Empire if I could only find a place to buy them!
BTW tricky way to raise a boards post count.

Being a relative newcomer to TMP and a computer idiot I am not aware of the reasons for keeping or not keeping the Empire site but as an avid Empire player I would like to say I would very much enjoy discussing the game with other interested players when the opportunity presents itself.

If that's the case then its serving its purpose John.

I got my start in Napoleonics with Empire back in the mid to late 1980's.

There are many things that I like from it and many things I don't like.

Like that the dice rolling is at a minimum.

Dislike that you can't fight a battle that was fought in real time 8-10 hours (Waterloo, Borodino etc…) in the same amount of time.

Want to fight one of the above you better schedule out a few weekends.

Depends on who you play with.

We play Waterloo in less than 6.

Then I assume you have a group of very experienced players-?

In reference to the remarks about Empire concerning the lenght of the games, myself and my military minded companions play Empire at least twice a month, on Sunday afternoons, and have the luxury of leaving the table set up when the game is not complete. We are also experianced players who have been playing for many years. Due to the extensive skylarking and general carousing that goes on at these miniature bloodlettings the games are rarely decided in one afternoon. I believe however, that if we put our hearts into it, we could finsish a battle whose historic duration was eight to ten hours in that lenght of time. (That being said, we very seldom fight historical battles, but instead have randomly generated scenarios based on a given campaign.)

John: sounds like a great group to game with!

Joes Shop: Yes, we are very fortunate in that respect.

=> Joe: We have 3 experience players that have played Empire for about 15-20 years and 3 noobs having begun this year.

A good mix: I've been playing since 1979.

I'm with OFM. If you delete Empire board then delete all the other rule specific boards. Don't like don't read it simple. And I have a boxed set of Empire IV I've never played but will someday I suppose

Well of then the fact that certain units are Gods (I.E. French Olf Guard) and that other units are pure trash (I.E. most Milita) it could be made playable.

It does have issues with getting a real battle fought in the same time as the actual battle was fought.

Ways to improve it are put in more realistic values for the troops.

True Elite units should be considered better than Milita but when it came to shooting 540 Miltia shooting at something will hit something.

The thing is that they would be more likely to break so morale would be way lower.

I got my start in Napoleonics with these rules.

But our gaming group decided that many house rules were needed to speed up play.

By the time we were done we could fight 4-5 Corps per side in a day's time, which for these rules is unheard of.

The one thing I believe no one can dispute is that Empire is a fantastic referance source for the period. Even if you hate the rules the appendix alone is worth owning them.

Started Napoleonics in mid (?) 1970s tahnks to Empire and a patient older gamer in Alief Texas…


Napoleon the good

Napoleon was an excellent general.

Napoleon was an exceptional military commander (see, for example, “Napoleon was the Best General Ever, and the Math Proves it”). He fought over 70 battles, and was defeated in only eight. He transformed the way in which the French army operated and turned France into the greatest military power in Europe. His confidence and ambition inspired his troops, and their victories brought glory to France.

Napoleon saved France from the chaos of the French Revolution.

Napoleon brought stable government to France after years of violent political turmoil resulting from the French Revolution of 1789. He granted amnesty to most émigrés (royalists who had fled the country after the Revolution), and admitted a number of talented émigrés to government service.

Napoleon established the Napoleonic Code.

Under Napoleon’s guidance, a commission of jurists finished drafting a body of clearly written civil laws to replace the patchwork of customary feudal and religious laws that existed in France (the effort to come up with a rational, uniform set of laws actually started before Napoleon came to power). The code recognized the principles of civil liberty, the equality of men before the law, and the secular nature of the state. The Napoleonic Code influenced the development of legal systems around the world. It remains the basis of civil law in France, Belgium and many former French colonies.

Napoleon introduced beneficial reforms in France.

Napoleon brought a number of useful innovations to France that survive to this day. He centralized government administration and introduced the prefecture system. He facilitated the adoption of the metric system, built public roads and sewers, and instituted a system of state-supported secondary education, through the lycées. He established a stable, single currency and created the Bank of France. He introduced meritocracy to both the French government and the French army, in which people were promoted on the basis of their ability, rather than on the basis of their family background.

Napoleon reconciled the French state and the Catholic Church.

During the French Revolution, the French church was removed from papal authority, church lands and endowments were seized by the state, and most clergy fled the country. In 1801, Napoleon signed a concordat with the Pope. This agreement acknowledged Catholicism as the religion of the majority of French people. Priests were allowed to return to their churches and preside over worship, although the church’s confiscated property was not returned.


Otto Von Bismarck Essay

Otto von Bismarck was born on April 1, 1815, at his family’s estate of Schoenhausen in Prussia. The same year, Prussia became again the most important country in Germany when its army under Field Marshal von Blücher would help the British duke of Wellington defeat Napoleon I at Waterloo, on June 18, 1815. Bismarck came from the hereditary warrior caste of the Junkers, Prussian nobles who had centuries before formed the cutting edge of the campaigns of the Teutonic knights in their wars in eastern Europe. At first, Bismarck did not follow the traditional Prussian Junker calling into the military, but took up legal studies in Hanover, Göttingen, and Berlin. Bismarck showed a disinclination toward the practice of law his interest centered on a career in diplomacy.

When the wave of revolutions swept throughout Europe in 1848, Bismarck was a conservative and relieved to see the revolutions largely fail. In France, the revolution did succeed, and Napoleon III, the nephew of Prussia’s old nemesis Napoleon, was elected to power. Nevertheless, Bismarck was not a doctrinaire conservative but more of a political pragmatist ready to adopt ideas from political liberalism that would benefit Prussia. Throughout his career, Bismarck was characterized by this political adaptability, which helped to make him the master statesman of his day.

Bismarck became a rising star in the Prussian diplomatic service, which had been the fast track to success in the kingdom since the time of Frederick the Great, who by his death in 1786 had made the comparatively small monarchy one of the great powers in Europe. He was sent to represent Prussia in France in 1862 and in czarist Russia in 1859, two of the three countries that could either help—or inhibit— Prussian foreign interests.

The Austrian Empire, as heir to the old Holy Roman Empire that Napoleon had destroyed in 1806, would prove to be the most important diplomatic threat to Prussian ambitions. While the Holy Roman Empire might be no more, the German Confederation existed in its place, and Prussia chafed at being subordinate to Austria. In 1851 King Frederick William (Friedrich Wilhelm) IV, in recognition of Bismarck’s loyalty during the 1848 uprising, appointed him to the Diet, or assembly, of the Confederation as Prussia’s representative. In one way or the other, von Bismarck would remain at the center of German affairs for the next four decades. At this time, Britain, ruled by Queen Victoria, treated developments in Europe, so long as one power did not become too powerful, as a second-class interest against those of Britain’s developing empire overseas.

Bismarck made clear from the start that he had little liking for letting Austria take the lead in German affairs and believed that Prussia should lead instead. After serving as Prussia’s minister to France and Russia and as Prussia’s representative to the German Federal Diet in Frankfurt, he was rewarded with the positions of Prussian foreign minister and prime minister in 1862. Well-schooled in diplomacy among the Great Powers, he would find politics within Prussia to be an entirely different game than the diplomatic game of nations. The kings and Bismarck came grudgingly to live with the political liberals and to realize that some accommodation with liberalism was needed if the country was to be governed at all.

Bismarck saw the army as the key to Prussia’s future. On February 1, 1864, a combined Prussian-Austrian army swept over the German frontier to invade Schleswig-Holstein and the Danish garrison occupying it. In August 1865 the Convention of Gastein apportioned Holstein to Austria and Schleswig to Prussia. Although the situation seemed resolved, Bismarck secretly hoped for a casus belli, a cause of war, with the Austrians. Mutual attacks in the parliament of the German Confederation between the Prussian and Austrian representatives were finally followed by a Prussian invasion of Austrian-held Holstein. Open hostilities soon broke out between Prussia and Austria. On July 3, 1866, Prussian commander Helmuth von Moltke launched his attack on the Austrians and their Hungarian allies In the Six Weeks’ War, the Prussians and their German allies defeated the Austrians and Hungarians. Peace­ between Prussia and Austria came in the Treaty of Prague in August 1866.

To Bismarck, the defeat of Austria was only a means to remove Austria from the German equation to leave Germany’s destiny in Prussian hands. Accordingly, out of the war came the North German Confederation, which Bismarck saw as a stepping stone to complete Prussian domination of the Germanic states. Bavaria, a southern contender for prominence, had also been humbled but not crushed during the Austrian war. With Franz Josef of Austria Hungary removed from the equation, there was only one player on the European scene with plans for Germany: Emperor Napoleon III of France.

Although popularly elected in the wake of the French Revolution of 1848, in 1852, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte had seized power in a military coup, much as his uncle had done in November 1799. Napoleon began to see himself also as the arbiter of German affairs, which was something Bismarck could not abide. At first, Napoleon desired only territorial compensation from Bismarck in return for his neutrality in the Six Weeks’ War. However, when Napoleon decided he wanted Luxembourg, Bismarck was able to marshall German opposition to French desires on German land.

The flash point, however, came in Spain. There was a succession crisis when Queen Isabella II of Spain was deposed in 1868. Spain looked for a candidate for the throne and decided on a member of the House of Hohenzollern the reigning house of King Wilhelm I of Prussia. Napoleon feared encirclement, and tension rose in both France and Prussia. The Hohenzollern candidacy was withdrawn, but Napoleon III foolishly kept up the diplomatic pressure to make it appear as a clear cut French triumph. Rather than suffer a strategic blow, Bismarck doctored the infamous Ems Telegram to King Wilhelm I to make it appear that the French had deliberately tried to humiliate the Prussian monarch.


Liking and disliking among the Napoleonic Marshalls of the Empire - History

Панславянский Союз

Pan-Slavic union

Белоруссия. Союз России и Белоруссии

Болгария. Великая Болгария

Босния и Герцеговина.

Лужицкие Сербы

Македония. Великая Македония

Приднестровье

Россия. Союз России и Белоруссии

Украина. Великая Украина. Украiна. Ukrajina

Хорватия. Великая Хорватия

Югославия. Великая Cербия

Pan-Slavism was a movement in the mid-19th century aimed at unity of all theSlavic peoples. The main focus was in the Balkans where the South Slavs had been ruled for centuries by other empires, Byzantine Empire, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Venice. It was also used as a political tool by both theRussian Empire and the Soviet Union, which gained political-military influence and control over all Slavic-majority nations between 1945 and 1948.

Extensive Pan-Slavism began much like Pan-Germanism, both of which grew from the sense of unity and nationalism experienced withinethnic groups under the domination of France during the Napoleonic Wars. Like other Romantic nationalist movements, Slavic intellectuals and scholars in the developing fields of history, philology, and folklore actively encouraged the passion of their shared identity and ancestry. Pan-Slavism also co-existed with the Southern Slavic independence.

Commonly used symbols of the Pan-Slavic movement were the Pan-Slavic colours (blue, white and red) and the Pan-Slavic anthem, Hey, Slavs.

The first pan-Slavist was Croatian Catholic missionary Juraj Križanić[1] (Russian: Крижанич, Юрий), who lived in 17th century. Some of the earliest manifestations of Pan-Slavic thought within the Habsburg Monarchy have been attributed to Adam Franz Kollár and Pavel Jozef Šafárik.[2] The movement began following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. In the aftermath, the leaders of Europe sought to restore the pre-war status quo. At the Congress of Vienna, Austria's representative, Prince von Metternich, felt the threat to this status quo in Austria was the nationalists demanding independence from the empire. While their subjects were composed of numerous ethnic groups (such as Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, etc.), most of the subjects were Slavs.

The First Pan-Slav congress was held in Prague, Bohemia in June, 1848, during the revolutionary movement of 1848. The Czechs had refused to send representatives to the Frankfurt Assembly feeling that Slavs had a distinct interest from the Germans. The Austroslav,František Palacký, presided over the event. Most of the delegates were Czech. Palacký called for the co-operation of the Habsburgs and had also endorsed the Habsburg monarchy as the political formation most likely to protect the peoples of central Europe. When the Germans asked him to declare himself in favour of their desire for national unity, he replied that he would not as this would weaken the Habsburg state: “Truly, if it were not that Austria had long existed, it would be necessary, in the interest of Europe, in the interest ofhumanity itself, to create it.”

The Pan-Slav congress met during the revolutionary turmoil of 1848. Young inhabitants of Prague had taken to the streets and in the confrontation, a stray bullet had killed the wife of Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz, the commander of the Austrian forces in Prague. Enraged, Windischgrätz seized the city, disbanded the congress, and established martial law throughout Bohemia.

The first Pan-Slavic convention was held in Prague in 1848 and was specifically both anti-Austrian and anti-Russian. Pan-Slavism has some supporters among Czech politicians but never gained dominant influence, possibly other than treating Czechs andSlovaks as branches of a single nation.

During World War I captured Slavic soldiers were asked to fight against the "oppression in Austrian Empire: some did (see Czechoslovak Legions).

Creation of an independent Czechoslovakia made the old ideals of Pan-Slavism anachronistic. Relations with other Slavic states varied, sometimes being tense. Even tensions between Czechs and Slovaks had appeared.

The Southern Slavic movement was active after Serbia regained independence from the Turkish Ottoman Empire. Austria feared that nationalists would endanger the empire. Pan-Slavism in the south was vastly different, instead it often turned to Russia for support. The Southern Slavic movement advocated the independence of the Slavic peoples in Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Some Serbian intellectuals sought to unite all of the Southern, Balkan Slavs, whether Catholic, Muslim, or Orthodox, under their rule. Serbia, just having gained independence, was a small nascent state, whereas the Austro-Hungarian Empire, though unstable, was still a strong opponent to Serbia. In this circumstance, the idea of Russia involving the Southern Slavic unity was favored.

The Southern Slavs were some of the first to revolt against the decaying Ottoman Empire. In 1804 and again in 1815, the Serbs secured autonomy from the Ottomans. Almost immediately after Serbia's autonomy, the Serbs began seeking expansion and unity of all the Southern Slavs not under Serbian rule[citation needed].

In Austria-Hungary Southern Slavs were distributed among several entities: Slovenes in the Austrian part (Carniola, Styria, Carinthia,Gorizia and Gradisca, Trieste, Istria (also Croats)), Croats and Serbs in the Hungarian part within the autonomous Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia and in the Austrian part within the autonomous Kingdom of Dalmatia, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, under direct control from Vienna. Due to a different position within Austria-Hungary several different goals were prominent among the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary. A strong alternative to Pan-Slavism was Austroslavism, especially among the Slovenes. Because the Serbs were distributed among several provinces, and the fact that they had special ties to the independent nation state of Serbia, they were among the strongest supporters of independence of South-Slavs from Austria.

After World War I the creation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, under Serbian royalty, did unite most Southern Slavs regardless of religion and cultural background (Orthodox/Muslim/Catholic). The only ones they did not unite with were the Bulgarians. Still, in the years after the Second World War, there were plans that Bulgaria should join as a 7th republic in communist Yugoslavia, thus uniting all south Slavs into one state[citation needed]. The idea was left after the break between Josip Broz Tito and Joseph Stalin in 1948.

Although early Pan-Slavism had found interest among some Poles, it soon lost its appeal as the movement became dominated byRussia, and while Russian Pan-Slavists spoke of liberation of other Slavs through Russian actions, parts of Poland had been ruled by theRussian Empire since the Partitions of Poland. Historically, Poland often saw itself in partnership with non-Slavic nations most of the time, such as Hungary, Saxony, Sweden or Lithuania under the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth from 1569 to 1795. The influence of 19th century Pan-Slavism had little impact in Poland except for creating sympathy towards the other oppressed Slavic nations to regaining independence. At the same time while Pan-Slavism worked against Austro-Hungary with South Slavs, Poles enjoyed a wide autonomy within the state and assumed a loyalist position as they were able to develop their national culture and preserve Polish language, something under threat in both German and Russian Empires. A Pan-Slavic federation was proposed, but on the condition that the Russian Empire would be excluded from such an entity. After Poland regained its independence (from Germany, Austria and Russia) in 1918 no major or minor force considered Pan-Slavism as a serious alternative, viewing Pan-Slavism as little more than a code word forRussification. During Poland's communist era the USSR used Pan-Slavism as propaganda tool to justify its control over the country. The issue of the Pan-Slavism was not part of the mainstream political agenda, and is widely seen as an ideology of Russian imperialism.

The authentic idea of unity of the Slavic people was all but gone after World War I when the maxim "Versailles and Trianon have put an end to all Slavisms" [4] and was finally put to rest with the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in late 1980s. With the failure of Pan-Slavic states such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and the problem of Russian and Serbian dominance in any proposed all-Slavic organisation, the idea of Pan-Slavic unity is mostly considered dead. Varying relations between the Slavic countries exist nowadays they range from mutual respect on equal footing and sympathy towards one another through traditional dislike and enmity, to indifference. None, other than culture and heritage oriented organizations, are currently considered as a form of rapprochement among the countries with Slavic origins. In modern times the appeals to Pan-Slavism are often made in Russia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina andSlovakia.[5] Sociologists agree that there are signs that Pan-Slavism is experiencing a growing trend among younger people in some Slavic countries. Multiple factors, such as the entry of Slavic countries such as Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria into the European Unionhas contributed to the fact that many young Slavs feel alienated and are finding a sense of belonging and identity in "being a Slav". Right-wing youth are much more prone to the ideas of Pan-Slavism.


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