Kurt Waldheim

Kurt Waldheim

Kurt Waldheim blev født i Sank Andra-Wordern, nær Wien, Østrig den 21. december 1918. Under anden verdenskrig blev han såret og derefter udskrevet fra den tyske hær.

I 1945 sluttede Waldheim sig til den østrigske diplomatiske tjeneste og tjente som første sekretær for Legationen i Frankrig (1948-1951) og leder af personaleafdelingen i Udenrigsministeriet (1951-55). Dette blev efterfulgt af diplomatiske stillinger i Canada (1956-60) og som leder af den politiske afdeling i det østrigske udenrigsministerium (1960-62).

I 1964 blev Waldheim Østrigs faste repræsentant for FN. Han havde denne post i over fire år og tjente i denne periode som formand for Komiteen for de fredelige anvendelser af det ydre rum.

Waldheim vendte tilbage til Østrig i 1968 for at tiltræde som føderal udenrigsminister. Dette blev efterfulgt af posten som formand for beskyttelsesudvalget for International Atomic Energy Agency.

I 1972 blev Waldheim generalsekretær for De Forenede Nationer. Han havde stillingen i ni år, og i denne periode foretog han flere besøg i et forsøg på at bringe en stopper for militær og politisk konflikt. Dette omfattede Sydafrika, Cypern, Syrien, Libanon, Israel, Egypten, Jordan, Indien, Pakistan, Bangladesh og Vietnam.

Waldheim blev valgt som præsident for Østrig i 1986. Kort efter hans sejr blev det afsløret, at Waldheim under anden verdenskrig var en nazistisk efterretningsofficer, der var involveret i transport af jøder til koncentrationslejre. Disse oplysninger var delvis ansvarlige for, at Waldheim blev besejret i 1992.

Det amerikanske justitsministerium offentliggjorde en rapport i 1994, der bekræftede, at Waldheim havde været involveret i grusomheder mod jøder, civile og allierede soldater under krigen.


Eks-FN-chefs nazistiske fortid dækkede til

I sidste uge døde den tidligere FN-generalsekretær og den østrigske præsident Kurt Waldheim i en alder af 88. Hans familie var sammen med ham, da han bukkede under for hjerte-kar-svigt.

De officielle nekrologer har hædret ham som en stor østrigsk og international statsmand. Den tidligere østrigske kansler Wolfgang Schüssel (Østrigsk Folkeparti, ÖVP) talte om Waldheim som "en stor fighter for fred og frihed i verden." FNs generalsekretær Ban Ki-moon og diplomater fra flere lande udtrykte deres sympati for Republikken Østrig og Waldheim-familien.

Ingen, der taler for FN, har husket Waldheims tid som medlem af Hitlers nationalsocialistiske (nazistiske) parti og som officer i Wehrmacht (tyske væbnede styrker) under Anden Verdenskrig. Ifølge presserapporter kom "den klareste hentydning til Waldheims fortid i Hitlerperioden" fra Mexicos FN -ambassadør Claude Heller. Han talte om Waldheim som en politiker med "usædvanlige evner", som en diplomat, der havde tilhørt en generation, der oplevede en "turbulent fase af historien."

Dette er den eufemisme, som Mexicos FN -ambassadør anvender til at beskrive årene 1933 til 1945, hvor Hitler -regimet frigjorde Anden Verdenskrig, og hvor cirka 50 millioner mennesker døde. Denne "turbulente fase af historien" omfattede også Holocaust, hvor mere end 6 millioner jøder blev tilintetgjort. Mange i det nazistiske regime deler ansvaret for disse største forbrydelser i menneskehedens historie. En af dem var Kurt Waldheim. Men som så mange andre blev han aldrig stillet til regnskab.

Gennem hele sit liv skjulte, undertrykte, spillede Kurt Waldheim sin deltagelse i nazisternes forbrydelser.

Waldheim blev født som søn af en lærer den 21. december 1918 i Nedre Østrig. Efter eksamen fra gymnasiet meldte han sig frivilligt til militærtjeneste. Derefter, fra 1937 til 1938, studerede han jura i Wien. I begyndelsen af ​​Anden Verdenskrig blev Waldheim indkaldt til Wehrmacht og var fra december 1940 en anden løjtnant i en kavaleri spejder enhed med den 45. infanteridivision.

Han deltog med sin division i den russiske kampagne og blev såret i december 1941. Efter ophold på militærhospitaler i Frankfurt an der Oder og Wien blev han i april 1942 beordret til det vestlige Bosnien som forbindelsesofficer med de besatte italienske tropper.

Fra april 1943 tilhørte han hærgruppen E, hvis officerstab var indkvarteret i Salonika i det nordlige Grækenland. Som officer i staben hos general Alexander Löhr i Salonika må han have haft kendskab til deportation af cirka 40.000 jøder til koncentrationslejrene i Auschwitz og Treblinka. På samme måde ville han have kendt til transporterne af italienske fanger til det tyske rige, på et tidspunkt hvor der ikke var nogen krigstilstand mellem Tyskland og Italien.

Som stabsofficer i det vestlige Bosnien ville Waldheim have haft kendskab til massakrene begået der af jugoslaviske partisaner, samt om ødelæggelsen af ​​mange landsbyer. Waldheim kendte de taktiske, strategiske og administrative ordrer og var ansvarlig for at udarbejde situationsrapporter for hærens personale.

Waldheim var medlem af den monterede stab i nazisternes stormtropper (Sturm Abteilung, SA) samt tilhørte det nationalsocialistiske tyske studenterforbund (NSDStB). I 1944, under krigen, afsluttede Waldheim sine jurastudier og opnåede en doktorgrad i jura. Fra foråret 1945 til krigens slutning var han stationeret i Trieste.

Ligesom i Vesttyskland, hvor mange gamle nazister fortsatte deres karriere i den nye stat, syntes intet at forhindre Kurt Waldheim i at forfølge en glitrende diplomatisk karriere efter krigens afslutning. Han gik ind i den østrigske diplomatiske tjeneste i 1945. Fra 1948 til 1951 var han en første sekretær ved Østrigs ambassade i Paris og ledede personaleafdelingen i udenrigsministeriet. I maj 1955 blev Waldheim østrigsk permanent observatør ved FN i New York i marts 1956, han tog til Canada som ambassadør.

Waldheim brugte sine gamle forbindelser til hurtigt at stige i den diplomatiske tjeneste. Mellem 1960 og 1964 stod han i spidsen for forskellige afdelinger i det wienske udenrigskontor. Efter Østrigs optagelse i FN i 1955 var han medlem af den østrigske delegation til generalforsamlingen. Fra begyndelsen af ​​1965 repræsenterede han Østrig i FN.

Mellem 1968 og 1970 var Waldheim den østrigske udenrigsminister, selvom han ikke tilhørte noget politisk parti. I 1971 blev han udpeget af den konservative ÖVP til kontoret som forbundsformand. Selvom kontoret som den østrigske præsident stort set er ceremonielt, er det genstand for direkte folkevalg. Selvom Waldheim tabte valget i 1971, efterfulgte han kort tid efter U Thant fra Burma som FN's generalsekretær. Han havde dette embede i 10 år indtil 1981.

Waldheim -affæren

I 1986 foreslog ÖVP igen Waldheim for det østrigske formandskab. Han forsøgte at score point ved at udnytte sit kontor som FN's generalsekretær-for eksempel producere en valgplakat med sloganet "En østrigsk, som verden stoler på", og skildrede ham stå foran New Yorks skyline.

I en velforsket artikel dengang Hubertus Czernin fra det østrigske nyhedsblad Profil afslørede Waldheims rolle under krigen. Minder om "Waldheim -affæren" Profil skriver i dag: "Czernin var ikke den første journalist til at afdække de mørke områder i Waldheims CV." I foråret 1971-som Waldheim stod for ÖVP ved præsidentvalget-den højreorienterede Salzburger Volksblatt skrev, at Waldheim var medlem af "SS-Reiterstandarte" (SS Mounted Standard Bearers). "Forhåbentlig vil ÖVP ikke tage afstand fra ham, krævede højrebladet kraftigt."

Ifølge Profil, rygtet var forkert Waldheim havde aldrig været med SS. Men hvad var vigtigt ved Volksblatt påstanden var, at ingen var interesseret i Waldheims nazistiske fortid, og især ikke de østrigske socialdemokrater (SPÖ). Lige på forhånd var fire tidligere SS -medlemmer blevet bragt ind i SPÖ -regeringen.

Men tingene var anderledes i 1986. Waldheim havde netop udgivet en selvbiografi med titlen I verdenspolitikkens glaspalads (Jeg er Glaspalast der Weltpolitik), som indeholdt meget lidt om hans aktiviteter under nazistisk styre og under Anden Verdenskrig, mens han inkluderede mange usandheder. Han skjulte sit medlemskab af nazistiske organisationer som SA Reiterkorps (SA Mounted Corps) og det nazistiske studenterforbund samt sine aktiviteter som officer i Salonika fra 1942 til 1943. Waldheim hævdede, at han var blevet såret ved østfronten og havde brugt resten af ​​krigen i Østrig. Der kan ikke findes noget ord i Waldheims bog om hans samarbejde med Wehrmacht -general Alexander Löhr, der blev dømt til døden den 16. februar 1947 i Jugoslavien som krigsforbryder.

Waldheim havde selv givet Czernin en visning af sine væbnede styrkers optegnelser, som var i stand til at bekræfte sit medlemskab af SA og nazistiske studenterforbund. Ifølge Profilto måneder før valget havde Czernin ønsket at interviewe Waldheim om sin nazistiske fortid og kørte en aften til Ebreichsdorf Slot nær Wien, hvor den aristokratiske Drasche -familie holdt en prangende reception for Waldheim. "Jeg sad i entreen og ventede," huskede Czernin senere. "Pludselig kom Waldheim hen til mig, lagde sin hånd på min skulder og sagde: 'Bare rolig,'" og hævdede, at han heller ikke kunne forklare sedlerne i sine militære optegnelser.

Det er klart, at Waldheim forkert opfattede situationen forkert. Da journalisten Czernin kom fra en "aristokratisk familie", og Waldheim havde kendt sin bedstefar godt - industrimanden Franz Josef Mayer Gunthof - troede han naturligvis på, at Czernin kun ville advare ham.

Men to dage senere, den 3. marts 1986, optrådte Czernins artikel under titlen "Waldheim and the SA." Bare en dag senere er New York Times udgav også en artikel om Waldheim, der illustrerede den med et foto, der viser Waldheim i en Wehrmacht-uniform på siden af ​​SS-gruppeleder Artur Phleps i Podgorica, Bosnien.

Lidt senere fandt Czernin også ud af, at Waldheim havde fået Zvonimir -medaljen, en ære givet af det fascistiske Ustasha -regime i Kroatien, som samarbejdede med nazisterne.

Waldheims første reaktion var benægtelse. Senere, da dette var uholdbart, vendte han sig til defensiven: "Jeg gjorde intet mere i krigen end hundredtusinder af østrigere, jeg gjorde min pligt som soldat." Waldheim hævdede, at eksponeringerne var en del af en massiv bagvaskelseskampagne. ”Du finder ingenting. Vi [!] Var anstændige. ” Desuden hævdede han, at det var "en skandale at trække ordentlige soldater gennem snavs på en sådan måde."

Han sagsøgte formanden for den jødiske verdenskongres (WJC), Edgar M. Bronfman, der havde kaldt ham "en del og en tandhjul i den nazistiske drabsmaskine." Waldheim trak først denne handling tilbage i 1988, efter Bronfman sagde, at WJC var parat til at stoppe sin kampagne mod ham. I mellemtiden havde USA sat Waldheim på sin såkaldte overvågningsliste på grund af sin fortid som Wehrmacht-officer på Balkan i Anden Verdenskrig, en handling, der sidestillede et forbud mod rejser til USA. Han blev på listen indtil sin død.

Waldheims tilhængere talte om en "beskidt kampagne." Inden for ÖVP var der dem, der så Waldheim som offer for "visse kredse på østkysten", en fælles antisemitisk stenografi for jøder. Tabloidaviserne var fulde af antisemitiske læserbreve. Michael Graff, dengang ÖVPs generalsekretær, sagde: "Så længe det ikke kan bevises, at han personligt kvalt seks jøder, er der ikke noget problem." Kort tid senere måtte Graff fratræde sin stilling som ÖVP-generalsekretær. Ikke desto mindre var det officielle slogan i Waldheims præsidentkampagne "Nu mere end nogensinde!"

Waldheim vandt valget. Op til slutningen af ​​sin embedsperiode i 1991 kunne han kun besøge arabiske stater og Vatikanet. I alle andre lande blev han betragtet som en uønsket gæst. Kort efter Waldheims valg nedsatte den østrigske regering under Kurt Vranitzky (SPÖ) en international historikerkommission. Dette kunne ikke finde bevis for nogen direkte deltagelse af Waldheim i krigsforbrydelser. Kommissionen beviste Waldheims medlemskab af SA og National Socialist German Student Federation (NSDStB) samt at han var blevet stationeret som stabsofficer og medlem af den centrale efterretningstjeneste for hærgruppen E på Balkan, hvilket Waldheim havde nægtet.

I sin endelige rapport skrev kommissionen: ”Kommissionen har ikke modtaget kendskab til nogen sag, hvor Waldheim rejste indsigelse eller protesterede mod en uretfærdighed, som han klart ville have kendt til eller foretaget nogen form for modforanstaltning for at forhindre en sådan uretfærdighed eller mindst for at gøre implementeringen vanskeligere. Tværtimod deltog han gentagne gange i ulovlige procedurer og lettede dermed deres henrettelse. ”

Med begrundelse, i sin nekrolog over Waldheim, det tyske nyhedsblad Der Spiegel minder Filbinger-sagen om: ”Sagen minder om den for nylig afdøde, tidligere premierminister i Baden-Württemberg Hans Filbinger, hvis fortid som nazistisk floddommer i kombination med hans frygtelige og fatale ytring ('Hvad var retfærdighed på det tidspunkt , kan ikke være en uretfærdighed i dag ') tvang hans fratræden fra embedet i 1970'erne. ”

Faktisk tog Waldheim - ligesom Filbinger - aldrig afstand fra nazisterne. I sit testamente, skrevet kort før hans død, nægter han ethvert ansvar og tegner et billede af en person, der ikke gjorde mere end sin pligt. "Ja, jeg lavede også fejl," skrev Waldheim. "Men disse var bestemt ikke en medrejsendes, endsige medskyldige i et kriminelt regime." Han ser "grunden til at håndtere disse hændelser for sent" især i "den hektiske karakter af mit overbelastede internationale liv - over år og årtier."

”Det var dog sandsynligvis den statspolitik, som vi skulle repræsentere som diplomater i den tidlige efterkrigstid, og som havde åbnet vejen for frihed og forfatning for os østrigere som’ Hitlers første ofre ’.” De “uhyrlige anklager” mod ham havde intet at gøre med hans liv og hans tankegang. Han var chokeret, fornærmet, endda forfærdet “over indholdet og omfanget af disse anklager”.

Waldheims død mindede os om, hvor stærk den politiske indflydelse fra et helt lag uforbederlige gamle nazister var i Tysklands og Østrigs efterkrigshistorie.


Indhold

De Forenede Nationers generalsekretær udnævnes af generalforsamlingen efter henstilling fra Sikkerhedsrådet. Kandidater til kontoret kan nedlægges veto af et af de fem faste medlemmer. Medlemmer af NATO og Warszawa -pagten var ikke berettigede til jobbet, da de ville blive nedlagt veto af den modsatte supermagt. Kun diplomater fra neutrale lande kunne forvente at undslippe et veto.

Den 18. januar 1971 meddelte generalsekretær U Thant, at han ikke ville søge en anden periode. [1] Thant havde tjent som generalsekretær siden 1961, da hans forgænger Dag Hammarskjöld døde i et flystyrt. Sovjetunionen, Frankrig og tredjelandes lande ønskede at udarbejde Thant i mindst et år mere i embedet, [2] [3], da han havde været stærkt imod apartheid og kolonialisme. [4] Thant erklærede imidlertid, at hans beslutning var "endelig og kategorisk", [5], og han ville ikke tjene "selv i to måneder" efter afslutningen af ​​sin periode. [6] USA modsatte sig også en anden betegnelse for Thant med henvisning til hans administrative mangler og hans modstand mod Vietnamkrigen. [4]

Officielle kandidater
Billede Kandidat Position Nomineret af Regional gruppe Noter
Prins Sadruddin Aga Khan De Forenede Nationers højkommissær for flygtninge Forenede Stater Asia-Pacific Group Tredobbelt statsborger i Frankrig, Iran og Schweiz, men nomineret af USA.
Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe Fast repræsentant for Ceylon i FN [7] Ceylon Asia-Pacific Group
Felipe Herrera Præsident for Inter-American Development Bank (1960–1970) Chile Latinamerikansk og caribisk gruppe
Gunnar Jarring FN's særlige repræsentant i Mellemøsten (1967–1971), Sveriges ambassadør i Sovjetunionen [8] Sovjetunionen Vesteuropæisk m.fl. -gruppe Borger i Sverige, men nomineret af Sovjetunionen som et skandinavisk alternativ til Jakobson. Erklærede, at han ikke ville stille op til kontoret, men ville tjene, hvis det blev valgt enstemmigt af Sikkerhedsrådet.
Max Jakobson Finlands faste repræsentant for FN [9] Finland Vesteuropæisk m.fl. -gruppe
Endelkachew Makonnen Etiopiens kommunikationsminister, tidligere Etiopiens faste repræsentant for FN [9] Etiopien Afrikansk gruppe [10]
Kurt Waldheim Formand for FN's udvalg om fredelige anvendelser af det ydre rum [9] Østrig Vesteuropæisk m.fl. -gruppe

Max Jakobson fra Finland deltog i løbet den 20. januar 1971. Jakobson havde taget en stærkt antikolonial holdning og vandt ham støtte fra de nyligt uafhængige lande i Afrika. [11] Han blev støttet af USA og Storbritannien, mens Frankrig kun var bekymret over hans manglende evne til at tale fransk. [6] Jakobson var blevet rost privat af arabiske diplomater for hans retfærdighed i formandskabet for et udvalg om palæstinensiske flygtninge. [9] De arabiske lande og Sovjetunionen udtrykte imidlertid deres tro på, at han ville blive udsat for zionistisk pres på grund af sin jødiske herkomst. [3] Vestlige diplomater mente, at Sovjetunionen faktisk modsatte sig Jakobson på grund af hans syn på finsk-sovjetiske forbindelser, [12] [13] men sovjetisk diplomat Victor Israelyan afslørede årtier senere, at Sovjetunionen nedlagde veto mod Jakobson på vegne af araberne. [14]: 206–207

Kurt Waldheim fra Østrig var længe rygter om at være interesseret i stillingen som generalsekretær. [11] Efter at have tabt det østrigske præsidentvalg til den siddende Franz Jonas i april 1971, [15] vendte Waldheim sin indsats til FN's generalsekretær. Den 16. juni 1971 opfordrede Waldheim det amerikanske udenrigsministerium til at meddele, at han ville være tilgængelig til stillingen. I modsætning til Jakobson talte Waldheim flydende fransk og kunne regne med den franske stemme. [16] Waldheim regnede også med sovjetisk støtte, hvis Jakobsons kandidatur begyndte at vakle. [17] USA var utilfredse med Waldheim, da hans "største aktiv" og "største ansvar" var, at han ikke havde nogen fjender og ikke ville gøre noget for at få fjender. [18]

Gunnar Jarring fra Sverige var en kandidat til mørkeheste. Selvom Jakobson vandt svensk godkendelse som den skandinaviske kandidat, svømmede Sovjetunionen Jarrings navn som et skandinavisk alternativ. [13]

Felipe Herrera fra Chile fik støtte sent i løbet, da latinamerikanske lande forenede sig bag hans kandidatur. Selvom Herrera var blevet nomineret af den venstreorienterede Allende -regering, forpligtede selv Argentinas militærjunta sig til at støtte ham som den latinamerikanske kandidat. [19] Herrera blev betragtet i Latinamerika som den tidligere chef for den interamerikanske udviklingsbank, hvor han var kendt som en "udviklingsmand". [20] USA modsatte sig imidlertid enhver kandidat, der var nomineret af Allende -regeringen, og mente, at Herrera var "en dårlig leder til at starte". [20] Den 20. oktober 1971 pålagde USA sine ambassadører at fortælle latinamerikanske udenrigsministre "i dyb tillid", at USA ikke kunne støtte en chilensk kandidat. [19] Den 5. november 1971 mødtes George Bush med Herrera og afslørede, at USA ikke ville støtte hans kandidatur. [21]

Høring af de faste medlemmer Rediger

I tidligere valg havde de to supermagter kontrolleret valget af den næste generalsekretær. [22] Valget i 1971 blev imidlertid kompliceret af den usikre status for det kinesiske sæde i FN. Den 20. november 1970 havde et flertal i generalforsamlingen stemt for at udvise Republikken Kina fra FN og erstatte den med Folkerepublikken Kina. Selvom afstemningen var faldet til de to tredjedele, der kræves for at få virkning, var tilhængere af det kommunistiske Kina sikre på sejr i 1971. [23] Den 25. oktober 1971 stemte to tredjedele af generalforsamlingen for at udvise nationalistisk Kina fra USA Nationer. Det kinesiske veto blev lagt i hænderne på det kommunistiske Kina, et tredjelandes land, der hverken var i overensstemmelse med USA eller Sovjetunionen.

USA og Sovjetunionen undgik at diskutere generalsekretæren, da de ventede på at se, hvad den kinesiske position ville være. [22] Fra tidligt i løbet havde Max Jakobson præsenteret sig som den eneste kandidat, der var acceptabel for Folkerepublikken Kina. [4] Kineserne var offentligt uforpligtende ved udvælgelsen af ​​en generalsekretær. [24] De afslørede imidlertid for de andre faste medlemmer, at deres bedste valg var Herrera og Jakobson. [25]

Den 6. december 1971 begyndte de permanente medlemmer endelig at mødes for at diskutere udvælgelsen af ​​en generalsekretær. [26] På trods af Thants "endelige og utvetydige" beslutning om at træde tilbage, [27] udtrykte Sovjetunionen sit ønske om at udarbejde Thant i mindst et par måneder for at håndtere den indo-pakistanske krig i 1971. [24] Selvom Thant havde for nylig blevet behandlet på Leroy Hospital for et blødende sår, [22] den sovjetiske ambassadør Yakov Malik sagde, at Thant ikke kunne forventes at være "100 procent egnet som astronaut" og havde brug for to ugers ferie. De amerikanske og britiske ambassadører argumenterede for, at Thant skulle have lov til at træde tilbage, [26] [24] og USA's udenrigsminister William P. Rogers pålagde Bush at nedlægge veto mod Thant, hvis hans navn stod på stemmesedlen. [25]

Den 17. december 1971 mødtes Sikkerhedsrådet i en lukket session for at stemme om udvælgelsen af ​​en generalsekretær. Afstemningen blev foretaget ved hemmelig afstemning, hvor de faste medlemmer stemte om røde afstemninger og de roterende medlemmer stemte på hvide afstemninger. Selvom Jakobson havde været formodet frontløberen i de sidste 11 måneder, [7] var Kurt Waldheim den eneste kandidat til at vinde det nødvendige flertal på 9 stemmer. [8] Waldheim blev imidlertid nedlagt veto af Kina og Det Forenede Kongerige. [28]: 411 Felipe Herrera fra Chile blev holdt på stemmesedlen på kinesisk og sovjetisk insisteren. [8] Hver kandidat blev nedlagt veto undtagen Gunnar Jarring fra Sverige, der blev den formodede frontløber. [29]

Den 20. december 1971 fortsatte Waldheim med at lede med 11 stemmer, men blev nedlagt veto af Kina. Carlos Ortiz de Rozas ankom til stemmesedlen med overraskende stærke 10 stemmer, men blev nedlagt veto af Sovjetunionen. Jakobson modtog det nødvendige minimum på 9 stemmer, men blev nedlagt veto af Sovjetunionen. Jarring klarede kun 7 stemmer og modtog et dobbelt veto, herunder et fra Kina. [30] Hver kandidat fik mindst et veto, og en kandidat blev endda nedlagt veto af fire faste medlemmer. [31] Diplomater forventede, at veto -duellen fortsatte i tredje afstemningsrunde. [30]

Utilsigtet Waldheim -sejr Rediger

Den 21. december 1971 modtog den amerikanske og britiske delegation instruktioner fra deres regeringer om at forhindre Kurt Waldheim i at blive udvalgt ved denne afstemning. Da begge lande havde stemt for Waldheim den 20. december 1971, besluttede de at undlade at stemme, hvis de var "rimelig sikre" på, at kineserne ville nedlægge veto mod Waldheim igen. Den amerikanske ambassadør George H. W. Bush bad den britiske ambassadør Colin Crowe om at tale med kineserne, men Crowe mente, at det "kun ville vække mistanke". I stedet spurgte de de norske og finske ambassadører, hvordan kineserne ville stemme og modtog forsikringer om, at kineserne fortsat ville nedlægge veto mod Waldheim. Bush talte også med Jakobson, der sagde, at kineserne ville nedlægge veto mod Waldheim "hele vejen igennem". [32]

I tredje afstemningsrunde flyttede Carlos Ortiz de Rozas i spidsen med 12 stemmer, men blev nedlagt veto af Sovjetunionen. Waldheim blev nummer to med 11 stemmer, men modtog ingen vetoer. [33] Til amerikanernes og briternes overraskelse afstod kineserne i stedet for at nedlægge veto mod Waldheim. [32] Som følge heraf blev Kurt Waldheim valgt som FN's generalsekretær for en periode, der begyndte 1. januar 1972. [33]

Afstemningsresultater Rediger

Resultater fra FN's generalsekretærs udvælgelsesresultater, 1971
Kandidat 17. december [8]
Runde 1
Til Mod Afholde sig Vetoer
Prins Sadruddin Aga Khan 3 Ja (ukendt)
Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe 5 Ja (ukendt)
Felipe Herrera 7 4 4
Gunnar Jarring 7 5 3 Ingen
Max Jakobson 8 5 2 Ja (ukendt)
Endelkachew Makonnen 4 Ja (ukendt)
Kurt Waldheim 10 3 2
Resultater fra FN's generalsekretærs udvælgelsesresultater, 1971
Kandidat 20. december [31] 21. december [32]
Runde 2 Runde 3
Til Mod Afholde sig Vetoer Til Mod Afholde sig Vetoer
Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe 4 6 5 Ja Fjernet fra stemmesedlen
Issoufou Saidou-Djermakoye 5 8 2 Ja Fjernet fra stemmesedlen
Felipe Herrera 7 6 2 Ja
Gunnar Jarring 7 4 4 + 1 (ukendt)
Max Jakobson 9 5 1 9 5 1
Carlos Ortiz de Rozas 10 3 2 12 3 0
Abdul Majid Rahmena 3 8 4 Ja Fjernet fra stemmesedlen
Shridath Ramphal 3 7 5 Ja Fjernet fra stemmesedlen
Gabriel Valdés 7 5 3 Ja
Kurt Waldheim 11 2 2 11 1 3 Ingen

Den østrigske kampagne for Kurt Waldheim var vellykket, selvom han "blev anset for at mangle tilstrækkelig statur og drive til at blive taget seriøst". [17] Den franske ambassadør Jacques Kosciusco-Morizet sagde, at det "ikke var nok at have en kandidat, som der ikke er nogen indsigelse imod. En kandidat til SYG [generalsekretær] bør også have noget til sin fordel." Den britiske ambassadør Colin Crowe var uenig i, at Waldheim endda var "ikke-anstødelig". [25] Waldheim modtog imidlertid stærk diplomatisk opbakning fra Østrigs socialdemokratiske regering under Bruno Kreisky, selvom Waldheim var fra oppositionens østrigske folkeparti. Waldheim blev også begunstiget af Sovjetunionen. Under en middag i Waldheims hus foreslog den sovjetiske ambassadør Yakov Malik en skål til værten: "Må alle dine ønsker gå i opfyldelse." [33]


WALDHEIM SAG

"Waldheim -affæren" er betegnelsen, der konventionelt anvendes på kontroversen omkring afsløringen af ​​den tidligere ukendte fortid for Kurt Waldheim, tidligere generalsekretær i FN, der opstod under hans kampagne for det østrigske formandskab i 1986. Sagen fokuserede ikke kun på international opmærksomhed på Waldheim personligt, men rejste også bredere spørgsmål vedrørende antisemitismenes historie i Østrig og den rolle østrigerne spillede i det nazistiske diktatur og "den endelige løsning". En ledsager af Waldheim -affæren var genoptræden i den østrigske politiske kultur af appellen til antisemitiske fordomme til politiske formål. Ved at anvende et kodet formsprog, der var mere passende til "post-Auschwitz" politisk debat, hjalp Waldheim-lejren (hovedsageligt det kristeligt demokratiske østrigske folkeparti [övp], som havde nomineret ham) med at konstruere et fjendtligt billede af jøder ("Feindbild"), der tjente begge at aflede kritik af Waldheims troværdighed og forklare den internationale "kampagne" mod ham. Den centrale antagelse om dette "Feindbild" var, at Waldheim og Østrig var under angreb fra en international jødisk sammensværgelse.

Kurt Waldheim havde haft en usædvanligt succesrig karriere i den østrigske udenrigstjeneste efter anden verdenskrig. Tiltrådt som sekretær for udenrigsminister Karl Gruber i 1946 tjente Waldheim på forskellige poster i udlandet og i Wien, herunder to perioder som østrigsk repræsentant for FN, og blev udnævnt til udenrigsminister i januar 1968 af kansler Josef Klaus (övp). Hans embedsperiode som minister sluttede i marts 1970, hvor Socialisterne (spö) under Bruno Kreisky vandt parlamentsvalget. Kort tid efter vendte Waldheim tilbage til New York som Østrigs ambassadør i FN. I januar 1971 var han igen i Wien midlertidigt for at stille op som ÖVP -kandidat til præsident, hvilket i Østrig er en stort set ceremoniel post, som der afholdes valg for hvert sjette år. Selvom han lavede en meget respektabel fremvisning, tabte Waldheim til den siddende socialist Franz Jonas og vendte derefter tilbage til sin post i New York. Den 22. december 1971 blev Waldheim valgt til generalsekretær i FN og genvalgt til en anden periode i 1976. Hans bud på en tredje periode mislykkedes dog, og i marts 1982 beskrev Waldheim af en journalist som "det mest succesrig østrigsk diplomat siden Metternich, "endelig kom hjem til Østrig.

Waldheims internationale fremtrædelse og personlige ambition efterlod få i tvivl om, at han ville stille op til det østrigske formandskab i 1986, men det var uklart, om han var kandidat for ÖVP eller som konsensuskandidat for de to store partier. Övp håbede at drage maksimal politisk fordel af Waldheims kandidatur for sig selv uden at identificere ham så tæt på det, at det ville bringe enten Waldheims valg som præsident eller den håbede tilhørende politiske "drejning" i fare. Derefter skubbede formand Alois Mock Waldheims nominering af ÖVP som en "ikke-partisk" kandidat i marts 1985, mere end et år før valget, meget tidligt efter traditionel østrigsk standard. Spoen, der også var bevidst om Waldheims valgappel, havde ikke udelukket et fælles kandidatur, før han blev konfronteret med ÖVP's fait accompli. En måned senere præsenterede spoen Kurt Steyrer, daværende minister for sundhed og miljø, som standardbærer. To mindre kandidater, Freda Meissner-Blau fra De Grønne, og Otto Scrinzi, tidligere fpö-parlamentsmedlem og repræsentant for (tysk) nationalist yderst til højre i Østrig, deltog også i løbet.

Den relativt begivenhedsløse tidlige fase af kampagnen, hvor Kurt Waldheim var den klare frontløber, sluttede brat i marts 1986. Faktisk kan Waldheim -sagen ordentligt siges at stamme fra den 3. marts 1986, da det østrigske ugeblad Profil offentliggjorte dokumenter, der først afslørede detaljer om Waldheims ukendte fortid. Profil 's afsløringer blev fulgt den 4. marts med næsten identiske afsløringer fra *World Jewish Congress (wjc), og New York Times (nyt). Nøglen til at låse beviset op siges at være et billede udgivet af en hærenhed, som placerede Waldheim i Jugoslavien på et bestemt tidspunkt og dermed kunne låse op for hans rekord fra krigen. Dette gav historikeren Robert Herstein, som blev bestilt af den jødiske verdenskongres, et sted at begynde.

Waldheim havde altid nægtet enhver tilknytning til nazisterne af nogen art, og havde i både sine offentlige udtalelser og i de relevante passager i hans erindringer hævdet, at hans værnepligt sluttede i vinteren 1941–42, med hans sår på den østlige foran. Beviserne offentliggjort af Profil, wjc og nyt antydede tværtimod, at den tidligere generalsekretær havde været medlem af den nazistiske studenterforening, og at han også havde tilhørt en monteret rideenhed i Sturmabteilung, eller sa, mens han deltog i det konsulære akademi i Wien mellem 1937 og 1939. Andre dokumenter afslørede, at Waldheim var blevet erklæret arbejdsdygtig i 1942, efter at hans sår var helet. I slutningen af ​​marts 1942 var Waldheim blevet tildelt hærens overkommando 12 (som blev til hærgruppe E i januar 1943), derefter baseret på Thessalonika (Salonica), og forblev knyttet til den indtil krigens slutning. Hærgruppe E, under kommando af Alexander Löhr, var kendt for sit engagement i deportationer af jøder fra Grækenland og for vildskab i sine militære operationer mod jugoslaviske partisaner og deres formodede civile tilhængere.

For his part, Waldheim denied membership in any Nazi organization and offered evidence suggesting his ideological hostility to Nazism. He conceded having served in Army Group E, but denied participation of any kind in atrocities committed by units under Löhr's command, and claimed to have known nothing of the deportation of the Jews of Thessalonika.

The more general strategy pursued by Waldheim and his supporters was to brand the disclosures as part of a "defamation campaign" designed to inhibit his chances in the presidential election. Waldheim's argument ran along the following lines: the accusations of the wjc and the nyt represent a continuation of a slander campaign which the spö had been waging against him for some time. The Socialists or their accomplices had fed documents to the wjc and the nyt in order to damage Waldheim's international reputation, his main advantage over Steyrer. Such allegations were all the less credible, since Waldheim had been cleared by the Austrian secret service at the time he entered the diplomatic service 40 years previously. Moreover, during his candidacy for un secretary general, the cia, the kgb, and the Israelis all investigated him and would not have allowed his election had there been anything in the least incriminating against him. He had not mentioned his tour of duty in the Balkans in his memoirs, Waldheim claimed, because he had had such a minor function and also because his injury on the eastern front had represented a major caesura in his life. He also said that he knew nothing of Jewish deportations and had had nothing to do with other atrocities. But if Waldheim were to be blamed for such things, then truly every Wehrmacht soldier would also come under suspicion.

Although the Waldheim affair became an international media extravaganza, the principal source of documents relating to Waldheim's past, as well as his most vocal critic, was the wjc, an organization based in New York whose primary activities involve campaigning to defend threatened Jewish communities throughout the world and lobbying for what it perceives as the common interests of Jews. The series of press releases and disclosures of documents (24 between March 4 and July 8, date of the second round of the Austrian presidential election) by the wjc set the pace and largely the terms for the debate on Waldheim in the United States. In the early phase of the controversy, the wjc published evidence relating to Waldheim's membership in the sa and Nazi Student Union, which it believed amounted to proof of his "Nazi past." The material on Waldheim's wartime past the wjc first presented was patchy and inconclusive, but over the next several months it made public dozens of additional documents which helped complete the picture of Waldheim's various duties in the Balkans.

On March 22, the wjc published a copy of the Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects (crowcass), a list compiled by the U.S. Army of persons suspected of war crimes, showing that Waldheim had been sought by Yugoslavia after the war for, among other things, murder. The basis for the crowcass listing was a file of the United Nations War Crimes Commission (unwcc), and this latter file was in turn based on a dossier prepared by the Yugoslav authorities and submitted to the unwcc shortly before it concluded its deliberations in 1948.

With the publication of the Yugoslav file, known as the Odluka, or "Decision," the debate on Waldheim's past acquired a far more serious dimension: allegations of war crimes had been leveled against Waldheim by the Yugoslav War Crimes Commission, and these had been reviewed and endorsed by the unwcc. The wjc's subsequent disclosures as well as the discussion on Waldheim's past in general were heavily influenced by this new discovery.

On March 25, 1986, the wjc presented the findings of Robert E. Herzstein, the historian it had commissioned to look into Waldheim's past. Herzstein had discovered that Waldheim had served as a staff officer in the military intelligence department of Army Group e and had been assigned to the Battle Group West Bosnia, whose troops were responsible for the slaughter of thousands of Yugoslavs in the Kozara Mountains in 1942. Waldheim had also received an award for valor (the King Zvonimir medal) from the puppet Croatian government at the end of this campaign.

The wjc continued to offer documents it felt corroborated the findings in the Odluka, and pressed U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese to place Waldheim's name on the so-called "watch list" of undesirable aliens, effectively barring him from entering the U.S. In the international media, calls for the publication of Waldheim's un file were coupled with more intensive efforts to find a "smoking gun."

The issues involving Waldheim's possible criminality were in any event never self-evident. The possibilities for inferring something opprobrious about Waldheim's service in the Wehrmacht from his previously concealed "Nazi past" were legion, while the publication of the crowcass and the Yugoslav Odluka transformed vague intimations about his military duties into concrete juridical suspicion.

Embarrassing, if not necessarily incriminating, documents were surfacing daily, but there were few around who could reliably interpret what they meant. Moreover, merely keeping track of Waldheim's whereabouts in the Balkans was difficult: he had served in seven different posts in at least ten locations in Serbia-Montenegro, Albania, and Greece. The issue of Waldheim's possible war criminality was also complicated by ignorance about the practice of the Nuremberg Tribunal. On the one hand, much of what the Wehrmacht did to Yugoslav partisans was gruesome but "legal." On the other hand, the conditions under which an officer of Waldheim's rank and position could even incur criminal liability were narrowly circumscribed. Categories of guilt, complicity, responsibility, etc., easily elided, while the suspicious background to the compilation of the Odluka, which undermined if not vitiated the charges made in it, only became known later.

In Austria itself, Waldheim and his supporters continued to portray all new claims about his wartime role as slander, and Waldheim as the victim of a coordinated international "defamation campaign," initiated by socialists, led by the World Jewish Congress, and promoted by the international press, particularly the New York Times. In the course of the election campaign, the wjc became the main object of abuse, and the abundant political invective arrayed by politicians of the övp against it as scapegoat helped promote and legitimate antisemitic prejudice in public discourse to an extent unseen since 1945. Waldheim also attempted to identify his own fate with that of his generation and country by claiming that he, like thousands of other Austrians, had merely done his "duty" under Nazi Germany, an appeal which struck a responsive note among many Austrian voters. In the election on May 4, 1986, Waldheim polled 49.7% of the votes, just short of the majority needed to win. During the six weeks leading up to the second round, the Socialists emphasized their candidate's ability to reconcile a divided nation, but to no avail. Waldheim won the second round handily: his 53.9% of the votes was the largest of its kind (i.e., when not running against an incumbent) in the Second Republic.

Whatever actually determined Austrian voting behavior is open to a great deal of speculation, but the result was almost certainly not affected in any significant way by a negative backlash against the Waldheim camp's antisemitic wager. At the same time, the election does not appear reducible to a moral referendum on Waldheim or his past, for it is doubtful either that Austrian voters conceived the election in such ethico-political terms or that their votes reflected their respective moral choices. Dissatisfaction with government policies or the desire to deliver a protest vote for any one of several reasons seem to have motivated voters at least as much as a reflexive national spite or even antisemitic prejudice. What cannot be doubted is that Waldheim's diminished credibility and his perceived trivialization of Nazi atrocities (in the eyes of his critics, if not his supporters) did not cost him the election.

Contrary to Waldheim's expectations, interest in the unanswered questions about his past did not disappear after his election. Waldheim received no official invitations from any country in Western Europe, and some official government visitors to Austria even avoided traveling to Vienna, as protocol would otherwise have required them to pay a courtesy call on the Austrian president. Some prominent private individuals, such as political scientist Ralf Dahrendorf, also boycotted events where Waldheim would have been present. In April 1987, the U.S. Department of Justice announced that it was placing Waldheim on the watch list, further reinforcing his pariah status.

Since Waldheim's election, three independent research efforts, a commission of seven historians established at the request of the Austrian government, a panel of five international jurists engaged by British and U.S. television production companies, and a commission of the British Ministry of Defense, have illuminated Waldheim's wartime career in great detail, and none found anything in Waldheim's behavior which could implicate him personally in any criminal activity. Waldheim himself considered these judgments a complete vindication, and he and his supporters found the stigma which still attached to him incomprehensible.

Waldheim's diplomatic isolation was broken initially by Pope John Paul ii, who received Waldheim officially in June 1987, and Waldheim subsequently visited a few Arab countries, some of whose papers had defended Waldheim against ostensible Zionist attacks. Though in April 1990 the U.S. Justice Department confirmed its decision to bar Waldheim, an indication of a possible thaw in attitudes toward Waldheim came the following July, when presidents Richard von Weizsäcker of Germany and Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia publicly met Waldheim at the Salzburg Festival, where Havel gave the ceremonial address in which he, albeit, indirectly attacked Waldheim by speaking of those who distort their memoirs.

In Austria itself, President Waldheim did not become the kind of integrative figure he had wished. Waldheim was initially an irritation and embarrassment to many, and was even forced by opponents in the government into remaining silent at the official commemoration of jubilee of the Austrian Anschluss in March 1988. During the second half of his term, which ended in 1992, on the other hand, Waldheim's treatment in the press suggested that increasing numbers of Austrians had accepted Waldheim as president, even though he would never be accorded the respect and affection his predecessors had enjoyed.

More broadly conceived, the Waldheim affair symbolizes the postwar unwillingness or inability adequately to confront the complications of the Nazi abomination. It remains to be seen whether current infelicitous images of Austria's Nazi past will be supplanted by the more prosaic Trapp family pendant, or whether the Waldheim affair becomes the occasion for a more general effort on all sides to come to terms with the past. If so, then Waldheim may indeed be said to have performed an important function.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cohen, Bernard, and Luc Rosenzweig. Waldheim. Translated by Josephine Bacon. New York, 1987.

Herzstein, Robert Edwin. Waldheim: The Missing Years. New York, 1988.

Ryan, James Daniel. The United Nations under Kurt Waldheim, 1972–1981. Lanham, Md., 2001.

Uhl, Heidemarie. "Österreich. Vom Opfermythos zur Mitverantwortungthese: Die Transformationen des österreichischen Gedächtnisses." In Mythen der Nationen. 1945—Arena der Erinnerungen, edited by Monica Flacke. Mainz, Germany, 2004.

Waldheim, Kurt. Im Glaspalast der Weltpolitik. Düsseldorf, Germany, 1985. Published in English as In the Eye of the Storm: A Memoir. Bethesda, Md., 1986.


Kurt Waldheim dies at 88 ex-UN chief hid Nazi past

Kurt Waldheim, the former UN secretary general and president of Austria whose hidden complicity in Nazi war crimes was exposed late in his career, died Thursday in Vienna, Austrian media reported. He was 88. He died of heart failure, the state broadcaster ORF reported.

Although it was never proved that Waldheim himself committed atrocities during World War II, he was a lieutenant in army intelligence, attached to brutal German military units that executed thousands of Yugoslav partisans and civilians and deported thousands of Greek Jews to death camps from 1942 to 1944. Waldheim lied about his wartime service in the Balkans, maintaining that his military career ended in 1942 after he was wounded in a battle on the Russian front.

But more than four decades later, his assertions were disputed by witnesses, photographs, medals and commendations given to Waldheim, and by his own signature on documents linked to massacres and deportations.

Kurt Waldheim was born on Dec. 21, 1918, in St. Andrä-Wördern, a village near Vienna. His father, Walter, the son of an impoverished blacksmith, became the local school superintendent and married a daughter of the mayor.

In his 1985 memoir, "In the Eye of the Storm," Kurt Waldheim described Austria in the aftermath of World War I as "the defeated, ruined, truncated remnant of the former Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire."

But thanks to his parents' middle-class standing, he and his brother and sister suffered few of the economic deprivations that most Austrians endured during the 1920s.

In March 1938, Adolf Hitler ordered his army into Austria and annexed the country. Because of his known anti-Nazi sympathies, Walter Waldheim was twice arrested by the Gestapo and lost his job.

"Our family was under constant surveillance," Waldheim wrote. "We lived in daily apprehension."

When defending himself against assertions that he had links to the Nazis, Waldheim always asserted that he never had belonged to a Nazi-affiliated group. But, in fact, at the age of 19 he joined the National Socialist German Students League - a Nazi youth organization - just a month after the Anschluss. Then in November 1938, he enrolled in the SA, the paramilitary Nazi organization of storm troopers.

Robert Edwin Herzstein, a historian and professor at the University of South Carolina, played a crucial role in uncovering Waldheim's Nazi past through archival research.

"Kurt Waldheim did not, in fact, order, incite or personally commit what is commonly called a war crime," Herzstein wrote. "But this nonguilt must not be confused with innocence. The fact that Waldheim played a significant role in military units that unquestionably committed war crimes makes him at the very least morally complicit in those crimes."

Waldheim may have been able to hide his past for so long because of the web of intrigue between intelligence services in the Cold War era. By early 1948, the UN War Crimes Commission listed him as a suspected war criminal subject to trial. Yet no government pressed to bring Waldheim to account or even to reveal his unsavory history.

Instead Waldheim, a hardworking and talented diplomat, was allowed to rise to the pinnacle of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, and then go on to serve two terms as secretary general, from 1972 to 1982.

It was a period when the world body was increasingly dominated by third world rhetoric and paralyzed by disagreements between the superpowers. As secretary general, Waldheim was often criticized - by governments in the West, East and the third world - as ineffectual and overly cautious in his attempts to find solutions to the many conflicts erupting around the globe.

It was not until Waldheim left the United Nations and then ran for president of Austria in 1986 that his wartime past became widely known. During his presidential campaign, the efforts of his political opponents, investigative journalists, historians and the World Jewish Congress uncovered archival evidence of Waldheim's involvement with the Nazi movement as a student and his wartime role in the Balkans.

But the disclosures sparked a nationalist backlash in Austria that aided Waldheim's election as president.

Many Austrians apparently viewed Waldheim's life as a parable of their own. They identified with his attempts to deny complicity with the Nazis and to view himself as a citizen of a nation occupied by German invaders and forced into their military service.

In the years between the discovery of his scandalous past and his death, Waldheim steadfastly portrayed himself as an ordinary, unheroic citizen caught up in a maelstrom, a point Herzstein reflected upon.

"Waldheim was clearly not a psychopath like Dr. Josef Mengele nor a hate-filled racist like Adolf Hitler," Herzstein wrote. "His very ordinariness, in fact, may be the most important thing about him. For if history teaches us anything, it is that the Hitlers and the Mengeles could never have accomplished their atrocious deeds by themselves. It took hundreds of thousands of ordinary men - well-meaning but ambitious men like Kurt Waldheim - to make the Third Reich possible."


3. Major Contributions

Waldheim undertook several peace missions as UN Secretary-General. He calmed tensions between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus in 1972 and led peaceful negotiations and reconciliation between 1973 and 1974. Waldheim made significant contributions in Vietnam, Yemen, India, and Pakistan, and organized the UN Emergency forces that acted as a buffer between Israel and Egyptian forces in 1973 in the long-standing Israel-Arab conflicts. Waldheim established a new international economic order at the UN by enacting policies that would reduce the gap between the rich and the poor. He negotiated the release of American Hostages from Tehran although he later became persona non grata in the US. Waldheim made several contributions for his country as president and diplomat.


Kurt Waldheim, Former U.N. Chief, Is Dead at 88

Kurt Waldheim, the former United Nations Secretary General and President of Austria whose hidden ties to Nazi organizations and war crimes was exposed late in his career, died today at his home in Vienna. He was 88.

His death was announced by the office of the Austrian president, Heinz Fischer, and by Mr. Waldheim’s wife, Elisabeth. The cause was heart failure, the state broadcaster ORF reported. Although it was never proved that Mr. Waldheim himself committed atrocities during World War II, he was a lieutenant in army intelligence attached to German military units that executed thousands of Yugoslav partisans and civilians and deported thousands of Greek Jews to death camps between 1942 and 1944.

Mr. Waldheim concealed his wartime service in the Balkans, saying his military career ended in 1942, after he was wounded on the Russian front.

But more than four decades later, his assertions were controverted by eyewitnesses, photographs, medals and commendations given to Mr. Waldheim, and by his own signature on documents linked to massacres and deportations.

“Kurt Waldheim did not, in fact, order, incite, or personally commit what is commonly called a war crime,” wrote Prof. Robert Edwin Herzstein of the University of South Carolina, a historian whose archival research was crucial in uncovering Mr. Waldheim’s Nazi past. “But this non-guilt must not be confused with innocence. The fact that Waldheim played a significant role in military units that unquestionably committed war crimes makes him at the very least morally complicit in those crimes.”

By early 1948, the United Nations War Crimes Commission listed him as a suspected war criminal subject to trial. Yet no government pressed to bring Mr. Waldheim to account or even to reveal his history.

A former Yugoslav intelligence official, Anton Kolendic, said he informed his Soviet counterparts “in late 1947 or 1948” that his government was seeking Mr. Waldheim on suspicion of involvement in war crimes. But the Russians did nothing. And according to a bipartisan letter from Congress sent to President Bill Clinton, the Central Intelligence Agency was aware of Mr. Waldheim’s wartime record years before he stood for election as secretary general but chose to conceal it.

Mr. Waldheim, who had reached the pinnacle of the Austrian foreign ministry, went on to serve two terms as secretary general from 1972 to 1982.

It was not until he ran for president of Austria in 1986 that his wartime past became widely known. During his campaign, political opponents, investigative journalists, historians and the World Jewish Congress uncovered archival evidence of Mr. Waldheim’s involvement with the Nazi movement as a student and his wartime role in the Balkans.

But the revelations were met by a nationalist, anti-Semitic backlash in Austria that aided Mr. Waldheim’s election. Many Austrians apparently viewed Mr. Waldheim’s life as a parable of their own. They identified with his attempts to deny complicity with the Nazis and to view himself as a citizen of a nation occupied by German invaders and forced into their military service. He became a soldier in Hitler’s army, Mr. Waldheim insisted, “just as hundreds of thousands of other Austrians did their duty.”

Kurt Waldheim was born on Dec. 21, 1918, in St. Andrä-Wördern, a village near Vienna. His father, Walter, the son of an impoverished blacksmith, became the local school superintendent and married a daughter of the mayor. Thanks to his parents’ middle-class standing, Kurt and his brother and sister endured few of the economic deprivations that most Austrians did during the 1920’s, when Austria was a “defeated, ruined, truncated remnant of the former Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire,” Mr. Waldheim wrote in his 1985 memoir, “In the Eye of the Storm.”

In March 1938, Adolf Hitler ordered his army into Austria and annexed the country in what became known as the Anschluss. Because of his anti-Nazi sympathies, Walter Waldheim was twice arrested by the Gestapo and lost his job. “Our family was under constant surveillance,” Kurt Waldheim wrote. “We lived in daily apprehension.”

Mr. Waldheim asserted that he had never belonged to a Nazi-affiliated group. But in fact, at 19, he had joined the National Socialist German Students League, a Nazi youth organization, a month after the Anschluss. Then, in November 1938, he enrolled in the Sturm-Abteilung, or SA, the paramilitary Nazi organization of storm troopers known as the Brownshirts.

Told in 1986 that documents existed that proved he had joined these Nazi groups, Mr. Waldheim dismissed their significance, arguing that they were meant to protect him and his family. He said in his memoir that he had enlisted in the German army to ward off suspicion of his anti-Nazi opinions.

“A civilian whose politics and activities were under scrutiny was better off as a soldier,” Mr. Waldheim wrote. “In the army, there was much less harassment of those known to disapprove of Nazism, and I had no further trouble.”

In the war, Mr. Waldheim was assigned to the Russian front as a first lieutenant. He suffered a severe ankle wound from a grenade fragment in December 1941 and was sent back to Austria to recover. By his account, his wound ended his military service in 1942, allowing him to complete his law studies.

In fact, as soon as his ankle recovered sufficiently, he was sent back into active service, this time as an intelligence officer in the Balkans. He was assigned to the 714th Infantry Division under the command of the notorious Gen. Friedrich Stahl, who led the Germans and their Croatian allies in an operation that slaughtered more than 60,000 suspected Yugoslav partisans and their family members at Kozara, in West Bosnia, in 1942.

Lieutenant Waldheim had a significant enough role in the massacre to have had his name inscribed on a divisional roll of honor. The Croatians awarded him the Silver Medal of the Crown of King Zvonimir “for courage in the battle against rebels in West Bosnia.”

When hiswartime service in the Balkans was revealed in 1986, Mr. Waldheim insisted at first that he had never been near Kozara. When documents proved the contrary, he played down any involvement in the massacre and told The Associated Press that the Zvonimir medal was handed out “like chocolates” to all German officers.

Other documents disclosed that Mr. Waldheim had served as a staff officer with a large military unit that executed thousands of partisans and noncombatants in Montenegro and eastern Macedonia and killed Allied commandos who had been taken prisoner.

Its commander, Gen. Alexander Löhr, was an Austrian who in 1947 was put to death in Yugoslavia for war crimes.

Mr. Waldheim was also stationed in Greece just outside Salonika, where more than 60,000 Jews were shipped off to Auschwitz. Only 10,000 survived.

“I never heard or learned anything of this while I was there,” Mr. Waldheim said in an interview with The New York Times in 1986. But according to Mr. Herzstein, the historian, Mr. Waldheim prepared numerous reports on the deportations for his army superiors, including General Löhr.

“It is hard to believe,” Mr. Herzstein wrote in “Waldheim: The Missing Years,” a 1988 book on his investigations into the former Secretary General’s past, that “this ambitious young staff officer, whose success had been based in large part on his ability to keep abreast of what was going on, could have failed to notice that most of the Jewish community of Salonika — nearly a third of the city’s population — had been shipped off to Auschwitz.” He added, “As that officer, Kurt Waldheim served as an efficient and effective cog in the machinery of genocide.”

On leave between his Balkan assignments, Mr. Waldheim managed to marry Elisabeth Ritschel and complete his law degree thesis at the University of Vienna in 1944. His wife, also a law student, was an ardent Nazi who before the war had renounced her Roman Catholic faith and joined the League of German Maidens, the female equivalent of the Hitler Youth. She applied for Nazi party membership as soon as she was old enough and was accepted in 1941.

The Waldheims had two daughters, Liselotte and Christa, and a son, Gerhard, who became an active defender of his father when revelations of his Nazi past surfaced in 1986.With the end of World War II, the Allies designated Austria as a nation invaded by the Nazis rather than Germany’s willing partner. The country’s new status helped assuage the fears of thousands of Austrian combatants like Mr. Waldheim. Moreover, Austria was named a neutral nation in the growing Cold War between East and West.

In December 1945, Mr. Waldheim became a personal assistant to Karl Gruber, who was soon appointed Austria’s foreign minister. Mr. Waldheim worked closely with Mr. Gruber on a bitter border dispute with Yugoslavia, by then a Communist country under the leadership of Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the partisans’ wartime commander.

Mr. Waldheim’s prominent role in the dispute almost proved his undoing. In September 1947, the Yugoslav interior ministry discovered that the young diplomat had been an intelligence officer in a German army unit involved in atrocities against Yugoslav partisans. The next year, the Yugoslavs had Mr. Waldheim’s name added to the United Nations War Crimes Commission list of suspected war criminals, a procedure that often led to extradition and trial.

But Cold War events apparently conspired to save Mr. Waldheim. Yugoslavia broke with the Soviet Union and claimed a neutral position between East and West. As part of their realignment, the Yugoslavs agreed to drop their claims on Austrian territory and thus may have no longer had any interest in extraditing Mr. Waldheim or even exposing his past.

Both the Americans and the Russians were aware of Mr. Waldheim’s wartime record. Mr. Kolendic, the former Yugoslav intelligence official, told The Times in 1986 that he had handed over to a senior Soviet intelligence officer a list of “about 25 or 27” Austrians sought for war crimes, including Mr. Waldheim.

It is unclear why American intelligence officials decided not to expose Mr. Waldheim’s wartime record early in his diplomatic career. But the C.I.A.’s failure to do so aroused Congressional resentment. “We now know that our government had in its possession information and documents on Kurt Waldheim,” a bipartisan group of 59 congressmen and women wrote to President Clinton in 1998. “There is no more onerous example of the harm these hidden files can cause than the fact that Kurt Waldheim was elected Secretary-General of the United Nations while the Central Intelligence Agency concealed his wartime past.”

Mr. Waldheim became first secretary in Austria’s embassy in Paris. By 1951, he was chief of the personnel division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Gruber lost his post in 1954, but Mr. Waldheim was already cultivating another mentor and rising star in the Austrian government, Bruno Kreisky, a socialist and a Jew who had survived the war in Sweden.

In 1955, Mr. Waldheim was named Austria’s first permanent representative to the United Nations. In 1968, with Mr. Kreisky installed as Chancellor of Austria, Mr. Waldheim became his foreign minister. Soon he traveled to Belgrade, where Marshal Tito bestowed on him the Order of the Grand Cross of the Yugoslav Flag, to acknowledge his efforts to improve relations between the two countries. Mr. Waldheim was now in the singular position of having been decorated by both the Fascist wartime authorities and the postwar Communist regime in Yugoslavia.

Three years later, when U Thant stepped down as Secretary General, the United States, France, Britain and the Soviet Union backed Mr. Waldheim for the post. He became Secretary General in 1972 and won another five-year term in 1977.

Mr. Waldheim was criticized as being ineffective and too willing to cave in to pressure. Western countries complained that he had failed to pressure Vietnam to abandon its military occupation of Cambodia. The United States and Israel said he was not being even-handed in the Middle East. He endorsed Palestinian statehood without mentioning Israel’s right to exist, and when an Israeli commando unit staged its dramatic rescue of hostages at Entebbe airport in Uganda in 1976, Mr. Waldheim called the action ”a serious violation of the national sovereignty of a United Nations member state.”

Mr. Waldheim retired from the U.N. after it became clear that he had no support for his bid for a third term as Secretary General. He returned to Austria and retired from the foreign ministry in 1984.

If Mr. Waldheim had stayed away from public office at this point, it is likely that his Nazi past would have never been revealed. But in 1985, he embarked on a campaign for the largely ceremonial post of President of Austria, running as the candidate of the rightwing People’s Party.

Rival Socialist politicians began to circulate stories about Mr. Waldheim’s Nazi past, and some archival material made its way into a leading magazine, Profil. Its interest aroused, the World Jewish Congress asked Mr. Herzstein, the scholar of Nazi history, to comb the National Archives in Washington for evidence of Mr. Waldheim’s possible involvement in war crimes.

On March 4, 1986, a Times reporter, John Tagliabue, wrote an article from Vienna on documentary evidence about Mr. Waldheim’s wartime service in the Balkans and his pre-war Nazi associations. And on March 25, the congress announced Mr. Herzstein’s findings at a press conference in New York.

The revelations set off a fierce debate in Austria. Socialists tried to persuade voters that a Waldheim victory would stain Austria’s reputation abroad. But conservatives convinced much of the electorate that the accusations against Mr. Waldheim were an intolerable interference by foreigners in Austrian internal affairs. Campaign posters reflected the backlash, asserting under images of Waldheim, “Now More Than Ever.” Hate mail threatened violence against Austrian Jews if Mr. Waldheim lost.

On June 8, 1986, in a two-round election, Mr. Waldheim won the runoff for Austria’s presidency with 53.9 percent of the 4.7 million votes cast. But the controversy over his past did not subside. On April 28, 1987 the Justice Department barred Mr. Waldheim from entering the United States after determining that he had “assisted or participated in” the deportation, mistreatment and execution of civilians and Allied soldiers in World War II.

At Mr. Waldheim’s request, the Austrian government appointed a commission of historians from seven countries to investigate the accusations. On Feb. 8, 1988, the panel said it had no evidence that Mr. Waldheim was guilty of war crimes. But itconcluded that he had to have been aware of the atrocities committed around him and had done nothing about them, thereby facilitating them.

Mr. Waldheim maintained that he was guiltless. He never expressed remorse or regret for his Balkan service or for his efforts to hide it.

Mr. Waldheim did not seek a second six-year term when his presidency ended in 1992. In a 1996 autobiography, “The Answer,” he contended that his banishment from the United States had resulted from a conspiracy by American Jews, who he said had pressured the Republican administration of President Ronald Reagan to send a “useful signal” to Jewish voters in the 1988 presidential campaign.

Mr. Waldheim steadfastly portrayed himself as an ordinary citizen who had been caught up in a maelstrom.

“Waldheim was clearly not a psycopath like Dr. Josef Mengele nor a hate-filled racist like Adolf Hitler,” Mr. Herzstein wrote. ”His very ordinariness, in fact, may be the most important thing about him. For if history teaches us anything, it is that the Hitlers and the Mengeles could never have accomplished their atrocious deeds by themselves. It took hundreds of thousands of ordinary men — well-meaning but ambitious men like Kurt Waldheim — to make the Third Reich possible.”


The Skeletons of Kurt Waldheim

Kurt Waldheim, the former UN secretary general and president of Austria whose reputation was tarnished by revelations over his Nazi past, died June 14, 2007 at the age of 88.

When I met Kurt Waldheim in Vienna in 1994, the Balkans were doubly at issue, a generation apart. Though I lived in the Austrian capital, I was spending most of my time covering the brutal fighting and ethnic displacements then racking a disintegrating Yugoslavia. Waldheim had served a painful term as Austrian President, marked from beginning to end by controversy over what he had done, seen or known as a young Wehrmacht first lieutenant in Nazi-occupied Yugoslavia in 1942. When his activities there first came under scrutiny during his 1986 campaign, Waldheim, who had served two terms as U.N. Secretary-General from 1972 to 1982, had battened down the hatches, saying, "I did my duty like hundreds of thousands of Austrians" during the war. The Austrians responded by resoundingly electing him under the defiant slogan "now more than ever." But the defiance faded after early 1987, when he was barred entry to the United States and became an international pariah. After six years as a lonely captive of the Hofburg, valiantly protesting his innocence but rarely invited anywhere, he had declined to run for a second term in 1992. He would live a wealthy but constrained existence for another 15 years, until his death on Thursday.

When I went to visit Waldheim in 1994, he was ensconced in his opulent offices at the Austrian League for the United Nations — but he was still under siege. Freedom of Information Act requests had pried open the 1987 Washington report that put Waldheim on the Justice Department's "watch list." The document placed him in Banja Luka in the summer of 1942, when the Nazis had rounded up the city's Jews and the Wehrmacht was fighting an anti-partisan offensive in the Kozara Mountains to the north. Reprisal killings against civilians were part of the Germans' brutal efforts to quell armed dissent in the region. The report didn't prove any direct personal responsibility of Waldheim, who was serving as a quartermaster's deputy, but its author, Neal Sher, argued that "one doesn't have to pull the trigger to be implemented in crimes." Waldheim was having none of that: "unfounded allegations and accusations, with no proof given," he told me.

The question of guilt in a command structure is no less complex now than it was then Waldheim was no card-carrying Nazi, but he had been an officer in a unit that had a very dirty war in the Balkans. His clean-vest spiel particularly rankled me because I'd been spending a fair amount of time in Banja Luka myself. Less than a year before my interview with Waldheim, the city's principal mosque had been totally razed by Serbs, and most of the Muslim population driven out of the city. In the summer of 1992, Serbs in Banja Luka had taken me on a bizarre tour of the camps further west where they held Muslim prisoners. The cruelty of the conflict, the suffering of thousands languishing in refugee camps, had already left a permanent mark on me. Could the conflict have been any less gutting in 1942?

Apparently so, for in his memoirs — the English translation of which bears the weirdly exculpatory title In the Eye of the Storm — Waldheim had simply skipped over his three years of military service in the Balkans. I couldn't fathom how anyone's experiences in a time and place like that could fail to figure in any honest account of a life. When Waldheim made a point of showing me that he was reading Thomas Keneally's Schindler's List — the movie had been released there just a week or so before our interview — I developed a strong sense that we'd talked long enough.

The true depth of Waldheim's involvement in Banja Luka and elsewhere in the Balkans may never be known for certain. By the end of his life he'd regretted having referred to his military service there as a duty done, and he acknowledged that it was a mistake to have excised the Balkans from his memoirs. More importantly, and largely as a result of what will always be known as the Waldheim Affair, Austria finally got beyond its mythic self-image as the first victim of National Socialism and faced up to its own share of responsibility in Hitler's assault on human values. Waldheim was an ambiguous marker on that road to a broader truth.


Conclusion

The efforts of the IWG and the CIA have produced significant additions to the historical record. These declassified documents will be used for many years by scholars and others interested in the issue of war crimes and in the treatment of suspected war criminals, as well as by those interested in post-World War II intelligence activities in Europe.

The IWG's historical researchers did not find major revelations in the CIA files of the six most prominent individuals: Hitler, Barbie, Eichmann, Mengele, Mueller, and Waldheim. All of them have been the subjects of many books and articles drawn from a vast array of sources. CIA files are not fundamentally inconsistent with what responsible authors have already made known through years of intensive research and careful analysis.

At the same time, the opening of CIA records on these six men has made it possible to effectively eliminate certain suspicions, speculation, or unsupported claims about these individuals. The notion, for example, that Heinrich Mueller survived the war and became an intelligence resource for the United States government cannot survive careful scrutiny of the CIA's Mueller file. This negative finding is all the more convincing in that CIA analysts, in documents designed solely for internal use, could not themselves determine conclusively whether Mueller had died in Berlin in early May 1945.

The CIA's Counterintelligence Brief entitled "The Hunt for Gestapo Mueller," written in December 1971, includes the following observations:

Most great counterintelligence feats . are the result of dedicated and endless investigation. Such searches cost a great deal. They also tend to generate vested interests and psychological phenomena-even delusions-which can cause an operation to continue long after it should have been terminated. Officers confronted with the decision as to whether and how far to follow a given trail tend to be torn between the fear of missing a big opportunity and the fear they may be pursuing a mirage or wasting time. Others become obsessed with a search. Publicity hounds, amateur sleuths, writers, fabricators, and provocateurs in the employ of interested parties, spread rumours and confuse matters still further. Moreover, as events recede into the background of history what was (or seemed to be) self-evident to contemporaries becomes mysterious and confusing. Records disappear, memories change, and those who study the events tend to evaluate them in the modern instead of contemporary context.

The search for Mueller provides a good illustration of these phenomena, which are still pertinent to the search for Heinrich Mueller in 2001.

There is no simple explanation or single formula to explain what happened to all the individuals in the second tier discussed in this report. Their activities during the war varied greatly. Wilhelm Harster was one of the worst perpetrators of the Holocaust, for example, while Eugen Dollmann may never personally have committed a war crime. It is logical that their postwar fates would vary, and they did vary to some extent.

A substantial number of the second-tier individuals studied here, however, committed serious crimes on behalf of the Nazi regime. In the immediate postwar period most of them received light punishment or no punishment at all. Part of the reason was that American and western intelligence agencies considered them useful assets in the Cold War. The fact that the Soviet Union also used former Nazi officials to spy against the West does not justify the West's protection of actual or suspected war criminals.

Emil Augsburg's case was not an extreme one in this group. Augsburg had substantive information about Soviet intelligence activities and spoke fluent Russian and Polish. After first being hired by CIC, he became an important player in two other postwar Western intelligence organizations in spite of concerns that he had carried out war crimes and that he might be vulnerable to Soviet pressure or recruitment because of Soviet knowledge of his wartime activities. The irony was that in seeking effective intelligence assets against the Soviet Union and settling upon men such as Augsburg, the CIC, the CIA, and the Gehlen organization made the West more vulnerable to Soviet espionage.

All these individuals lacked the kind of moral and political compass that would have helped them recognize the nature of the Nazi regime and prevented them from working for it. Not surprisingly, some of them also made dubious moral and political choices in the postwar period.

This page was last reviewed on August 15, 2016.
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